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Introduction
Organizations constitute groups of individuals formed to govern and guide in-
dividual behavior; they are “a means of achieving the benefits from collective
action” (Arrow 1974, p.33). That definition does not only include firms, but
also public organizations, clubs, churches, and indeed any organized group
of people (Bernard 1938). Within those, individuals interact in a variety of
ways and are therefore strongly intertwined. They communicate, gather, and
exchange information; they collaborate, help each other, and work together
on projects; they compete for recognition, promotions, and bonuses.
It is these multi-faceted interactions that make the optimal structure of
organizations, the organizational design, a matter of vast complexity. A firm
must consider how to efficiently motivate employees, induce cooperative be-
havior, structure the decision-making process, enhance the flow of knowledge,
and much more. For that reason, the optimal “design of organizations has
become an object of inquiry” (Arrow 1964, p.398), and despite decades of re-
search numerous questions remain unanswered (Gibbons and Roberts 2012).
This dissertation contains three chapters that help to understand the op-
timal design of organizations and the behavior of individuals therein. It
provides insights and answers to (1) when and why individuals seek advice,
(2) how the design of rules affects rule adherence, and (3) how organiza-
tions optimally structure promotions and managerial decision-making. The
general approach of the dissertation is similar across all three chapters. In
each chapter, I use theoretical models to investigate individual behavior and
the impact of organizational design thereon. I rely extensively on tools and
models developed in microeconomic theory and game theory. For instance,
I analyze individual decision-making in Chapter 1 and Principal-Agent mod-
els in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 also includes results from an economic
laboratory experiment.
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Furthermore, the first and the second chapter analyze the decision problem
of an individual with reputation concerns and thus build on a large litera-
ture on signaling games, starting with Spence (1973). I follow the approach
by, e.g., Akerlof (1980), Bernheim (1994) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006);
in both chapters an individual derives additional utility from her reputation
or social image, i.e. when appearing smart (Chapter 1) or adherent to rules
(Chapter 2). Two interpretations are consistent with that approach. The first
one builds on a game theoretical argument and explains reputation utility as
a simplification of a repeated game. In that case, higher reputation increases
utility because it implies higher benefits in later periods. This interpretation
is in line with the model in Chapter 1. There employees want to impress their
supervisor, for example because a good reputation increases the chances of
getting promoted which implies higher future wages. The second interpre-
tation, based on findings in psychology and behavioral economics, explains
utility from reputation as an intrinsic preference (Bénabou and Tirole 2006).
Individuals feel better when others hold them in high regard. The model in
the second chapter follows that idea; there individuals want to be perceived
as rule-following, for instance because it is a social norm to adhere to rules
(Sunstein 1996).
All three chapters in this dissertation are single-authored and self-contained,
with separate appendices and one common bibliography at the end of the
dissertation. This introduction proceeds with an overview over the three
chapters to outline their respective motivation, intuition and main insights.
Overview
Chapter 1 relates to questions on employee cooperation and the flow of
knowledge and information in organizations. It investigates the impact of
reputation concerns and ability on an employee’s incentives to seek advice.
Advice and help are crucial for informed decision-making and efficient work;
therefore organizations put special emphasis on encouraging advice-seeking
when it is needed.
The chapter is motivated by an obstacle to advice-seeking, namely the
common intuition that “by seeking help [i.e. advice], one publicly acknowl-
edges incompetence” (Lee 2002, p.19). Following that idea, asking for advice
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reveals that the advice-seeker lacks the skills to solve a problem alone. There-
fore individuals fear for their reputation and may not ask for advice or help
when they need it. An inefficient equilibrium arises because of reputation
concerns (Levy 2004).
Yet I show that this intuition can be misleading. In a work environment,
advice helps an employee to solve a problem that jeopardizes her project
outcome. The decision to ask for advice becomes more complex because ad-
ditional effects on the employee’s work must be taken into account. This novel
approach results in three main findings that contradict the previous reasoning.
First, the incentives to seek advice partly increase with the employee’s ability.
Secondly, advice-seeking can in fact signal high ability. Thirdly, reputation
concerns can be beneficial; they increase advice-seeking in some situations.
The underlying reason for the model’s findings is a positive, indirect effect
of ability on advice-seeking that works through effort provision. First, a hard-
working employee has higher incentives to seek advice because higher work
effort raises expected benefits from a project and thus the need to solve the
project-threatening problem. Secondly, a more competent employee works
harder because ability increases the productivity of effort. Hence advice-
seeking incentives increase with the seeker’s ability. On the other hand, more
competent employees are better problem-solvers themselves and hence have
a lower need for advice which reflects the common intuition above. The
two effects thus work in opposite directions. The overall relationship between
ability and advice-seeking becomes non-monotonic. If the link between ability
and effort is sufficiently pronounced, the overall incentives to seek advice
increase with the seeker’s ability.
Moreover, I show that reputation concerns may well have a positive effect
on advice-seeking because they increase incentives to do so in some situations.
There are two reasons to that. First, if project success is associated with
high ability, reputation concerns make employees work harder. Consequently,
as effort raises the incentives to seek advice, reputation concerns increase
advice-seeking. Secondly, as outlined above, the incentives to seek advice
can be higher for more competent employees. In that case, advice-seeking
itself becomes a signal for high ability and employees start seeking advice to
increase their reputation.
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Chapter 1 suggests that the interaction between reputation and advice-
seeking is more complex than previously thought, complementing a literature
that has mainly focused on negative reputation effects of advice-seeking (Lee
2002; Levy 2004; Chandrasekhar et al. 2018). Yet the model includes these
findings, precisely because the need for advice signals a lack of problem-
solving skills and thus low ability. Further, due to the novel effort channel that
arises in work environments reputation and advice-seeking are also positively
linked. This new theoretical result is consistent with more recent evidence
that highlights a potential positive interaction (Brooks et al. 2015; Thompson
and Bolino 2018); there advice-seeking increases the seeker’s reputation.
Chapter 2 investigates the optimal design of rules that are issued to
promote prosocial behavior. That objective is especially crucial for organiza-
tions that are strongly committed to increase teamwork and cooperation. To
this end they often rely on informal rules, for example encoded in employee
handbooks or corporate statements. Rules are ubiquitous in organizations;
however, they vary widely in scope, content and effectiveness. I explore how
the design of such rules affects adherence to them. Thereby I compare the
behavior and welfare implications of two common, but very distinct rules.
The “Unconditional Rule” is universal in scope and content; it prescribes one
action regardless of circumstances (“You shall not lie”). The “Conditional
Rule” is very specific; it prescribes different actions for different situations
(“If A, then do B”).
I claim that the Conditional Rule can lead to less rule-following and lower
welfare than the Unconditional Rule. That finding hinges on the existence
of selfish individuals who want to be perceived as “good people”, i.e. ad-
herent to rules. It is known from previous literature that those individuals
act more selfishly when their actions’ observability decreases in a so-called
“moral wiggle room” (Dana et al. 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). I first
show theoretically that a similar mechanism results in less adherence to the
Conditional Rule.
Since the Unconditional Rule prescribes only one action there is no un-
certainty regarding an individual’s intentions; hence if image concerns are
sufficiently pronounced, even selfish individuals will follow the rule. The Con-
ditional Rule, however, prescribes different actions for different situations. In
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an uncertain world, one can never be sure about an individual’s intentions;
either she acted selfishly on purpose, or she is a rule-follower who received
a misleading signal. Therefore the observability of individual behavior de-
creases under the Conditional Rule. As a result, selfish, image-concerned
individuals can break the rule and nonetheless maintain a positive image. A
trade-off between the two rules emerges; the Unconditional Rule is inefficient
in some situations, but followed by everyone, while the Conditional Rule is
efficient in all situations, but only followed by individuals who always follow
rules. Consequently the Unconditional Rule leads to higher welfare if too
many people are indeed selfish in spirit.
Further I present results from a laboratory experiment to investigate rule-
following behavior (i.e. contributions in a public goods game) under the two
rules described above. The experiment shows that subjects tend to follow
the rules. Furthermore, a moral wiggle room exists since selfish actions are
deemed socially less inappropriate under the Conditional Rule. Nonetheless I
do not find general differences in contribution behavior between the two rules.
Yet the results also indicate that selfish subjects act more selfishly under the
Conditional Rule if incentives to do so are sufficiently strong. In conclusion,
the experimental evidence regarding moral wiggle rooms and behavior under
rules remains inconclusive (in line with conflicting findings by Dana et al.
2007, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009 and van der Weele et al. 2014). Future
research on the existence, reasons and implications of moral wiggle rooms is
hence needed.
Chapter 3 directly deals with how to design an organization. More
specifically, it investigates how a firm should optimally design its promotion
rules and structure its decision-making process. It is concerned with the
effects of promotions that are based on employee performance. In general,
those promotions have two objectives, namely to motivate employees and to
select good managers. However, empirical evidence by Benson et al. (2018)
suggests that performance-based promotions in fact fail their second objective
and select bad managers. This result resembles the “Peter Principle” (Peter
and Hull 1969); promotions seem to promote the wrong employees. In this
chapter I theoretically explain how such promotion policies can emerge from
optimal organizational design.
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The model is based on two premises. First, managers extract private ben-
efits when they make decisions, at the firm’s expense. Secondly, individuals
differ in the amount of benefits they extract. Since performance-based pro-
motions give rise to potential private benefits in the future, they motivate
employees to work hard. However, due to the heterogeneity in benefit ex-
traction employees are motivated differently by promotion prospects. Those
employees who, as managers, extract more private benefits and decrease firm
profits work harder and are thus more likely to get promoted.
Therefore performance-based promotions have two counteracting effects.
They increase profits by motivating employees but the subsequent bad se-
lection of managers has negative implications for firm profits. That trade-off
affects the optimal design of organizations. I show that the joint use of partial
delegation and performance-based promotions can be optimal. The principal
uses promotions to motivate employees; however, he restricts a manager’s de-
cision rights to limit the private benefits extracted by the manager. Thereby
he limits (a) the likelihood of promoting the “wrong” employee and (b) re-
duces the profit losses from the manager’s rent extraction. Yet a negative
selection effect still arises and the wrong employee is promoted with a higher
probability. Chapter 3 complements a literature on the (negative) selection
effects of promotions which focuses on skill-based explanations (Bernhardt
1995; Fairburn and Malcomson 2001); there performance-based promotions
result in managers with wrong or worse skills. In contrast, I explain negative
selection effects as an immediate consequence of performance-based promo-
tions. They arise solely from the preference misalignment between manager
and firm, and not the manager’s skills.
In conclusion, this dissertation contains three contributions on the optimal
design of organizations and its implications on individual behavior, in three
distinct settings. It offers new insights into the mechanics behind the decision
to seek advice, the optimality of rules to enhance prosocial behavior and the
optimal design of promotion rules and delegation of authority.
Chapter 1
Advice-Seeking and Reputation
1.1 Introduction
“[H]elp seekers need help because of their inability to solve prob-
lems and find solutions on their own (...)”
“By seeking help, one publicly acknowledges incompetence, in-
feriority, and dependence in front of another person, which can
be highly threatening to one’s public impressions within organiza-
tional settings.”
Lee (2002, p. 18/19)
Advice and help from other people are crucial for decision-making because
an advisor can provide important information that the advice-seeker lacks.
Indeed, advice and information lead to better decision-making, higher perfor-
mance and higher profits.1 But despite its positive effects individuals often
refrain from actively asking for advice because they fear appearing incompe-
tent (DePaulo and Fisher 1980). Accordingly, students do not ask for help
from their teachers when they need it (Ryan et al. 2001). Employees do not
seek advice either (Lee 1997), nor do they accept help that is offered to them
(Thompson and Bolino 2018).
1For example, they improve financial decisions (Duflo and Saez 2003), educational choices
(Jensen 2010), labor market outcomes (Altmann et al. 2018), creativity (Mueller and
Kamdar 2011), and performance in experiments (Schotter 2003) as well as organizations
(Podsakoff et al. 2009; Thompson and Bolino 2018).
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A fear of reputation loss creates a tension between helpful advice-seeking
and a high reputation. As Lee (2002) suggests, common intuition is that one
only needs advice because of an inability to solve problems alone, which in
turn implies low competence. Consequently, if a person is not seeking advice
they signal not needing advice, and thus high competence. Given sufficiently
strong reputation concerns, only those (incompetent) individuals with a very
strong need for advice seek it. An inefficient separating equilibrium emerges as
reputation concerns prevent people from seeking helpful advice (Levy 2004).
But this intuition is simplistic, for two reasons; first, reputation is built
on more factors than only the decision to seek advice. For example, a teacher
evaluates his students not only on whether they have asked for help, but
on their exam performances. Similarly, an employee is assessed mainly on
the basis of his or her (un)successful work. Secondly, this reasoning does not
consider how the benefits of advice change with the advice-seeker’s ability. For
example competent students may study harder and thus benefit more from
their teacher’s help. In such environments advice-seekers must thus consider
the joint effects of advice-seeking on their reputation, work performance and
the interaction thereof. Consequently, the relationship between ability and
advice-seeking becomes more nuanced than suggested.
This chapter explores the relationship between advice-seeking and rep-
utation concerns in a work environment. I ask how advice-seeking and an
employee’s work effort interact and under what circumstances the employee
seeks advice. Furthermore, the triangular relationship between ability, advice
and effort is examined. I investigate whether the common intuition still holds
true that only individuals with low ability need and thus seek advice. Lastly,
I evaluate how reputation concerns and advice-seeking interact. Do reputa-
tion concerns necessarily prevent individuals from seeking helpful advice or
are there positive reputation effects that eventually increase advice-seeking?
In search of answers, I model the decision problem of an agent who works
on a project. At some point, a problem may appear which jeopardizes the
project. To solve the problem the agent follows a step-by-step procedure.
First, she tries to solve the problem on her own. If failing, she faces the
decision of either (costly) seeking advice which solves the problem or trying
to solve the problem on her own a second time. Ultimately, an unsolved
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problem leads to project failure; if the problem is solved, the project outcome
depends on previous work effort.
The setup results in a complementarity between advice-seeking and effort
provision. First, advice increases the productivity of effort and has a motivat-
ing effect on the agent. Without advice the problem may remain unsolved and
all effort will be in vain. Hence, advice effectively “restores” previous work
by solving the problem with certainty. Therefore, an agent who seeks advice
works harder. Vice versa, higher effort increases the incentives to seek advice
because it improves the chances of a successful project and thus the expected
benefits from solving the problem increase. As advice affects the probability
of problem-solving higher effort induces stronger incentives to seek advice.
Furthermore, I find that the relationship between ability and advice in-
volves two counteracting effects that arise from a positive correlation between
ability and problem-solving skills. First, a competent agent is less likely to
need advice because of higher problem-solving skills. Therefore, higher abil-
ity means less advice-seeking. On the other hand, higher problem-solving
skills also imply higher productivity of effort. Hence, competent agents work
harder and as effort increases the incentives to seek advice, their likelihood
to do so increases. Taken together, there are two counteracting forces. While
the direct effect of ability on advice-seeking is negative, the indirect effect via
effort provision implies a positive impact of ability on advice-seeking.
Who ultimately seeks advice depends on the relative strength of the two
effects. If the complementarity between advice and effort is particularly pro-
nounced, an “intermediate sorting” equilibrium arises. In that case, very
competent agents refrain from seeking advice because they have a high prob-
ability of solving problems on their own. Also very incompetent agents do not
seek advice because their likelihood to need advice and thus bear additional
advice-seeking costs is too high. For them, it is more profitable to work little
and not seek advice. Therefore, only agents with intermediate ability seek
advice.
Most empirical studies have focused solely on the negative relationship
between ability and advice-seeking, investigating the seeker’s fear of appear-
ing incompetent (DePaulo and Fisher 1980; Ashford and Northcraft 1992; Lee
1997) and consequences in advice-seeking behavior (Lee 2002; Chandrasekhar
et al. 2018). In contrast, some researchers investigate actual consequences on
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the seeker’s reputation than just his beliefs, and find different results. In
a series of lab experiments, Brooks et al. (2015) show that advisors have a
higher perception of a subject’s competence if they are asked for advice, in
particular in difficult tasks. The result also applies when the advisors are
given information about the subject’s prior performance. In a survey study,
Thompson and Bolino (2018) find that employees’ negative beliefs about ac-
cepting help from co-workers is correlated with lower performance evaluations
by their supervisors. Thus, accepting help implies higher reputation. Relat-
edly, Yoon et al. (2019) find that requesting time extensions for project work
does not harm employees’ reputation although the employees think so and
thus refrain from requests for time extensions. These findings are consistent
with a more nuanced relationship between ability and advice as it is outlined
in this paper.
Therefore it is natural to re-examine the role of reputation concerns in
advice-seeking decisions. Interestingly, I find a broader spectrum of equilib-
ria than previous models. Indeed, my model incorporates negative effects
of reputation as in Levy (2004) and Chandrasekhar et al. (2018), because
agents fear signaling incompetence by seeking advice. However I also present
equilibria in which reputation concerns induce more people to seek advice.
In this case, reputation concerns increase advice-seeking. The result
emerges from two distinct mechanisms. First, reputation is built on more
factors than just the decision to seek advice, for instance because it is also
affected by the project outcome. If project success is associated with high
ability, everyone works harder to signal competence. Due to the complemen-
tarity between effort and advice, the incentives to seek advice increase. Sec-
ondly, reputation concerns can increase advice-seeking because advice-seeking
signals high ability. That finding is in direct contrast to the general fear of
losing reputation when asking for advice. Its intuition relies on the afore-
mentioned result that advice-seeking can increase with ability. If competent
agents generally benefit more from advice-seeking but costs are too high, rep-
utation concerns can be beneficial. If advice-seeking is a signal for high ability
reputation concerns induce competent agents to seek advice. However they
are not sufficiently pronounced to induce incompetent agents to seek advice;
hence a separating equilibrium emerges, consistent with positive reputation
effects of advice-seeking.
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The model does not only account for the variety of empirical findings
regarding advice-seeking, it is also applicable to a variety of different environ-
ments. As a leading example, I present the model in a work environment. The
agent first works on a project when a problem may appear. If that is the case
the agent can ask her supervisor for advice. However, the model also captures
other circumstances such as a student who is preparing for her exam. Here
comprehension problems can occur that threaten a successful exam, and then
the student must ask her teacher for help. In that setting, the model finds
that a teacher’s accessibility will improve student performance. The teacher’s
help increases the probability of success by providing help and motivating his
students to study harder. That intuition mirrors existing empirical evidence
in education research (Zepke and Leach 2010; Johnson and LaBelle 2017)
Related Literature. Unlike in other social sciences, advice-seeking has
received little attention in economics, with aforementioned exemptions of
Levy (2004) and Chandrasekhar et al. (2018). Economists have been primar-
ily interested in advice-taking and how advice influences decisions.2 Therefore
this work relates mostly to research on advice-seeking from psychology and
management. I will provide a thorough overview over the advice-seeking lit-
erature in Section 1.5, after presenting the model and its results.
This work also relates to the literature on social image and reputation
concerns. Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) provide an excellent overview over its
empirical relevance. For theoretical work on that topic, I refer the interested
reader to Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008).
Advice-seeking is closely related to other concepts such as information-
seeking, help-seeking and feedback-seeking. Thus, I like to clarify the inter-
pretation of advice in the model. Advice enters the model in reduced form;
it plainly solves a problem with certainty. To leave room for different in-
terpretations of the advising process, the underlying problem-solving process
is not modeled. For example, the advisor may literally advise (i.e. suggest
a course of action that is then undertaken by the seeker), provide firsthand
help (i.e. solve the problem himself) or give information to the seeker that
2Schotter (2003) provides an overview over four experimental studies on the effects of
advice on individual behavior in the lab. Other work includes Croson and Marks (2001),
Chaudhuri et al. (2008), and Brandts et al. (2015). For an overview of organizational
psychology research on the effects of advice-taking, see Bonaccio and Dalal (2006).
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helps to find a solution. Consequently, advice-seeking can also be interpreted
as help-seeking or information-seeking and I sometimes use the terms help
and advice interchangeably. Such interpretation is in line with the current
literature (Brooks et al. 2015; van der Rijt et al. 2013). Yet it should be
noted that the model does not capture the related subject of feedback-seeking.
Feedback-seeking (Ashford and Cummings 1983) describes proactive search
for information on previous performance and is not tied to a specific problem
(van der Rijt et al. 2013). Even though reputation concerns also arise in such
decisions, feedback-seeking is distinctive to the setting investigated here.
The chapter unfolds as follows. In Section 1.2 the model is introduced
and the decision to seek advice is analyzed. Section 1.3 focuses exclusively on
how the agent’s ability affects her advice-seeking decision. Reputation con-
cerns are introduced in Section 1.4. I first generally examine how reputation
concerns affect the decision to seek advice before analyzing the relationship
between reputation and advice-seeking in equilibrium. Section 1.5 contains
an extended discussion. First, I discuss the main results in light of related
literature as well as further implications that arise from the model. Sec-
ondly, I discuss open questions regarding advice-seeking in general. Section
1.6 concludes.
1.2 A Model of Advice-Seeking
I consider the decision problem of one risk-neutral agent (she) in a work
environment. The agent faces two decisions, (1) how much effort e ∈ [0, 1]
to provide, and (2) whether to seek advice or not. The latter decision is
described by a ∈ {A, N} where a = A denotes advice-seeking.
The agent works on one project. A successful project has a value of v for
the agent. If the project fails, the agent receives 0. At t = 1, she privately
chooses an effort level e ∈ [0, 1]. e determines the project’s success probability
via prob(success|e) = e and comes at costs ce
2
e2 with ce > 0.
After the agent has chosen an effort level, a problem occurs with proba-
bility π at t = 2. If the problem is still unsolved when the project outcome is
realized, the project fails with certainty. If the problem is solved by then, it is
as if it never occurred and the project’s success probability is still determined
by previous effort provision e.
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Problem-Solving (II)
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t
Figure 1.1: Advice-Seeking and Reputation - Timeline of the Model
In case a problem occurs, the agent first tries to solve the problem on her
own at t = 2.5. Let λ ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that she fails and the
problem remains unsolved.3
Given that she fails, advice is available with probability α ∈ [0, 1] at
t = 3. If the agent seeks advice (a = A) she incurs advice-seeking costs of
cA > 0. Advice solves the problem with certainty. If the problem is unsolved
at t = 3.5, because of not having sought advice or its unavailability, the agent
tries to solve the problem a second time. Again, with probability λ she fails
and the problem remains unsolved.
At t = 4 the game ends, the project outcome is realized and payoffs
are made. If the problem is still unsolved, the agent receives a payoff of
0. If the problem has not occurred or was solved the project is successful
with probability e, yielding a payoff of v and 0 otherwise. The model’s full
timeline is depicted in Figure 1.1. Since this constitutes a one-player game
with complete information, I employ the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
as solution concept.
1.2.1 Advice-Seeking without Reputation Concerns
Let superscript A denote actions and utilities of an agent who seeks advice
and N of an agent who does not. Call eA the equilibrium effort provided by an
advice-seeking agent, and eN accordingly. Then, any subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in which the agent seeks advice is defined by the following two
conditions. First, at the effort stage the agent provides effort eA. Secondly,
at the advice stage the agent prefers advice-seeking over no advice-seeking,
given the previous effort choice eA.
3Similar to its use in physics and engineering, λ thus describes the “failure rate” of an
agent.
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Formally the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the agent seeks
advice is hence characterized by
EuAt3(e
A) ≥ EuNt3(eA) and EuAt1(eA) ≥ EuNt1(eN). (1.1)
Likewise, the no-advice-seeking subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is charac-
terized by EuAt3(e
N) ≤ EuNt3(eN) and EuAt1(eA) ≤ EuNt1(eN).
The game is solved by backward induction. First, consider the advice
stage, t = 3. Given effort e the agent receives an expected utility of EuAt3 =
e · v − cA if she seeks advice. If she does not, expected utility is given by
EuNt3 = (1 − λ) · (e · v) + λ · 0. Thus, at the advice stage the agent trades
off expected benefits from advice-seeking e · λv against certain costs cA. She
seeks advice if and only if
e · λv ≥ cA. (1.2)
Advice-seeking changes the probability of success. If an agent does not seek
advice, the project is successful with probability (1 − λ) · e. Advice-seeking
then increases the probability of success to 1 · e. That increase in expected
utility, relative to the costs of advice-seeking, is captured in Equation (1.2).
At the effort stage, t = 1, the agent chooses an effort level e. In equi-
librium, the agent anticipates her future advice-seeking choice. Thus, there
are two optimal effort levels eA and eN , associated with anticipated advice-
seeking and no advice-seeking in t = 3. Given that the agent seeks advice,
she maximizes expected utility over e at t = 1 to find eA:
max
e
EuAt1 =(1 − πλ)ev + πλ · [α(ev − cA) + (1 − α)(1 − λ)ev] −
ce
2
e2
=
(
1 − (1 − α)πλ2
)
ev − ce
2
e2 − πλα · cA. (1.3)
The optimal effort when not seeking advice, eN , is derived similarly:
max
e
EuNt1 =(1 − πλ)ev + πλ · (1 − λ)ev −
ce
2
e2
=
(
1 − πλ2
)
ev − ce
2
e2. (1.4)
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The optimal effort levels are then given by
eA =
(1 − (1 − α)πλ2) v
ce
and eN =
(1 − πλ2) v
ce
. (1.5)
The comparative statics are straightforward. If a problem is not solved until
the end of the game the project fails with certainty and all effort was in vain.
Therefore, effort productivity decreases with the overall probability of not
solving an occurring problem, given by the joint probability of a problem
arising, π, and failing to solve the problem twice, λ2. As a consequence,
effort provision is decreasing in π and λ. Moreover, if the agent wants to seek
advice the problem remains unsolved only if no advice is available. Hence, eA
is increasing in α and advice-seeking effort is more productive for any positive
probability of receiving advice, i.e. α > 0.
Lemma 1.1 shows the motivating effect of advice. Advice-seeking itself as
well as the availability of advice increase effort provision. As advice increases
chances of being successful, it motivates the agent to work hard if she seeks
(and receives) advice if needed.
Lemma 1.1.
(1) An agent who seeks advice exerts higher effort than an agent who does
not seek advice.
(2) Effort provision of an advice-seeking agent is increasing in the availability
of advice.
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1.1 is built on two observations that follow from (1.5). The first
statement follows from eA > eN ∀α > 0. The second statement follows from
∂eA
∂α
> 0 ∀α < 1. Because eN is independent of α, Lemma 1.1 also implies
that the effort increase due to advice-seeking, i.e. eA − eN , is increasing in
the availability of advice.
I proceed with the equilibrium analysis. Proposition 1.1 states the neces-
sary and sufficient condition that determines advice-seeking in equilibrium.
Chapter 1. Advice-Seeking and Reputation 16
Proposition 1.1.
In the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, an agent seeks advice if and
only if
(2 − (2 − α)πλ2) v
2ce
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effort Effect
· λv
︸︷︷︸
Advice Effect
≥ cA. (Condition I)
The agent does not seek advice if and only if the inequality is reversed.
Proof. For a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with advice-seeking, there are two
conditions: EuAt3(e
A) ≥ EuNt3(eA) and EuAt1(eA) ≥ EuNt1(eN ). The first condition
can be re-written as e · λv ≥ cA, see Equation (1.2). Expected utilities at t = 1
for the second condition are given by Equations (1.3) and (1.4). Plugging in the
optimal effort levels given by Equation (1.5), I can re-write the two conditions as
EuAt3(e
A) ≥ EuNt3(eA) ⇔
(
1 − (1 − α)πλ2
)
v
ce
· λv ≥ cA (1.6)
EuAt1(e
A) ≥ EuNt1(eN ) ⇔
((
1 − (1 − α) πλ2
)
v
)2
2ce
− πλαcA ≥
((
1 − πλ2
)
v
)2
2ce
. (1.7)
First, simple mathematical reformulation yields (2− (2−2α)πλ2) ·λv2 −2cecA ≥ 0
and απλ ·
(
(2 − (2 − α)πλ2)λv2 − 2cecA
)
≥ 0. That implies that Condition I is
equivalent to the second condition and implies the first condition. Therefore it
is necessary and sufficient. For the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with no
advice-seeking, the proof is similar and thus omitted here.
To ease understanding, Condition I is decomposed into two effects. They
show how expected benefits are formed by advice-seeking at the different
stages of the game. The Advice Effect displays the gain from advice-seeking
at t = 3. To see that, compare Condition I to Equation (1.2). An agent seeks
advice if and only if e ·λv ≥ cA. Here λv states the increase in expected bene-
fits due to advice seeking. This is because the project can only be successful if
the problem was solved before. While without advice-seeking the problem is
solved with probability (1−λ), advice solves the problem with certainty. The
same intuition holds for the Advice Effect. It emphasizes the utility increase
due to advice-seeking as advice solves the advice-seeker’s problem.
The Effort Effect describes how the advice-seeking decision is shaped by
effort considerations. It shows the complementarity between advice and ef-
fort that builds on Lemma 1.1. For illustration, the Effort Effect can be
re-written as (2−(2−α)πλ
2)v
2ce
= eN + e
A−eN
2
. It becomes apparent that the Ef-
fort Effect is increasing in eA and eN and higher effort provision raises the
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incentives to seek advice. This is because advice-seeking “restores” effort by
solving the problem. Hence, higher effort increases expected benefits from
problem-solving, and thus advice-seeking. The Effort Effect further shows
the motivating effect of advice-seeking, i.e. e
A−eN
2
, and its positive effect on
expected utility. The associated increase in expected utility due to higher
effort provision is adjusted by the costs of effort and divided in half.4
In Condition I, expected benefits are compared to costs of advice-seeking,
given by cA. Note that if cA = 0, i.e. if advice is costless, the agent al-
ways seeks advice. However, there exist manifold reasons for positive advice-
seeking costs, for instance opportunity costs or search costs to find suitable
helpers (Hofmann et al. 2009).
1.2.2 Comparative Statics
The Effect of Advice Availability α. An increase in advice availability
increases advice-seeking since the left-hand side of Condition I increases with
α. This is due to the Effort Effect. Lemma 1.1 shows that the difference
in effort provision, eA − eN , is increasing in advice availability. If advice
becomes more likely effort productivity increases. Hence the availability of
advice increases effort provision and ultimately the incentives to seek advice.
The Effect of Problem Probability π. The effect of a higher problem
probability on advice-seeking is negative since the left-hand side of Condition
I decreases with π. Again, the intuition comes from the Effort Effect. A higher
problem probability demotivates the agent (and thus decreases both eA and
eN). Therefore, at the advice stage the agent has little at stake because the
probability of project success is low. Consequently incentives to seek advice
decrease with π.
The comparative statics with respect to λ, the probability of solving prob-
lems, are investigated in more detail in the next section. Further assuming
a positive correlation between λ and the agent’s ability allows for a better
interpretation of the problem-solving process.
4This is an immediate consequence of the model’s functional forms, i.e. the linear success
probability and convex costs.
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1.3 Who Seeks Advice? The Role of Ability
I impose that higher ability correlates with better problem solving skills.5
Denote θ as the agent’s ability. Let λ = λ(θ) ∈ [0, 1] be decreasing in θ, i.e.
∂λ(θ)
∂θ
< 0. Hence if ability θ increases, the probability of solving a problem,
i.e. 1 − λ, is increasing as well. Due to the one-to-one relationship between
θ and λ and for notational ease, I will drop θ and refer to the agent’s type
merely as λ. It is important to note that a high λ corresponds to low ability,
and vice versa.
In what follows I first analyze how expected benefits from advice-seeking
are affected by the agent’s ability in Lemma 1.2. In fact, I show that that
the relationship between advice-seeking and ability is non-monotonic.
Lemma 1.2.
Define f(λ) := (2 − (2 − α)πλ2)λv2 − 2cecA. f(λ) is concave in λ, with
λ =
√
2
3(2−α)π
as its unique global maximum.
(a) If λ < λ, the expected gains from advice-seeking decrease with ability,
i.e. ∂f(λ)
∂λ
> 0.
(b) If λ > λ, the expected gains from advice-seeking increase with ability,
i.e. ∂f(λ)
∂λ
< 0.
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.1.
To understand why expected benefits from advice-seeking are concave
in λ, first note that f(λ) is a re-formulation of Condition I. If and only if
f(λ) ≥ 0, the expected net benefits from advice-seeking are positive. Hence,
I can analyze the relationship between ability and advice by examining the
functional form of f(λ). As f is concave in λ so are expected benefits from
advice-seeking. For the intuition, I examine the impact of λ on the Advice
Effect and the Effort Effect separately.
A higher λ, i.e. lower ability, increases the Advice Effect. If λ increases,
the probability to solve a problem after not seeking advice decreases. Hence,
5That assumption is consistent with the definition of ability or competence in psychology.
Gardner (1983, p.13) argues that “a human intellectual competence must entail a set
of skills of problem solving — enabling the individual to resolve genuine problems or
difficulties that he or she encounters and, when appropriate, to create an effective product
(...)”.
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the relative benefits of seeking advice increase in λ. Individuals with low
ability who are bad at solving problems gain more from seeking advice. It
follows that the Advice Effect captures a negative effect of ability on the
incentives to seek advice.
On the other hand, a higher λ decreases effort provision. This is because
agents with high ability are more likely to solve the problem on their own.
Therefore, their expected productivity of effort is higher and thus high ability
types work harder. On the opposite, agents with low ability have a higher
likelihood of project failure because of an unsolved problem. In that case,
all effort was in vain. Agents with a low ability are demotivated by this
prospect and exert lower effort. Therefore ability has a positive effect on
effort provision. Condition I shows a complementarity between effort and
advice. Consequently, since ability increases effort provision and higher effort
makes advice-seeking more profitable the Effort Effect captures an indirect
positive effect of ability on the incentives to seek advice.
Thus, the impact of λ on advice-seeking consists of two counteracting
forces. The Advice Effect induces a negative effect of ability on advice-seeking
via problem solving. It captures the common intuition that individuals with a
lower ability are more likely to seek advice because they cannot solve problems
on their own due to their low ability. Thus, they have a higher demand for
advice. Secondly, the Effort Effect provides a foundation for a positive effect
of ability on advice-seeking via effort provision.
Both effects taken together result in a concave relationship between ability
and advice. The Effort Effect gives a natural “upper bound” to the negative
impact of ability on advice-seeking incentives that arises from the Advice Ef-
fect. How behavior is ultimately affected by the agent’s ability then hinges
upon the relative strengths of the two effects. Before proceeding with Propo-
sition 1.2 that summarizes all potential advice-seeking equilibria, I state in
Lemma 1.3 that for any advice-seeking to take place, its costs must be suffi-
ciently low.
Lemma 1.3.
If cA > cA =
2v2
3ce
, the agent never seeks advice regardless of her type.
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.1.
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The intuition is straightforward. If costs of advice-seeking are too high the
agent never has an incentive to seek advice at t = 3. Lemma 1.3 gives an
upper bound cA to those advice-seeking costs. If they exceed cA, even the
maximum expected benefits from advice-seeking are not sufficient to induce
any type to seek advice. With that observation, I turn to the effects of ability
on advice-seeking in equilibrium. To this end it is useful to define λ1 and λ2
as the positive roots of f(λ) = (2 − (2 − α)πλ2)λv2 − 2cecA, if they exist.
Proposition 1.2.
Suppose cA ≤ cA. There exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
which the agent exerts effort according to (1.5) and her advice-seeking behavior
is as follows.
(a) “Negative sorting”: If π ≤ 2(v2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
, an agent of type λ seeks advice if
and only if
λ1 ≤ λ ≤ 1. (1.8)
(b) “Intermediate sorting”: If 2(v
2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
< π ≤ 2
3(2−α)
( 2v
2
3cecA
)2, an agent of
type λ seeks advice if and only if
λ1 ≤ λ ≤ λ2 < 1. (1.9)
(c) “No Advice-Seeking”: If 2
3(2−α)
( 2v
2
3cecA
)2 < π, the agent never seeks advice
regardless of her type.
Proof. Recall f(λ) := ((2 − (2 − α)πλ2)λv2) − 2cecA with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, if and
only if f(λ) ≥ 0, Condition I holds. Therefore I am interested in the roots of f(λ).
First, note that at λ = 0, f(λ) = −2cecA < 0 and f ′(λ) = 2v2 > 0. Therefore,
no advice-seeking takes place at λ = 0. Secondly, note that if f(λ) < 0, there
is no advice-seeking because even the type with the highest benefits from advice-
seeking, λ, does not seek advice. Using λ =
√
2
3(2−α)π , f(λ) < 0 gives an upper
bound π = 23(2−α)(
2v2
3cecA
)2 on the problem probability. Only if the probability of a
problem arising is sufficiently low, i.e. if π ≤ π, advice-seeking may take place.
Keeping that in mind, turn to the analysis of f(λ)’s roots. Due to the concavity
of f and f(0) < 0, there are between zero and two roots for f . Remember that λ1
and λ2 denote f ’s potential roots, with λ1 < λ2.
First, I investigate the case of zero roots. Because f is concave in λ and
f(λ = 0) < 0 it is apparent that f has zero roots if at λ = 1 it is negative but still
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increasing. Therefore, f has zero roots if f(λ = 1) < 0 and f ′(λ = 1) > 0. We
can rewrite these conditions as π > 2(v
2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
and π < 23(2−α) . In that case, f has
never crossed the abscissa, therefore f(λ) < 0 ∀λ and no agent ever seeks advice.
f has one root if and only if f(λ = 1) ≥ 0. Then, f has crossed the abscissa
only once, at λ1. We can rewrite this condition as π ≤ 2(v
2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
. In this case,
it holds that f(λ) < 0 for λ < λ1 and f(λ) ≥ 0 for λ ≥ λ1. This corresponds
to a “negative sorting” equilibrium. Only types with sufficiently low ability that
corresponds with a sufficiently high λ seek advice.
There are two roots if, at λ = 1 f is negative but decreasing and f(λ) > 0. The
last condition will be examined at the end of the proof, for now suppose it holds
true. The first two conditions are captured by f(λ = 1) ≤ 0 and f ′(λ = 1) < 0. We
can rewrite these conditions as π ≥ 2(v2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
and π > 23(2−α) . In this case, f(λ) > 0
if and only if λ1 ≤ λ ≤ λ2 ≤ 1. This corresponds to the “intermediate sorting”
equilibrium. Only types of an intermediate λ that corresponds with λ1 ≤ λ ≤ λ2
seek advice.
Together with π ≤ π = 23(2−α)( 2v
2
3cecA
)2, I can summarize as follows.
(1) There is no advice-seeking if π > π or 2(v
2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
< π < 23(2−α) .
(2) There is advice-seeking for all λ ≥ λ1 if π ≤ min
{
2(v2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
, π
}
.
(3) There is advice-seeking for all λ ∈ [λ1, λ2] if max
{
2(v2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
, 23(2−α)
}
< π < π.
As a next step, c < cA implies
2v2
3cecA
> 1. Therefore, 2/3(2−α) < (2v2/3cecA)2 ·
(2/3(2 − α)) = π. Hence, the second condition of case (1) is unfeasible and the
condition on case (3) can be simplified to 2(v
2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
< π ≤ 23(2−α)( 2v
2
3cecA
)2, as stated
in Proposition 1.2.
Secondly, f(λ = 1) > 0 implies f(λ) > 0. Therefore, π ≤ 2(v2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
implies π <
2
3(2−α)(
2v2
3cecA
)2 = π. It follows that 2(v
2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
< π. That simplifies the condition in
the second case to π ≤ 2(v2−cecA)
(2−α)v2
, as stated in Proposition 1.2.
The expected net benefits of advice-seeking are sketched in Figure 1.2
and illustrated by f(λ). Condition I holds if and only if f(λ) ≥ 0 because
f(λ) is a re-formulation of it. To examine the influence between ability and
advice-seeking, I focus on how f(λ) reacts to changes in λ as displayed in
Figure 1.2. Furthermore, recall the negative relationship between ability and
the probability of not solving the problem, λ. The closer λ is to zero, the
higher the agent’s ability.
First, Figure 1.2 shows that agents with a very high ability (low λ) do
not seek advice as f(λ) is negative. For them, it is never worthwhile to seek
advice because their probability of solving the problem alone is sufficiently
high. Therefore, they never have an incentive to bear the costs of advice-
seeking cA. Secondly, all graphs are concave in λ. As discussed before, that
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Figure 1.2: The Influence of Ability on Advice-Seeking
Note: This is an illustration of Proposition 1.2. Note that ability increases as λ decreases
as displayed by the dashed arrow.
concavity hinges on the relative size of the Advice Effect and the Effort Effect;
the stronger the Effort Effect, the more the advice-seeking incentives react to
changes in ability. Proposition 1.2 gives conditions on the relative size of the
Effort Effect in terms of the problem probability, π. Thus π determines what
equilibrium emerges. To see why, note that it has two effects on the decision
to seek advice. First, it decreases the Effort Effect as a higher problem prob-
ability decreases incentives to exert high effort (see Lemma 1.1). Secondly, it
increases the marginal effect of ability on the Effort Effect.
Figure 1.2 presents the three potential equilibria described in Proposition
1.1. In Figure 1.2a, π is relatively small and only types with a sufficiently
low ability seek advice. Note that a small problem probability π implies
that the absolute size of the Effort Effect is high and so are the incentives
to seek advice. Therefore, the advice-seeking threshold λ1 is relatively low.
Furthermore, a small π also implies that ability only weakly affects effort,
displayed as the low marginal effect of λ on the slope of f(λ). Therefore,
the positive effect of ability on advice via effort provision is not particularly
pronounced. As a result, the (negative) impact of ability on advice-seeking
via the Advice Effect becomes superior. Hence, the incentives to seek advice
monotonically increase with λ and the negative sorting equilibrium arises.
Only low ability types (with λ ≥ λ1) seek advice.
In Figure 1.2b, π is intermediate. Compared to Figure 1.2a, the absolute
size of the Effort Effect has decreased as effort is reduced when π increases.
Therefore, the agent’s demand for advice must increase to make her seek
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advice. Consequently, the threshold λ1 increases compared to Figure 1.2a. A
higher π also results in a stronger positive effect of ability on advice-seeking
incentives. Therefore, the Effort Effect decreases strongly if λ increases and
the positive effect is superior for all λ > λ. In that case, the incentive to
seek advice decreases with λ; thus a very incompetent agent (λ > λ2) has no
incentive to seek advice. The intermediate sorting equilibrium emerges.
In Figure 1.2c, π is very high. As a consequence, the agent is strongly
demotivated to exert effort because of the likely prospect of project failure,
irrespective of her ability. Therefore, the absolute value of the Effort Effect
is very low and at the advice stage, no type is willing to bear the costs of
seeking advice. Hence the no advice-seeking equilibrium arises.
To sum up, the effect of ability on advice-seeking is two-fold. On the one
hand, the most competent individuals have no incentive to seek advice be-
cause they are sufficiently good at problem-solving themselves. Yet, as ability
decreases the incentives to do so increases. On the other hand, as outlined in
this section, effort decreases with ability which leads to a counteracting effect.
Three equilibria may emerge: negative sorting, intermediate sorting and no
advice-seeking. That finding also changes the role of reputation concerns; if
mainly high types seek advice, reputation concerns may induce others to seek
advice as well.
1.4 Who Seeks Advice? The Role of Reputa-
tion
Reputation concerns affect voting behavior, educational choices, effort in the
workplace or financial investments (for an overview, see Bursztyn and Jensen
2017). Ample evidence further emphasizes its importance in the advice-
seeking decision. Indeed, people fear a reputation loss because of signaling
incompetence when asking for advice (Lee 2002). This idea is in line with
the previously found negative sorting equilibrium. Since the Advice Effect is
particularly pronounced, only agents with low ability seek advice. A neutral
observer thus infers low ability if someone seeks advice. However, the Effort
Effect gives rise to an equilibrium in which the most incompetent also do not
seek advice. In that case, the intermediate sorting equilibrium emerges.
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Previous models on the interplay between advice-seeking and reputa-
tion concerns have focused solely on the former intuition (Levy 2004; Chan-
drasekhar et al. 2018). They find that reputation concerns are harmful and
induce inefficiencies because they prevent individuals from advice-seeking.
But with the findings from Section 1.3 in mind, it is natural to re-examine
this relationship. In this section I show that the model encompasses two
conflicting views on the relationship between advice-seeking and reputation.
The negative view on reputation effects, described in Section 1.4.3, is con-
sistent with the fear of reputation loss and subsequently fewer people seeking
advice. Since only incompetent agents seek advice, it reduces reputation. As
a consequence, fewer people ask for advice because they fear signaling incom-
petence. Therefore, the model captures previous findings on advice-seeking
that have focused on that fear (for a thorough discussion, see Section 1.5.2).
The positive view, described in Section 1.4.3, highlights a different effect
of reputation concerns. In particular, it builds on the positive effect of ability
on effort provision. There are two different mechanisms how that influences
the role of reputation concerns. First, high types exert higher effort; hence
successful projects become a signal for high ability (Theorem 1.1). Con-
sequently reputation concerns increase all types’ effort provision. Because
effort and advice are complementary, reputation concerns ultimately increase
advice-seeking even though it remains a signal for low ability.
Furthermore, Theorem 1.2 presents an equilibrium in which advice-seeking
in fact even signals high ability. This is not only contrary to previous find-
ings but also to the common intuition that “by seeking help one publicly
acknowledge incompetence” (Lee 2002, p. 19). In the previous section I show
that agents with higher ability have higher incentives to seek advice (in the
“intermediate sorting” equilibrium). Theorem 1.2 builds on that intuition.
There, I construct a separating equilibrium in which only high types have a
strong incentive to seek advice and are induced by reputation concerns to do
so, hence advice-seeking signals high ability.
This section builds on the previous model, with few adjustments made and
presented in Section 1.4.1. I first investigate the general incentives to seek
advice under reputation concerns in Section 1.4.2. The equilibrium effects of
reputation concerns on advice-seeking are then examined in Sections 1.4.3.
Chapter 1. Advice-Seeking and Reputation 25
1.4.1 Adjustments to the Model
To focus on the effects of reputation concerns I make the following adjust-
ments. First, advice is always available, i.e. α = 1. Secondly, the agent’s
ability and effort are private; thus the game becomes one of incomplete in-
formation. Thirdly, the agent is one of two ability types, a low type θl or
a high type θh > θl. The prior is given by prob(θ = θh) = µ. Since the
high type is of higher ability she is more likely to solve a problem. Denote
the types’ respective probability of failing to solve the problem by λl and λh,
respectively. Hence λl > λh. Note that λl denotes the low (ability) type even
though λl > λh. As before, I will use λ ∈ {λl, λh} to refer to an agent’s type
for notational ease.
The agent’s type λ and the chosen effort level e are private informa-
tion. Her decision to seek advice a ∈ {A, N} and the project outcome
y ∈ {F (ail), S(uccess)} are publicly observable.
The agent cares about her reputation, i.e. an observer’s posterior belief
µ̂(a, y) after observing (a, y) and using Bayes’ rule. The exact functional form
of the agent’s reputation utility R is assumed to be
R(µ̂(a, y), µ, r) =



r if µ̂(a, y) ≥ µ
0 if µ̂(a, y) < µ.
(1.10)
This reputation utility function is a step function. If the observer’s posterior
belief exceeds a threshold µ the agent receives a reputation utility of r.
This functional form implies that gains from reputation emerge from a
binary choice. Such a setting can be found in many instances, for exam-
ple promotions in organizations. Suppose an employee’s supervisor is more
knowledgeable and can solve problems better than an agent. When an em-
ployee cannot solve her problem alone she turns to her supervisor for advice.6
Yet an employee also cares about her reputation because the supervisor
decides over relevant outcomes such as bonuses or promotions. As Prender-
6This process is common in organizations. Garicano (2000) gives a theoretical foundation
of why knowledge is concentrated in higher tiers. Also in his model, if an employee cannot
solve a problem alone, it is passed on to his direct supervisor. On the empirical side, Fisher
et al. (2018) find that the majority of employees go to their direct bosses to ask for help.
The interpretation of the supervisor as advisor is also consistent with a small literature
on expert leadership (Goodall et al. 2011).
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gast (1999, p. 33) states, “most workers in the economy are evaluated sub-
jectively”. Moreover, Frederiksen et al. (2017) and Frederiksen et al. (2019)
show how a supervisor’s subjective rating of his supervisee’s performance has
strong effects on the supervisee’s career outcomes. In that setting, one can
interpret r as expected gains from a future promotion. If the supervisor bases
the binary promotion decision on his subjective beliefs about the agent’s abil-
ity, reputation concerns arise. Before seeking advice from a supervisor one
must consider the reputation effects of such action.
1.4.2 Advice-Seeking with Reputation Concerns
I first re-examine the agent’s decision to seek advice in the light of reputation
concerns before investigating the equilibrium effects. For notational ease it is
useful to define Ra,y := R(µ̂(a, y), µ, r) as the agent’s reputation utility if the
observer’s posterior belief is based on advice-seeking decision a and project
outcome y. Furthermore, define da := Ra,S − Ra,F as the advice-seeking
specific differences in reputation utility dependent on the project outcome.
Note that both Ra,y and da depend on the action a ∈ {A, N} as well as
the associated posterior beliefs that emerge in equilibrium and are therefore
dependent on the equilibrium under consideration. Yet I first analyze general
implications of reputation concerns (thus treat R and d as exogenous) before
considering the equilibrium effects of reputation in Section 1.4.3.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In equi-
librium, advice-seeking needs to be optimal at the effort and advice stage. As
in the previous analysis without reputation concerns, in any PBE an agent
seeks advice if and only if
EũAt1(e
A) ≥ EũNt1(eN) and EũAt3(eA) ≥ EũNt3(eA). (1.11)
To find the necessary and sufficient condition for advice-seeking in the pres-
ence of reputation concerns I proceed as in Section 1.2. First, I write expected
utilities at the advice stage given any previous effort provision e as
EũAt3 = e(v + d
A) + RA,F − cA (1.12)
EũNt3 = (1 − λ) · e(v + dN) + RN,F . (1.13)
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Thus, the agent seeks advice at t = 3 if and only if
e · λv + RA,F − RN,F + e · (dA − (1 − λ)dN) ≥ cA. (1.14)
This expression is similar to the one without reputation concerns, see Equa-
tion (1.2). Comparing the two, I find that the project-related benefits of
advice-seeking are e · λv in both cases. The reputation effects of advice-
seeking depend on the project outcome. If the project fails the difference in
the agent’s utility is given by RA,F − RN,F . If the project succeeds there are
additional changes in the agent’s reputation gains. These are conditional on
advice-seeking (i.e. dA and dN). As before, the project succeeds with prob-
ability e if the agent seeks advice, but only with probability e(1 − λ) if the
agent does not seek advice. Thus, the agent’s expected reputation gains from
a successful project are e · (dA − (1 − λ)dN).
In the next step, I determine the optimal effort levels ẽA and ẽN . The
respective expected utilities at t = 1 are maximized w.r.t. effort level e:
max
e
EũAt1 =e · (v + dN) + πλ · [x(dA − dN) + RA,F − RN,F ] − πλcA −
ce
2
e2
(1.15)
max
e
EũNt1 =(1 − πλ2) · e · (v + dN) −
ce
2
e2. (1.16)
The optimal effort levels with reputation concerns are given by
ẽA =
v + dN + πλ(dA − dN)
ce
and ẽN =
(1 − πλ2)(v + dN)
ce
. (1.17)
Lemma 1.4 presents the comparative statics with regard to reputation con-
cerns in equilibrium. First, if project success increases reputation (i.e. dA >
0, dN > 0) the agent exerts higher effort, regardless of the advice-seeking
decision. The intuition is straightforward; reputation concerns increase the
benefits of a successful project and thus motivative the agent. But if the
reputation utility is especially pronounced when not seeking advice (i.e. dN
is sufficiently large), an advice-seeking agent may work less. Then the repu-
tation incentives to work hard are low for advice-seekers while an agent who
does not seek advice is particularly motivated by their reputation concerns.
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Lemma 1.4.
(1) Effort increases with reputation concerns if in equilibrium dA > 0 and
dN > 0, regardless of the advice-seeking decision.
(2) An agent who seeks advice exerts higher effort than one who does not seek
advice, i.e. ẽA > ẽN , if in equilibrium dN < λv+d
A
1−λ
.
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.1.
I proceed with the necessary and sufficient condition for advice-seeking in
equilibrium with reputation concerns in Proposition 1.3. It expands Propo-
sition 1.1 by the additional effects of reputation on advice-seeking.
Proposition 1.3.
In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with reputation concerns, an agent of
type λ seeks advice if and only if
(2 − πλ2)(v + dN) + πλ(dA − dN)
2ce
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effort Effect
· [λv + dA − (1 − λ)dN ]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Advice Effect
+ (RA,F − RN,F )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pure Reputation
≥ cA.
(Condition II)
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 1.1 and is thus omitted here.
In general, one can show that Condition II is equivalent to EũAt1(e
A) ≥ EũNt1(eN )
and implies EũAt3(e
A) ≥ EũNt3(eA).
Condition II is decomposed into three different effects. Besides the Effort
Effect and the Advice Effect, already known from the analysis without rep-
utation concerns, a third effect emerges, the “Pure Reputation Effect”. The
interpretation of the Effort Effect and the Advice Effect remain unchanged.
Advice-seeking increases the probability of project success and thus expected
utility, as shown by the Advice Effect. The Effort Effect describes the com-
plementarity between effort and advice. Lastly, the Pure Reputation Effect
shows the reputation benefits of advice-seeking without any effort provision
(i.e. in case of certain failure of the project).
Reputation concerns influence the decision to seek advice through all three
channels. First, the Pure Reputation Effect arises solely from reputation
concerns. It captures the advice-seeking difference in reputation conditional
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on project failure. Secondly, the introduction of reputation concerns changes
the Advice Effect, i.e. the expected relative payoff if the project is successful,
by dA −(1−λ)dN (see the discussion on Equation (1.14)). Thirdly, reputation
concerns affect effort provision, and thus the Effort Effect, via ẽA and ẽN .
Lemma 1.4 shows that effort provision increases if project success is associated
with a high type. That intuition can be applied here as well: if project success
is associated with a high type, i.e. dA > 0, dN > 0, the Effort Effect and thus
the incentives to seek advice increase.
1.4.3 The Effects of Reputation Concerns
As in any signaling game, posterior beliefs are determined only in equilibrium;
thus the exact implications of reputation concerns depend on equilibrium
inferences. Therefore I analyze the equilibrium effects of reputation concerns
on advice-seeking in this section. I focus solely on the comparison of advice-
seeking behavior with and without reputation concerns.7 Hereby, I investigate
effects on the extensive margin and compare advice-seeking behavior of an
agent with type λ ∈ {λl, λh} without reputation concerns and with reputation
concerns, given (r, µ). More specifically, define
f̃(λ) :=[(2 − πλ2)(v + dN) + πλ(dA − dN)] · [λv + dA − (1 − λ)dN ]
+ 2ce(R
A,F − RN,F ) − 2cecA. (1.18)
Here, posterior beliefs are determined in equilibrium and reputation utility
realizes according to the posterior beliefs and (r, µ). As α = 1 is imposed
throughout this section, redefine f(λ) as
f(λ) := (2 − πλ2)λv2 − 2cecA. (1.19)
As before, an agent of type λ ∈ {λl, λh} seeks advice without reputation
concerns if and only if f(λ) ≥ 0. When her reputation is involved, she seeks
advice if and only if f̃(λ) ≥ 0. Throughout the analysis I focus on the
extensive margin of reputation effects. Thereby, I compare actual advice-
seeking behavior with and without reputation concerns and do not consider
7For the interested reader, I conduct a full equilibrium analysis of all Perfect Bayesian
equilibria with reputation concerns in pure strategies in Appendix A.2.
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marginal changes, neither of reputation nor advice-seeking incentives. I define
positive and negative effects of reputation concerns as follows.
1. Reputation concerns have a positive effect on advice-seeking if there
exists at least one type λ who is induced to switch from no advice-
seeking to advice-seeking but not vice versa. Formally,
∃ λ ∈ {λl, λh} : f(λ) < 0 ∧ f̃(λ) ≥ 0
∄ λ ∈ {λl, λh} : f(λ) ≥ 0 ∧ f̃(λ) < 0.
2. Reputation concerns have a negative effect advice-seeking if there exists
at least one type λ who seeks advice without reputation concerns but
does not with reputation concerns. Formally,
∃ λ ∈ {λl, λh} : f(λ) ≥ 0 ∧ f̃(λ) < 0
∄ λ ∈ {λl, λh} : f(λ) < 0 ∧ f̃(λ) ≥ 0.
On the Negative Effects of Reputation Concerns
In the following analysis I will show the existence of the two different effects
of reputation concerns. I start with the negative effects and examine the ex-
istence of a PBE in the spirit of Chandrasekhar et al. (2018). In their setting,
everyone seeks advice without reputation concerns. Reputation concerns then
lead to a negative sorting equilibrium. Above some cutoff, high ability types
stop seeking advice because they fear for their reputation. Such an equilib-
rium is also embedded in the current model. It is described in Proposition
1.4 and follows a similar intuition. Moreover, I show in Proposition 1.5 that
reputation concerns can even lead to a full termination of advice-seeking. In
that case, no type seeks advice due to a fear of signaling a low type.
Proposition 1.4 presents an equilibrium in which both types pool on
advice-seeking without reputation concerns but separate with reputation con-
cerns and only the low type seeks advice. In the latter case advice-seeking
becomes fully informative and reveals a low type. Hence there is no reputation
utility when seeking advice, i.e. RA,S = RA,F = 0; but an agent who does not
seek advice signals a high type. In the equilibrium described by Proposition
1.4, no advice-seeking thus leads to reputation gains, i.e. RN,S = RN,F = r.
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Because advice-seeking is fully informative the project outcome bears no im-
plications for the seeker’s reputation. Hence effort is not affected by repu-
tation concerns. Since the low type seeks advice in equilibrium, she exerts
higher effort which in turn increases her incentives to seek advice further.
Therefore, the two types face different trade-offs at the advice stage. The
low type has more at stake and a lower probability of solving the problem.
Hence she accepts a low reputation and rather seeks advice to solve the prob-
lem with certainty. The high type worked less at t = 1 and has a high prob-
ability of solving the problem alone. Thus he rather collects the reputation
gain r than to seek advice.
Proposition 1.4.
There exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the following properties.
1. Advice-seeking harms reputation, i.e. µ̂N,y1 > µ̂A,y2 = 0 ∀y1, y2 ∈
{S, F} .
2. The agent receives positive reputation utility only if she does not ask for
advice, i.e. µ ∈
(
0, µ̂N,S
]
.
3. Reputational benefits are intermediate, i.e. r ∈
(
f(λh)
2ce
, f(λl)
2ce
]
.
4. Reputation concerns discourage the high type from seeking advice: both
types seek advice without reputation concerns, but only the low type
seeks advice with reputation concerns, i.e. f(λ) > 0 ∀λ ∈ {λl, λh} and
f̃(λl) > 0 > f̃(λh).
Proof. To construct the equilibrium described in Proposition 1.4, I first note that
in this separating equilibrium with reputation concerns only the low type seeks
advice. Thus, advice-seeking is fully informative, i.e. µ̂A = 0. It follows that
RA,S = RA,F = 0 and dA = 0. The respective types’ effort provision in that
equilibrium is given by eNh =
(1−πλ2
h
)(v+dN )
ce
and eAl =
v+(1−πλl)d
N
ce
.
I will show that there exists a PBE in which dN = 0. In this case, eAl > e
N
h
and thus µ̂N,S < µ̂N,F . dN = 0 then holds only if µ ≤ µ̂N,S . Therefore, no advice-
seeking comes with reputation benefits: RN,S = RN,F = r. The condition for a
separating equilibrium is then follows from Condition II: (2 − πλ2l )λlv2 − 2cer ≥
2cecA ≥ (2 − πλ2h)λhv2 − 2cer which can be re-written as f(λl) ≥ 2cer > f(λh). As
types seek advice without reputation concerns, it must also hold that f(λ) ≥ 0 ∀λ.
Therefore, the necessary conditions for the equilibrium to hold are (1) f(λl) >
f(λh) ≥ 0, (2) r ∈ (f(λh)2ce ,
f(λl)
2ce
], (3) µ ∈ (0, µ̂N,S ].
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In the equilibrium described by Proposition 1.4, reputation concerns dis-
courage the high type from seeking advice. The first two conditions state
that reputation utility is independent of project outcome and is positive if
and only if the agent does not seek advice. In equilibrium, advice-seeking
is a perfect signal for a low type since they have a higher incentive to seek
advice (as they need advice more likely and work harder). Therefore, the
high type fears for his reputation if seeking advice. If reputation concerns
are sufficiently strong she is not willing to seek advice to keep her reputation.
Thus there is a lower bound on r. In addition, if reputation concerns are too
strong even the low type does not seek advice and deviates. This gives an
upper bound on r.
If reputation concerns increase above that upper bound, they can even
prevent the low type from seeking advice and thus result in no advice-seeking
at all. In that case no type seeks advice and any off-equilibrium deviation to
advice-seeking is punished by the neutral observer with a low posterior be-
lief. Thus, with sufficiently strong reputation concerns no agent seeks advice.
Proposition 1.5 shows that strong reputation concerns can always destroy any
advice-seeking, regardless of who seeks advice without reputation concerns.
Proposition 1.5.
There exists a class of Perfect Bayesian equilibria with the following proper-
ties.
1. Advice-seeking harms reputation, i.e. µ̂N,y1 > µ̂A,y2 ∀y1, y2 ∈ {S, F}.
2. The agent receives positive reputation utility only if she does not ask for
advice, i.e. µ ∈
(
max
{
µ̂A,S, µ̂A,F
}
, µ̂N,F
]
.
3. Reputational benefits are sufficiently large, i.e. r > max
{
f(λh)
2ce
, f(λl)
2ce
}
.
4. Reputation concerns destroy all advice-seeking: at least one type seeks
advice without reputation concerns, but no type seeks advice with rep-
utation concerns, i.e. (f(λl) > 0 ∨ f(λh) > 0) and f̃(λ) < 0 ∀λ ∈
{λl, λh}.
Proof. In all equilibria described in Proposition 1.5, no type seeks advice with
reputation concerns. I will construct equilibria in which it holds that dA = dN = 0.
In this case, eNh =
(1−πλ2
h
)v
ce
>
(1−πλ2
l
)v
ce
= eNl . Hence, success is an indicator for
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being a high type, conditional on no advice-seeking. Thus, µ̂N,S > µ̂N,F . To
construct the equilibria, suppose that it holds for the off-equilibrium beliefs (i.e. if
the agent sought advice) that µ̂A,y < µ̂N,F ∀y. Then advice-seeking in punished in
terms of reputation utility if µ ∈
(
max
{
µ̂A,S , µ̂A,F
}
, µ̂N,F
]
, and thus RA = 0 and
RN = r.
There are three cases consistent with Proposition 1.5: (a) f(λl) > f(λh) ≥ 0,
(b) f(λl) ≥ 0 > f(λh), (c) f(λh) ≥ 0 > f(λl). Furthermore, I can re-write
Condition II for the pooling equilibrium with dA = dN = 0 as (2 − πλ2)λv2 −
2cer − 2cecA < 0, i.e. f(λ) − 2cer < 0 ∀λ. Therefore, any PBE described by the
following conditions are consistent with Proposition 1.5:
(1) max {f(λl), f(λh)} ≥ 0, (2) r > max
{
f(λl)
2ce
, f(λh)2ce
}
, (3) µ̂A,y < µ̂N,F < µ̂N,S ∀y,
(4) µ ∈
(
max
{
µ̂A,S , µ̂A,F
}
, µ̂N,F
]
.
This completes the section on the negative effects of reputation concerns.
It shows that the model captures previous findings by Levy (2004) and Chan-
drasekhar et al. (2018). If the agent’s evaluation only depends on his decision
to seek advice and advice-seeking signals a low type, as in Propositions 1.4
and 1.5, agents fear for their reputation and do not seek advice. However,
the next section shows opposite effects; in fact there exist equilibria in which
(a) reputation concerns increase advice-seeking and (b) advice-seeking even
signals a high type.
On the Positive Effects of Reputation Concerns
This section reveals two distinct channels how reputation concerns can in-
crease advice-seeking. Theorem 1.1 shows that reputation concerns can raise
effort provision which increases the incentives to seek advice. Indeed, in the
equilibrium described therein reputation concerns induce both types to seek
advice. The intuition is as follows. Suppose without reputation concerns
advice-seeking costs are too high so that no type seeks advice. In the equi-
librium with reputation concerns, the agent only receives positive reputation
utility if her project is successful. Therefore the expected benefits of a suc-
cessful project increase and both types exert high effort. Higher effort implies
higher incentives to seek advice. If reputation concerns are strong, effort pro-
vision and hence the incentives to seek advice increase and outweigh the high
costs of advice-seeking. Consequently both types seek advice.
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Theorem 1.1.
There exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the following properties.
1. Project success increases reputation, i.e. µ̂a,S > µ̂a,F ∀a ∈ {A, N} .
2. The agent receives positive reputation utility only if her project is suc-
cessful and she does not ask for advice, i.e. µ ∈
(
max
{
µ̂A,S, µ̂N,F
}
, µ̂N,S
]
.
3. Reputational benefits are intermediate, i.e. r ∈ [r, r], and bounds are
given in the proof.
4. Reputation concerns induce both types to seek advice: no type seeks
advice without reputation concerns, but both types seek advice with rep-
utation concerns, i.e. f(λ) < 0 ∧ f̃(λ) ≥ 0 ∀λ ∈ {λl, λh}.
Proof. The equilibrium described by Theorem 1.1 states that no type seeks ad-
vice without reputation concerns but all types seek advice with reputation con-
cerns. I construct an equilibrium in which dN = r and dA = 0 and both types
seek advice under reputation concerns. Then, eAh =
v+(1−πλh)r
ce
> v+(1−πλl)r
ce
=
eAl . As both types seek advice and the low type is more likely to need advice,
it follows that µ̂N,S > µ̂A,S and µ̂N,F > µ̂A,F . The effort levels imply that
µ̂N,S > µ̂N,F and µ̂A,S > µ̂A,F . Taken together, the following ordering of pos-
terior beliefs arises: µ̂A,F < min
{
µ̂A,S , µ̂N,F
}
< max
{
µ̂A,S , µ̂N,F
}
< µ̂N,S . If
µ ∈
({
µ̂A,S , µ̂N,F
}
, µ̂N,S
]
, it holds that RA,F = RA,S = RN,F = 0 and RN,S = r.
It follows that dN = r and dA = 0 hold. For both types to seek advice in equilib-
rium, from (Condition II) it follows that
[(2 − πλ2)(v + r) − πλr][λv − (1 − λ)r] ≥ 2cecA ∀ λ ∈ {λl, λh}
⇔ f(λ) − r(z · r − w · v) ≥ 0 ∀ λ ∈ {λl, λh} (1.20)
with w = 2((2 − πλ2)λ − 1) and z = (1 − λ)(2 − πλ − πλ2) > 0 must hold. First,
note that the no advice-seeking pooling equilibrium without reputation concerns
implies f(λ) < 0 ∀λ ∈ {λl, λh}. Hence, reputation concerns increase advice-seeking
only if zr − wv < 0, i.e. r < wv
z
with w > 0. Secondly, as z > 0, the left-hand side
of (1.20) is concave in r with a maximum at wv2z . The zeros of Equation (1.20) are
given by r =
wv±
√
(wv)2+4zf(λ)
2z ∈ (0, wvz ) as f(λ) < 0. Therefore, I can construct a
PBE, described in Theorem 1.1, with the following properties:
1. µ̂A,F < min
{
µ̂A,S , µ̂N,F
}
< max
{
µ̂A,S , µ̂N,F
}
< µ̂N,S ,
2. µ ∈
(
max
{
µ̂A,S , µ̂N,F
}
, µ̂N,S
]
,
3. r ∈ [r, r] ∀λ ∈ {λl, λh}, with r = wv−
√
(wv)2+4zf(λ)
2z and r =
wv+
√
(wv)2+4zf(λ)
2z ,
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4. w = 2((2 − πλ2)λ − 1) > 0 ∀λ ∈ {λl, λh},
5. − (wv)24z < f(λ) < 0 ∧ f̃(λ) ≥ 0 ∀λ ∈ {λl, λh}.
In equilibrium, both type seek advice but the high type exerts higher
effort (eAh =
v+(1−πλh)r
ce
> v+(1−πλl)r
ce
= eAl ). Consequently, project success is
associated with high ability and thus increases reputation, as stated in the
first condition. Yet advice-seeking itself still signals a low type. In fact,
both types seek advice despite a subsequent loss of reputation. At the advice
stage reputation concerns induce a trade-off between reputation and expected
benefits from a successful project. First, reputation concerns increase the
incentive to not seek advice as only then the agent may collect the gains from
reputation. Secondly, they raise effort provision which in turn increases the
expected benefits from advice-seeking. In Theorem 1.1, the latter effect is
stronger. Thus, reputation concerns increase the incentives to seek advice.
Moreover, reputation concerns are bounded. On the one hand, r must be
sufficiently large to induce both types to exert sufficient effort which induces
them to seek advice in the first place. Yet, because advice-seeking is also as-
sociated with a loss of reputation, r must be bounded from above. Otherwise
the high type has an incentive to deviate, work hard but not seek advice. In
that case, she still has a sufficiently high probability of solving the problem
alone and receive r.
Despite the positive effect of reputation concerns on actual advice-seeking,
any agent who seeks advice must still fear for their reputation in Theorem
1.1. This is different in Theorem 1.2. Here the agent’s reputation increases
with advice-seeking because only the high type seeks advice. The underlying
intuition is the following. Suppose the high type gains more from advice-
seeking than the low type, similar to the intermediate sorting equilibrium
in Section 1.3. Yet advice-seeking costs are high and no type seeks advice
without reputation concerns. In equilibrium, reputation concerns induce only
the high type to seek advice; hence advice-seeking becomes a perfect signal
for high ability. Thus, the high type receives additional reputation utility that
induces him to seek advice. For the low type, reputation concerns are not
high enough; she abstains from advice-seeking and a separating equilibrium
emerges.
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Theorem 1.2.
There exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the following properties.
1. Advice-seeking increases reputation, i.e. µ̂A,y1 = 1 > µ̂N,y2 ∀y1, y2 ∈
{S, F}.
2. The agent receives positive reputation utility only if she asks for advice,
i.e. µ ∈
(
µ̂N,y, µ̂A,y
]
∀y ∈ {S, F}.
3. Reputational benefits are intermediate, i.e. r ∈
[
−f(λh)
2ce
, −f(λh)
2ce
)
.
4. Reputation concerns induces only the high type to seek advice: no type
seeks advice without reputation concerns, but the high type seeks advice
with reputation concerns, i.e. f(λ) < 0 ∀λ ∈ {λl, λh} ∧ f̃(λh) ≥ 0 >
f̃(λl).
Proof. In the PBE described by Theorem 1.2, the types separate under reputation
concerns as the high type seeks advice while the low type does not. Thus, advice-
seeking is perfectly informative and µ̂A,S = µ̂A,F = 1 and consequently RA,S =
RA,F = 1 and dA = 0. I construct an equilibrium in which it holds that dN = 0. In
this case, effort is given by eAh =
v
ce
and eNl =
(1−πλ2
l
)v
ce
. It follows that, conditional
on no advice-seeking, success is an indicator for the high type and thus µ̂N,S > µ̂N,F .
To sustain dN = 0, I impose µ ∈ (µ̂N,S , 1].
Therefore, Condition II implies for this specific PBE in which both types seek
advice that (2 − πλ2h)λhv2 + 2cer ≥ 2cecA > (2 − πλ2l )λlv2 + 2cer. This can be
re-written as f(λh) > −2cer > f(λl). It follows that there exists a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, described by Theorem 1.2, with the following conditions:
(1) r ∈
[
−f(λh)
2ce
, −f(λl)2ce
)
, (2) µ ∈ (µ̂N,S , 1], (3) f(λl) < f(λh) < 0.
There is one common theme that combines all equilibria with a positive
effect of reputation concerns. They are all based on the effects of effort on
advice-seeking. For the equilibrium described in Theorem 1.1, reputation con-
cerns affect effort provision, change the likelihood of project success and thus
indirectly influence the decision to seek advice. The equilibrium described
in Theorem 1.2 is based on the presumption that the high type has higher
benefits from advice-seeking without reputation concerns. Otherwise, repu-
tation concerns could not separate low and high types. But the positive effect
of ability on advice again builds on the complementarity between effort and
advice; hence the equilibrium in Theorem 1.2 does not exist without effort
considerations.
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Therefore, the positive results on reputation concerns hinge on the incor-
poration of effort into the model. If that part is excluded from the analysis,
there is no positive effect of ability on advice; and reputation concerns have
an unambiguously negative effect on advice-seeking. Consequently, models
that do not take into account the joint interplay between effort, advice, and
reputation miss potential positive effects of reputation concerns. This was
the case in previous advice-seeking models such as Levy (2004) and Chan-
drasekhar et al. (2018) who conclude that advice-seeking signals low ability
and thus reputation concerns reduce advice-seeking. Theorem 1.2 stands in
stark contrast to that finding. Because ability increases effort provision com-
petent agents have higher incentives to seek advice. Ultimately, a separating
equilibrium emerges in which agents should not fear for their reputation, but
in fact seek advice precisely because advice-seeking signals high ability.
1.5 Discussion
The key new feature of this model is the introduction of effort into a model of
advice-seeking. Such a setting not only mimics many relevant situations such
as employees seeking help from their supervisors, also its implications relate
well to existing empirical evidence. This section first discusses that evidence
in relation to the model’s findings as well as further implications and gives a
thorough overview over potential new avenues of research.
1.5.1 On the Effects of Advice
Advice is helpful. It increases the chances to succeed in the task at hand.
Thus, if success depends on the agent’s effort provision, advice and effort
become complements. If the availability of advice increases it is more valuable
to work hard. Lemma 1.1 describes that complementarity. Effort provision
and therefore (expected) performance increase with advice-seeking and the
availability of advice. Due to the prevalent unobservability of effort, empirical
research has focused on the effect of advice on performance and finds that,
unsurprisingly and in line with the model, advice increases performance in
various settings. For a detailed and excellent overview on that finding, I refer
the reader to Bonaccio and Dalal (2006).
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Moreover, empirical evidence shows that perceived support increases an
employee’s performance. In terms of the model, perceived support can be
interpreted a proxy for the (perceived) availability of advice. Mueller (2012)
shows that larger team sizes result in lower perceived support which in turn
decreases performance in larger teams. Relatedly, Amabile et al. (2004) find
that higher perceived leader support increases employees’ creative work per-
formance. This result also relates to current research on the value and role
of supervisors. Lazear et al. (2015) estimate that replacing a bad with a
good supervisor is similar to adding one employee to a nine-member team.
As an explanation to these large productivity effects of supervisors, Lazear
et al. (2015, p. 585) cite from interviews with managers and workers who “all
emphasized the significant effects that bosses have in coaching and motivat-
ing workers.” That fits the model’s interpretation of supervisors as advisors.
Bosses coach their employees by providing advice when needed and that gives
them an additional motivation.
Further, advice availability increases advice-seeking due its positive effects
on effort provision. There is ample evidence for this positive relationship
across various fields. In the medical sector, Hofmann et al. (2009) show that
nurses seek more help when the helper is perceived as more accessible or is
formally required to help. In education, students seek more help and advice if
their teachers are more approachable (Ryan et al. 2001; Johnson and LaBelle
2017). In organizations, Borgatti and Cross (2003) and van der Rijt et al.
(2013) find that employees’ seek more advice from more available advisors.
These findings have manifold implications for corporate culture and the
role of leaders. In recent years, many firms have installed policies to foster
communication and collaboration in order to adapt to a ever-changing world.
More and more jobs involve non-routine tasks (Autor et al. 2003) and social
skills (Deming 2017; Deming and Kahn 2018). At the same time, hierarchies
get flatter (Rajan and Wulf 2006), companies implement open-door policies,
open plan offices and social intranets and emphasize the need for collaboration
in employee handbooks and their corporate statements.8 In terms of the
8For example, HP inc. has installed an open-door policy “for a work environment” where
“open, honest communication between managers and employees is a day-to-day business
practice” and “advice is freely given”, see hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/diversity/open-
door (visited on 2019-09-06). Facebook’s new headquarters includes an open plan of-
fice for around 2,800 employees to “make work as frictionless as possible”, accord-
Chapter 1. Advice-Seeking and Reputation 39
model, these policies are similar to a decrease in advice-seeking costs or an
increase of advice availability. In that case they will not only increase advice-
seeking but also motivate employees to work hard which gives an additional
positive effects of advice on performance.
1.5.2 On Advice, Ability, and Reputation
Starting with Tessler and Schwartz (1972) and Ashford and Cummings (1983)
psychological and organizational research on help-, advice- and feedback-
seeking has been concerned with the seeker’s image. In fact, DePaulo and
Fisher (1980) find in an early lab experiment on help-seeking that subjects
think they appear less competent when seeking help. Further evidence from
different fields and environments is provided and reviewed by Morrison and
Bies (1991), Ashford and Northcraft (1992), Lee (1997), Ryan et al. (2001),
van der Rijt et al. (2013), and Yoon et al. (2019). The main finding is that
individuals fear for their reputation if they seek advice, help, information or
feedback and that such fear makes individuals seek advice less.9
The underlying intuition was formalized and introduced to economics by
Levy (2004). In her model, an image-concerned decision maker needs to take
an action in an uncertain environment. Before choosing the action, he receives
a private signal about the state of the world. The signal’s precision increases
with the decision maker’s ability. In addition he can (publicly) consult an
advisor to receive an second signal. Levy (2004) shows that decision makers
with high ability do not consult the advisor if image concerns are sufficiently
strong. As signal precision increases with ability, a decision maker that is not
seeking advice signals a high own signal precision and thus high ability. On
the other hand, low types need the signal provided by the advisor to take
an informed decision; hence they seek advice despite reputation losses. A
separating equilibrium emerges. Levy (2004) also find that this equilibrium is
ing to the Washington Post (wapo.st/1NYmOWF, visited on 2019-09-06). The Daim-
ler AG has implemented a new Enterprise Social Network for its 300,000 employees in
2018, see blog.daimler.com/en/2018/10/29/digital-life-daimler-collaborate-
networking (visited on 2019-09-06). Amabile et al. (2014) give an example of a “corpo-
rate culture of helping”.
9Such fear is also discussed in newspaper articles, for instance in “Why Is Asking for Help
So Difficult?”, New York Times, July 05, 2007, p. C5.
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inefficient; decision makers who should seek advice from a welfare perspective
end up not seeking advice.
Chandrasekhar et al. (2018) investigate the effects of signaling concerns
and shame on advice-seeking.10 They first set up a model that is similar
to Levy (2004) in spirit and results; they show that if low competence im-
plies higher benefits from advice, reputation concerns decrease advice-seeking.
Moreover, they run a lab-in-the field experiment in India to show further proof
of negative effects of signaling and shame on advice-seeking. Chandrasekhar
et al. (2018) first find that subjects with high ability do not seek advice
since they regard it as unnecessary. Further, the advice-seeking probability
of subjects with low ability decreases by 55% when the need for advice be-
comes correlated with ability. Thus, subjects care for their reputation and
fear signaling incompetence when seeking advice.
The intuition that advice-seeking signals inability is captured in the cur-
rent model by the Advice Effect. Individuals with low ability have a lower
probability of solving a problem on their own. Hence advice becomes more
beneficial for them and as a consequence advice-seeking signals a low type.
In Levy (2004), this effect is implemented as a difference in the precision of
private signal; advice is more beneficial to decision makers with low ability
and imprecise signals. Chandrasekhar et al. (2018) plainly assume that low
ability types have higher benefits from advice.
The current model adds an additional layer to these findings. Introducing
effort gives rise to a positive effect of ability on advice via effort provision.
Since ability increase effort and advice and effort are complements, ability
increases the incentives to seek advice. This Effort Effect implies an coun-
teracting channel compared to the Advice Effect. In such richer setting, the
agent can in fact signal high ability by seeking advice in some situations.
While this theoretical result contrasts the aforementioned literature, some
experimental evidence is consistent with such positive relationship between
reputation and advice-seeking. Brooks et al. (2015) investigate how subjects
perceive the competence of advice-seekers in a series of lab experiments. They
find that the perceived competence increases if subjects are asked for their
10Chandrasekhar et al. (2018) model shame as disutility of incompetent agents from inter-
acting with someone who knows of their incompetence and show that it is an important
driver of advice-seeking; it decreases the advice-seeking probability of subjects with low
ability by 65%.
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advice, in particular for difficult tasks and independent of prior information
about the advice-seeker’s performance. In a related study, Thompson and
Bolino (2018) focus on negative beliefs about accepting help from co-workers.
They find that employees who hold those beliefs and, for example, think
that “[m]y manager believes in me more when I complete my work without
help” are evaluated worse in a variety of dimensions such as performance,
competence and creativity. Hence positive reputation effects of accepting help
seem to exist. Similarly, Yoon et al. (2019) find that asking for time extensions
of project work leads to better evaluations by the supervisor. Employees,
however, do not expect such updating but in fact fear appearing incompetent
when asking for extensions. Again, this fear prevents them from asking for
more time when they need it. More generally, Brooks and John (2018) or
Grant (2018) argue that people should ask more questions and ask for more
help because, for instance, help-seeking increases the seeker’s likability.
1.5.3 Open Questions
The inconclusive evidence on the link between reputation and advice-seeking
hints towards a more general point. Advice-seeking is a complex decision
that is highly dependent on situational, personal and organizational factors.
Therefore, general claims are hard to make and the exact interaction of ad-
vice and reputation depends strongly on the circumstances. That presents
a fruitful avenue for economists who build models and analyze data that
are often tied to one specific environment instead of working on one gen-
eral, ubiquitously applicable theory (Rodrik 2015). Further open questions
on advice-seeking and related matter are discussed in the following.
The Relationship between Advice and Effort
The model’s findings build strongly on a complementarity between ability
and effort. Yet one can easily imagine situations in which the relationship is
reversed. For example, team meetings are institutionalized events of advice-
seeking and -giving. They are central to organizations, but yet they are
criticized for being inefficient and time-wasting.11 An exemplary anecdote is
11See Rogelberg et al. (2007) or Perlow et al. (2017). A Microsoft survey in 2015 finds that
employees spend roughly 5.5 hours per week in meetings, and seven of ten employees
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given by Carnegie (1948) who describes his publisher Leon Shimkin’s frus-
tration with the inefficiency and unnecessary length of team meetings. But
Shimkin realized that his employees were using team meetings, i.e. advice, as
a substitute for problem-solving effort. They overloaded meetings with their
own problems which made an efficient use of the meetings impossible.
This anecdote reveals the relationship between advice and effort is highly
dependent on the kind of work under examination. The current model fo-
cuses on effort that determines expected benefits from the employee’s work.
On the other hand, an employee’s work also consists of problem-solving ef-
fort, especially in complex, creative and non-routine tasks. Here, advice and
problem-solving effort are substitutes. In that case, that advice-seeking and
the availability of advice decrease (problem-solving) effort. The intuition
is straightforward. If an agent knows that she will receive problem-solving
advice in the future, it is not worthwhile to bear own problem-solving effort
costs. In this case, the principal may want to restrict advice-seeking incentives
as Leon Shimkin did. To shorten the length of team meetings, he required his
employees to fill out a pre-meeting questionnaire if they wanted to discuss a
problem and its potential solution. By doing so, he made them think about
their problem before the meeting and therefore (a) increased advice-seeking
costs and (b) induced them to increase own problem-solving effort.
Optimal Firm Policies
Like Leon Shimkin, firms implement policies to create an efficient workspace.
As jobs have changed dramatically towards complex, non-routine jobs that
require much teamwork (Autor et al. 2003; Autor and Price 2013; Bandiera
et al. 2013; Deming 2017), firms implement open-door policies, open plan
workspaces and enterprise social networks to increase accessibility and de-
crease communication costs (see footnote 8). Or they create a corporate
culture of helping to build a norm of helping and foster cooperation and
teamwork (Cleavenger et al. 2007; Amabile et al. 2014; Grodal et al. 2015).
On the other hand, well-intentioned corporate policies to foster collabo-
ration and prosociality can turn out inefficient or even profit-harming. Haas
and Hansen (2005) and Hansen (2009) describe cases where firms’ emphasis
find them ineffective, see news.microsoft.com/2005/03/15/survey-finds-workers-
average-only-three-productive-days-per-week/ (visited on 2019-09-06).
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on teamwork and cooperation led to inefficient because unnecessary collabo-
ration. Even “organizational citizen behavior” (e.g. helping others, speaking
up, taking on responsibilities) can harm individual and organizational per-
formance (Bolino et al. 2013; Bolino and Grant 2016) and “helping routines”
in organizations can result in inefficient help-seeking and a crowding-out of
problem-solving effort (Hargadon and Bechky 2006, p.490).
These examples call for a thorough examination of corporate policy ef-
fects. In the current model there are no costs associated to the availability
or provision of advice; thus advice is always beneficial. However, a potential
substitutability between advice and problem-solving effort as well as opportu-
nity costs of advising yield natural upper bounds to optimal advice-seeking.
Consequently, firms may need to restrict advice-seeking by making managers
unavailable (e.g. by increasing advisors’ workload, managers’ span of control,
by changing management practices, and consequently lowering α) or increas-
ing the costs of advice-seeking cA. A complete analysis of optimal corporate
policies with regard to advice-seeking incentives is left to future research.
Behavioral Aspects of Advice-Seeking
The willingness to seek advice negatively depends on the perceived probability
of receiving advice (in the model captured by α). If an individual thinks she
will not get advice she does not seek it. However, there are strong mispercep-
tions regarding advice-seeking and -giving behavior. Research in psychology
(with a focus on helping) shows that individuals underestimate the willingness
to help as well as the amount of help they would receive if asking for help (see
Flynn and Bohns (2008), Newark et al. (2017) and the references therein). On
the other side of the interaction, potential helpers overestimate the amount
of help-seeking (Bohns and Flynn 2010) because they do not account for a
feeling of “embarrassment” when seeking help. This provides an interesting
link to the findings by Brooks et al. (2015). In both cases, helpers or advi-
sors do not believe that negative emotions (such as feeling incompetent or
embarrassed) play a role in helping contexts but they do. Therefore, the case
of advice- or help-seeking constitutes an important application of economic
research on misperceptions of own and others’ attitudes and preferences (see
Eckel and Grossman 2008; Fedyk 2018; Ericson and Laibson 2019).
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1.6 Conclusion
There is a common belief among researchers (Lee 2002) as well as students
(Ryan et al. 2001), employees (Thompson and Bolino 2018) and journalists12
that advice-seeking harms the reputation of the seeker. Consequently, rep-
utation concerns also harm advice-seeking incentives and lead to inefficient
outcomes (Levy 2004). This holds true if lower ability implies a higher need
for advice and consequently higher incentives to eventually seek it. However,
recent evidence shows that advice-seeking can also have positive implications
for the seeker’s reputation (Brooks et al. 2015).
Consistent with these findings, the current paper has revealed the belief
of reputation losses from advice-seeking to be partly flawed as its intuition
is simplistic. If advice-seeking is embedded into a richer environment, in-
competent agents may not seek advice and reputation concerns have positive
effects on advice-seeking. Because ability increases effort provision agents
with higher ability work harder. Therefore, they have more at stake when
needing advice and thus have a higher incentive to seek advice. The same
intuition explains why reputation concerns can induce agents to seek advice,
via two distinct mechanisms. First, if project success is associated with high
ability, any agent exerts higher effort and thus the incentive to seek advice
increase for all types. Secondly, in some situations only agents with high
ability seek advice. In that case, advice-seeking itself signals high ability.
Many unanswered questions surround the decision to seek advice that are
(partly) discussed in Section 1.5.3. For example, should a company issue
policies that enhance or discourage advice-seeking? When does advice in-
crease effort, and when does it lead to a crowding-out? What are the reasons
for common misperceptions associated with advice-seeking? Other questions
involve the advisor’s incentives. Absent formal requirement, why do people
help each other? How can an organization make sure that seeking advice and
advising is an efficient process? Given the manifold circumstances, in which
advice and help are important factors, there is opulent work to be done. This
model is to be thought of as a first step towards a more thorough analysis of
advice-seeking in various situations.
12“Why Is Asking for Help So Difficult?”, New York Times, July 05, 2007, p. C5.
Chapter 2
Optimal Rule Design and an
Emerging Moral Wiggle Room
2.1 Introduction
Individuals behave more selfishly when their actions’ observability decreases.
In dictator games, dictators give less when it is uncertain whether unfair
outcomes result from their selfish behavior or from bad luck (Andreoni and
Bernheim 2009), a lack of information, or other dictators’ behavior (Dana
et al. 2007). They even avoid information to uphold an excuse to act selfishly
(Dana et al. 2007; Grossman 2014). Such “moral wiggle room” behavior
can be explained by selfish, but image-concerned individuals (Andreoni and
Bernheim 2009). These individuals want to be perceived as good people, thus
as being fair in dictator games; yet they also want to maximize their own
monetary payoff. When their actions’ observability decreases, it is possible
to act selfishly and uphold a positive image at the same time, for instance by
blaming bad luck for unfair outcomes.
In this chapter, I investigate how the optimal design of non-binding rules,
issued to promote prosocial behavior, is shaped by selfish behavior in moral
wiggle rooms that emerge under some rules. Rules are omnipresent; they
shape all aspects of life, public or private. Governments enact laws; parents
set rules for their children; religious leaders create commandments to follow.
Given the widespread use of rules, it is unsurprising that they differ widely in
content and scope. For example, many rules are broad and universal (“You
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shall not lie”), some rely on the individual’s judgment (“Do the right thing”)
and others are highly specific and conditional on the situation (“If A, then
do B”).1
I argue that a moral wiggle room emerges under highly specific rules, but
not under universal rules. Using both a model and an experiment, I compare
behavior and welfare consequences under two rules that are designed to induce
an agent to act prosocially. The “Unconditional Rule” prescribes one single
action regardless of circumstances; it is thus universal. The “Conditional
Rule” prescribes different actions conditional on the state of the world; it is
thus specific. If all agents followed rules blindly, the Conditional Rule would
be superior because of its conditionality. It can prescribe the efficient action
for each state of the world. To the contrary, the Unconditional Rule dictates
inefficient actions in some situations.
The model clarifies that only the Conditional Rule creates a moral wiggle
room, due to the existence of selfish, but image-concerned agents. Conse-
quently it induces less compliance, less prosocial actions and thus lower wel-
fare. The intuition is the following. The two goals of selfish, image-concerned
agents conflict under the Unconditional Rule that prescribes one single proso-
cial action. Here, acting selfishly is a perfect signal for being selfish. If image
concerns are sufficiently strong those agents will follow the rule to prevent
appearing selfish. On the other hand, the Conditional Rule prescribes selfish
behavior in some situations (i.e. when it is efficient to act selfishly). In an
uncertain world, a neutral observer thus can never be certain about an agent’s
intentions. Either the agent acted selfishly on purpose, or he is a rule-follower
that received a misleading signal about the state of the world. Hence self-
ish, image-concerned agents can maintain a positive image even when acting
selfishly, due to the emerging moral wiggle room.
Therefore, while being inefficient in some situations the Unconditional
Rule also leads to more rule-following than the Conditional Rule. If the latter
part is of particular value, the Unconditional Rule is superior. In the theory
part of this chapter, I first find conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of a wiggle room equilibrium and then compare welfare implications of both
rules. The wiggle room can in fact make the Conditional Rule inferior to the
1Anyone working in an university should be aware of truly specific rules, for example for
travel reimbursements.
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Unconditional Rule, if there are sufficiently many selfish, image-concerned
agents and image concerns are sufficiently pronounced.
In the second part of the chapter, I present results from a laboratory exper-
iment to test for the existence of a moral wiggle room under the Conditional
Rule. For that purpose, I investigate how subjects react to different rules
in a variant of the public goods game. Subjects contribute to a public good
and are ought to follow a non-binding rule. At the same time, uncertainty
blurs the relationship between the subjects’ actions and actual consequences.
In two treatments, I examine the effects of the Unconditional Rule and the
Conditional Rule on contribution behavior.
The experimental findings can be summarized as follows. (1) Subjects
tend to follow both rules. Their contributions are strongly affected by what
the rule prescribes them to do. (2) There is scope for wiggle room behavior
as it is socially less inappropriate to act selfishly (i.e. contribute zero to the
public good) under the Conditional Rule. (3) In general, the wiggle room
has no effect on overall contributions. When the Conditional Rule and the
Unconditional Rule prescribe the same behavior, the wiggle room equilibrium
predicts less adherence to the Conditional Rule. Yet, contributions in the
experiments (mostly) do not differ in the hypothesized way. (4) Nonetheless,
the results also indicate that selfish subjects do react to the potential moral
wiggle room under the Conditional Rule when incentives to act selfishly are
sufficiently strong.
The contribution of this chapter is therefore two-fold. First, the theory
clarifies the welfare effects of rules. I show under what conditions a wiggle
room equilibrium exists that makes the Unconditional Rule worthwhile to
use. In that case, the Conditional Rule allows for excuses of selfish actions
and are thus induces less rule-following. The experimental evidence on wiggle
room behavior under the two different rules remains, however, inconclusive.
Even though selfish subjects follow the Conditional Rule less when incentives
are sufficiently strong, there is no pronounced general effect of the emerging
moral wiggle room.
Related Literature. This chapter is related to two different strands of
literature. First, the literature on moral wiggle rooms shows that individuals
use ambiguity about their actions to act more selfishly. In dictator games,
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dictators give less when they can attribute their selfish behavior to bad luck
(Dana et al. 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009) or to other subjects’ behavior
(Dana et al. 2007). They even avoid information to uphold the moral wiggle
room and thus their excuse to act selfishly (Dana et al. 2007; Grossman
2014). On the other hand, van der Weele et al. (2014) do not find wiggle
room behavior in trust and moonlighting games. They explain that result by
strong effects of reciprocity that outweigh the incentive to act selfishly in a
moral wiggle room.
In general, wiggle room behavior can be explained by selfish agents who
want to be perceived as “good” people.2 Similar to this work, Andreoni and
Bernheim (2009) theoretically and experimentally show that (a) image con-
cerns of otherwise selfish agents can account for prosocial behavior in dictator
games, (b) a norm of equal split emerges, and (c) that this norm breaks down
when the dictators’ true action is obscured to the receiver.3 However, the
focus of Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) differs from mine. They analyze be-
havior in dictator games only and thus are not able to examine welfare impli-
cations of the moral wiggle room. In contrast, my model compares prosocial
behavior and welfare under the two different rules. I find that welfare in-
creases under the Unconditional Rule only if externalities are high, costs of
the prosocial action are low and the share of selfish agents is high (given the
wiggle room equilibrium). Bénabou et al. (2018) find similar results when
examining the impact of imperatives and narratives issued by a principal to
affect an agent’s prosocial behavior. In their setting, the principal has su-
perior information about an action’s externality and the question is how to
effectively communicate his information to the agent. In one extension, im-
peratives bear a cost of flexibility, which is reminiscent of the Unconditional
Rule’s inefficiency. Similarly, Bénabou et al. (2018) find that the use of im-
peratives increases in the action’s externality and decreases when the agent
is less likely to follow the imperative.
On the experimental side, my work relates to laboratory experiments that
investigate behavior under laws, obligations and advice. The results are in
2Whereas the interpretation of “good” varies by context. In dictator games, a good type
is fair (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009), in the current context a good type follows rules.
3Thus, both their and my model build on the manifold work on the role of image concerns,
on the theory side by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008)
and on the empirical side see Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) for an excellent overview.
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line with findings by Galbiati and Vertova (2008, 2014). In both papers,
the authors find that minimum obligations increase contributions in public
good games. Galbiati and Vertova (2014) also show that this is independent
of formal sanctions for non-compliance. In contrast, Tyran and Feld (2006)
find that only self-imposed obligations, so-called mild laws, affect subjects’
contribution behavior. My experimental findings also relate to results on the
effects of advice, see Croson and Marks (2001), Schotter and Sopher (2006),
Chaudhuri et al. (2008) and Çelen et al. (2010). They show that advice, issued
by other participants in the experiment, can also affect behavior and increase
performance. As non-binding rules could also be interpreted as advice, the
results from the current experiment, showing that subjects follow rules, fit
well into that literature.
The chapter proceeds by presenting the model and its results on the wiggle
room equilibrium as well as welfare implications of the two rules in Section
2.2. In Section 2.3, I present the experimental setup and results. Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 Model
The model deals with the heterogeneous effects of the Unconditional Rule
and the Conditional Rule on rule-following behavior. The analysis shows
the existence and uniqueness of a “wiggle room equilibrium” under certain
conditions. In this equilibrium, everyone follows the Unconditional Rule. The
Conditional Rule, however, induces only partial rule-following as a selfish,
image-concerned agent does not adhere to it.
2.2.1 Set-up
0. Overview There is one principal (she) and one agent (he). The prin-
cipal issues a rule to induce the agent to take a prosocial action. The model
consists of five stages, t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. At t = 1, the principal designs a
non-binding rule to maximize expected welfare that is affected by the agent’s
action. At t = 2, Nature privately draws a state of the world ω. At t = 3, Na-
ture draws a noisy signal about the realized state that is privately displayed
to the agent. At t = 4, the agent chooses an action a, at a cost of c(a), that
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Figure 2.1: Optimal Rule Design - Timeline of the Model
has a positive externality e on welfare. At t = 5, the state of the world and
the agent’s action are revealed and the agent’s payoff and total welfare are
realized. The timeline is summarized in Figure 2.1.
1. The Agent At t = 4, the agent takes a binary action a ∈ {0, 1} at
costs c(a), with c(1) = c and c(0) = 0. a = 1 is a “prosocial” action as
it involves a positive externality on welfare. Accordingly, I call a = 0 the
“selfish” action. The agent’s material payoff P depends on the action and the
state of the world ω. There are two potential states of the world, a low and
a high state. The low state is denoted by ω = 0 and the high state by ω = 1,
with pr(ω = 1) = ρ. The agent’s material payoff is defined as
P = a · ω − c(a). (2.1)
At the time of choosing a, the agent does not know ω. Instead, he receives
a private signal s at t = 3. Again, the signal is either low (s = l), or high
(s = h). The signal generating process is given by conditional probabilities
pr(s = h|ω = 1) = σh and pr(s = h|ω = 0) = σl, with σh > 1/2 > σl. Using
Bayes’ rule, the agent updates his beliefs after observing the signal. Denote
the resulting posteriors as πh = pr(ω = 1|s = h) and πl = pr(ω = 1|s = l).
As σh > 1/2 > σl, it also holds that πh > ρ > πl.
1a. The Rule-Following Type The agent is one of two types, i ∈
{F, S} with pr(i = F ) = µ. F denotes the “rule-following” type. Besides
utility from the material payoff, this type feels an intrinsic disutility when
not complying to rules. Let γF denote the agent’s weight on the concern to
follow the rule and b(a, ã(R, s)) reflect the disutility when breaking a rule.
F ’s utility function is given by
uF = P + γF · b(a, ã(R, s)). (2.2)
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The disutility from rule-breaking, b(a, ã(R, s)), depends on the agent’s action
a as well as action ã(R, s) that is dictated by rule R for the agent’s private
signal s. The functional form of b is given by
b(a, ã(R, s)) =



0 if a ≥ ã(R, s)
a − ã if a < ã(R, s).
(2.3)
The agent is neutral to a positive deviation from the rule, i.e. when he chooses
the costly action a = 1 even though ã = 0. However, choosing a = 0 when
the rule dictates ã = 1 gives a disutility of −γF .
1b. The Selfish Type S denotes the “selfish, image-concerned” type.
This type cares about his image and wants to be perceived as a rule-follower.
Thus, his utility is increasing in the posterior belief µ̂(a, ω) = pr(i = F |a, ω)
of a neutral observer. The observer observes action a and state ω at the end
of the game and updates his prior about the agent’s type according to Bayes’
rule. The observer does not observe the agent’s private signal. Let γI denote
the agent’s weight on image concerns. S’s utility is given by
uS = P + γI · µ̂(a, ω). (2.4)
2. Welfare At t = 1, the principal chooses a rule to maximize welfare W .
Thereby, she takes into account the positive externality e the agent’s action
has on welfare. Welfare is not affected by the agent types’ intrinsic utility
(i.e. the rule-following or image utility) and is given by
W = (1 + e) · a · ω − c(a). (2.5)
Moreover, I impose that
(1 + e) · πh > (1 + e) · ρ > c > 1 > (1 + e) · πl. (2.6)
Implications are as follows. First, (1 + e) · ρ > c implies that from an ex-
ante welfare perspective, it is optimal to act prosocially and play a = 1.
Secondly, (1 + e) · πh > c > (1 + e) · πl implies that from an ex-post welfare
perspective, it is optimal to play a = 1 if and only if s = h, i.e. to take the
Chapter 2. Optimal Rule Design and an Emerging Moral Wiggle Room 52
prosocial action if and only if the signal is high. Thirdly, c > 1 implies that
the selfish action, a = 0, maximizes monetary payoffs regardless of the state
or signal. Therefore, if no rule was in place, a conflict of interests would arise
between the agent, who then maximizes only his monetary payoff, and the
welfare-maximizing principal.
3. Rules To overcome this conflict of interests and to induce the agent to
take the welfare-maximizing action, the principal designs a non-binding rule
at t = 1. There exist no formal sanctions for non-compliance with any rule.
A rule R prescribes an action ã that is ought to be taken by the agent
after receiving signal s. The principal can choose between the following two
rules.4 The Unconditional Rule RU dictates the ex-ante efficient behavior,
i.e. ã = 1 regardless of the signal. The Conditional Rule RC dictates the
ex-post efficient behavior, i.e. ã = 1 if and only if s = h. Formally, the rules
are given by
RU : ã = 1 ∀ s (2.7)
RC : ã =



1 if s = h
0 if s = l.
(2.8)
2.2.2 Analysis
The analysis focuses on a “wiggle room equilibrium” and shows its existence
and uniqueness under certain conditions. In such an equilibrium, the Uncon-
ditional Rule induces adherence by both types while under the Conditional
Rule, the selfish, image-concerned type does not follow that rule. Definition
2.1 states that intuition formally.
4Note that there are generally four rules available. In addition to the two analyzed, there
is an Unconditional Rule that prescribes ã = 0 ∀ s and a Conditional Rule that prescribes
ã = 0(1) if s = h(l). Both rules are not included in the analysis because they are clearly
inferior to RU and RC .
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Definition 2.1.
A “wiggle room equilibrium” is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), using
the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987) as an equilibrium refinement.
In this equilibrium the agent behaves as follows:
aF = ã ∀ R ∈ {RU , RC} (2.9)
aS =



ã if R = RU
0 if R = RC ,
(2.10)
and posterior beliefs are updated accordingly.
I proceed by analyzing behavior of the two types separately, starting with
the rule-following type. This type is intrinsically motivated to follow any rule
since he feels a disutility when not doing so. Therefore, he plays a game of
complete information. Lemma 2.1 says that the rule-following type follows
any rule and acts prosocially if and only if his rule-following concerns are
sufficiently pronounced.
Lemma 2.1.
In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the rule-following type follows any rule
if and only if γF ≥ c − πl.
Proof. I first analyze the behavior of the rule-following type under the Uncondi-
tional Rule. If s = h, rule-following (i.e. a = 1) yields an expected utility of
πh − c < 0. If s = l, rule-following gives πl − c < 0. In both cases, not following
the rule implies that the agent feels a disutility of −γF . As πl < πh, (a) the rule-
following type follows the Unconditional Rule and acts prosocially after any signal
if and only if γF ≥ c − πl; (b) if γF ∈ (c − πl, c − πh], the agent acts prosocially
if and only if s = h; (c) if γF < c − πh, the agent never follows the rule and acts
selfishly. Under the Conditional Rule, the agent always complies with the rule if
s = l since the rule prescribes a = 0 and thus there is no conflict between the rule
and the payoff-maximizing action. If s = h, the same logic applies as under the
Unconditional Rule. The agent complies with the rule if and only if γF ≥ c − πh.
As πh > πl, it is implied by γF ≥ c − πl and thus the agent follows both rules if
and only if γF ≥ c − πl.
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In what follows, I restrict the analysis to the case described by Lemma
2.1.5 I proceed by analyzing the behavior of the selfish type under the Un-
conditional Rule, described in Lemma 2.2. It shows the existence of a unique
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the selfish type fully follows the Un-
conditional Rule. For all proofs throughout this section, it will be useful to
define Esµ̂(a) := πsµ̂(a, 1) + (1 − πs)µ̂(a, 0) as the agent’s expectations about
the observer’s posterior belief when the agent receives signal s and plays ac-
tion a. Note that, as posterior beliefs are formed in equilibrium, Esµ̂(a) is
conditional on the equilibrium under consideration.
Lemma 2.2.
Suppose γF ≥ c − πl and γI ≥ c−πlµ . There exists a unique Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, using the Intuitive Criterion as equilibrium refinement, in which
the selfish type acts prosocially under the Unconditional Rule, regardless of
the signal he receives.
Proof. In the unique PBE described in Lemma 2.2, the selfish type always follows
the rule. In this case, the selfish type perfectly mimics the rule-following type,
and therefore actions contain no information about the agent; hence µ̂ = µ. That
gives an expected utility of πh − c + γIµ after s = h, or πl − c + γIµ after s = l.
Further, note that for the rule-following type a = 0 is dominated by a = 1 because
of Lemma 2.1. The Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987) can be applied:
upon observing a deviation to a = 0 the observer infers that µ̂ = 0. Therefore,
only if πl − c + γIµ ≥ 0, i.e. γI ≥ c−πlµ , the selfish agent follows the Unconditional
Rule. This establishes the necessary and sufficient condition. For uniqueness, I first
find conditions for all other potential (three pure-strategy and one mixed-strategy)
PBE, and then show that these are not consistent with γI ≥ c−πlµ .
In the second PBE, the selfish type never follows the rule. This gives an utility
of 0, while deviating gives πh − c + γI or πl − c + γI respectively. Therefore,
only if γI < c − πh, the selfish agent never follows the Unconditional Rule. As
c − πh < c − πl, this is inconsistent with γI ≥ c−πlµ > c − πh.
In the third PBE, the selfish agent only acts prosocially after s = h. This gives
a utility of πh − c + γIEhµ̂(1) whereas deviating gives 0 after observing s = h.
Moreover, in that PBE, the selfish agent plays a = 0 after s = l, receiving 0. In
that case, deviation utility is given by πl −c+γIElµ̂(1). Therefore, the selfish agent
acts prosocially after s = h and selfish after s = l only if c−πh
Ehµ̂(1)
< γI <
c−πl
Elµ̂(1)
.
Note that Elµ̂(1) = πlµ̂(1, 1) + (1 − πl)µ̂(1, 0) > µ because both posterior beliefs
are larger than µ. Thus c−πl
µ
> c−πl
Elµ̂(1)
and this PBE is inconsistent with γI ≥ c−πlµ .
5In the other two cases, described in the proof of Lemma 2.1, the rule-following type follows
the rule either partially or not at all. However they are inconsistent with a wiggle room
equilibrium. The equilibrium analysis for these cases can be found in Footnote 6.
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The fourth potential PBE states that the selfish agent only acts prosocially after
s = l. Similar to above, the necessary condition is given by c−πl
Elµ̂(1)
< γI <
c−πh
Ehµ̂(1)
.
However, since πh > πl, that condition requires that Ehµ̂(1) < Elµ̂(1). Noting
µ̂(1, 1) > µ̂(1, 0), Esµ̂(1) = πsµ̂(1, 1) + (1 − πs)µ̂(1, 0), and πh > πl it becomes
apparent that c−πl
Elµ̂(1)
> c−πh
Ehµ̂(1)
. Hence, this case is not a PBE.
Lastly, consider a mixed strategy PBE in which the agent plays a = 1 with
probability qh (ql) ∈ (0, 1) after receiving s = h (s = l). In such equilibrium, the
agent must be indifferent between playing a = 1 and a = 0 under each signal.
Furthermore, because the rule-following type never acts selfishly (but the selfish
type may as ql, qh < 1), posterior beliefs after a = 0 are given by µ̂(0, ω) = 0.
It follows that Esµ̂(0) = 0 ∀s. Therefore, for the agent to be indifferent between
a = 1 and a = 0, it must hold that πh − c + γIEhµ̂(1) != γIEhµ̂(0) = 0 and
πl − c + γIElµ̂(1) != γIElµ̂(0) = 0 since the rule-following type follows the rule.
As Esµ̂(1) = πsµ̂(1, 1) + (1 − πs)µ̂(1, 0), these two conditions give a system of
equations with two unknowns and two equations. Solving gives µ̂(1, 1) = c−1
γI
and
µ̂(1, 0) = c
γI
. Posterior beliefs are determined in the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Therefore, it must also hold that µ̂(1, 1) = µ
µ+(1−µ)[σhqh+(1−σh)ql]
and µ̂(1, 0) =
µ
µ+(1−µ)[σlqh+(1−σl)ql]
. Note that, since qh, ql > 0, both posterior beliefs are larger
than µ Hence in the mixed strategy PBE it must jointly hold that µ̂(1, 1) = c−1
γI
> µ
and µ̂(1, 0) = c
γI
> µ, and thus c−1
µ
> γI >
c
µ
. The first inequality violates
γI ≥ c−πlµ . Therefore, the pure strategy PBE described in Lemma 2.1 is unique for
γI ≥ c−πlµ .
Lemma 2.2 states that if image concerns are sufficiently strong even the
selfish type will act prosocially and follow the Unconditional Rule. Since the
Unconditional Rule prescribes to play a = 1 independent of the signal, there
is no uncertainty about the agent’s rule-following intentions. Hence the two
objectives of the selfish, image-concerned type conflict. If image concerns are
sufficiently strong, the selfish type rather pools with the rule-following type
to maintain a positive image and also follows the rule.
Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique for the range of parameters in
which the selfish type acts prosocially under the Unconditional Rule. The
underlying intuition is that if the selfish type acts selfishly the posterior beliefs
after a prosocial action are higher. That implies that the incentives to act
prosocially increase. If image concerns are sufficiently strong, as in Lemma
2.2, any selfish action implies too strong incentives to deviate to a prosocial
action and receive image utility. In that case there cannot be any selfish
behavior in equilibrium, not even in mixed strategies.
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I proceed by analyzing the selfish type’s behavior under the Conditional
Rule. Lemma 2.3 states that the only existing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
is one in which the selfish type acts selfishly. However, for that equilibrium
to exist image concerns must be sufficiently low. For the analysis, let g(µ) :=
(1−µ)[1−µ(σlπh+(1−πh)σh)]
(1−µσh)(1−µσl)
, with g(µ) ∈ (0, 1) if (σh < 1 ∨ σl > 0) and µ > 0.
Lemma 2.3.
Suppose γF ≥ c − πl and γI ≤ c−πhg(µ) . There exists a unique Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium in which the selfish type acts selfishly under the Conditional Rule.
If γI >
c−πh
g(µ)
, there does not exist a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium under the
Conditional Rule, neither in pure nor in mixed strategies.
Proof. Before proving the existence of the PBE in Lemma 2.3, I prove that no
other Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists.
First, consider a potential PBE in which the selfish type acts prosocially. In
that case, only the prosocial type may act selfishly, thus µ̂(a = 0) = 1. Hence a
deviation of the selfish type to a = 0 increases both the monetary payoff (a = 1
gives πs − c < 0 ) and the type’s image. Thus that case cannot constitute an
equilibrium.
Secondly, consider a potential PBE in which the selfish type acts prosocially
only if s = h. Note that in this equilibrium, the selfish type perfectly mimics
the rule-following type. Therefore, actions contain no information regarding the
agent’s type and any posterior belief is equal to the prior. After s = h, the selfish
type plays a = 1 which results in an expected utility of πh − c + γIµ. Deviation
gives γIµ. As πh − c < 0, the selfish type deviates.
Thirdly, consider a potential PBE in which the selfish type acts prosocially only
if s = l. After s = h, he plays a = 0 which results in an expected utility of γIEhµ̂(0).
Deviating gives πh − c + γIEhµ̂(1). After s = l, he plays a = 1 which results in an
expected utility of πl − c + γIElµ̂(1). Deviating gives γIElµ̂(0). The resulting two
conditions can be summarized as c−πl
Elµ̂(1)−Elµ̂(0)
< γI <
c−πl
Ehµ̂(1)−Ehµ̂(0)
. However, note
that µ̂(1, 1) > µ̂(1, 0) (in a high state, a high action is more likely to be from a rule-
following type) and µ̂(0, 0) > µ̂(0, 1) (in a low state, a low action is more likely to
be from a rule-following type). As πh > πl and Esµ̂(a) = πsµ̂(a, 1)+(1−πs)µ̂(a, 0),
it follows that Elµ̂(1) − Elµ̂(0) < Ehµ̂(1) − Ehµ̂(0) and thus it can never hold that
c−πl
Elµ̂(1)−Elµ̂(0)
< c−πl
Ehµ̂(1)−Ehµ̂(0)
.
Fourthly, consider a potential mixed strategy PBE in which the agent plays
a = 1 with probability qh (ql) ∈ (0, 1) after receiving s = h (s = l). In such
equilibrium, the agent must be indifferent between playing a = 1 and a = 0 un-
der each signal. Therefore, it must hold that πh − c + γIEhµ̂(1) = γIEhµ̂(0) and
πl−c+γIElµ̂(1) = γIElµ̂(0). Putting the two conditions together, it must hold that
πh+γI [Ehµ̂(1)−Ehµ̂(0)] = πl+γI [Elµ̂(1) − Elµ̂(0)]. πh > πl implies that Ehµ̂(1)−
Ehµ̂(0) < Elµ̂(1) − Elµ̂(0) is a necessary condition for a mixed strategy equilib-
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rium. I can re-write that condition as πh [(µ̂(1, 1) − µ̂(1, 0)) − (µ̂(0, 1) − µ̂(0, 0))] <
πl [(µ̂(1, 1) − µ̂(1, 0)) − (µ̂(0, 1) − µ̂(0, 0))]. Therefore, since πh > πl, it must hold
that [(µ̂(1, 1) − µ̂(1, 0)) − (µ̂(0, 1) − µ̂(0, 0))] < 0. However, as the rule-following
type follows the Conditional Rule perfectly, in any mixed strategy equilibrium
it holds that µ̂(1, 1) > µ̂(0, 1) and/or µ̂(0, 0) > µ̂(1, 0), i.e. the posterior belief
is higher after observing a rule-following action. Therefore, [(µ̂(1, 1) − µ̂(1, 0)) −
(µ̂(0, 1)− µ̂(0, 0))] is positive and the necessary condition for a mixed strategy PBE
is violated.
The last remaining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is the one in which the selfish
agent acts selfishly. That gives an expected utility of γIEhµ̂(0) and γIElµ̂(0) after
observing s = h and s = l respectively. Deviating to a = 1 gives πh − c + γI and
πl − c + γI as µ̂(a = 1) = 1. Therefore, within that equilibrium it must hold that
γI ≤ c−πh1−Ehµ̂(0) and γI ≤
c−πl
1−Elµ̂(0)
. Note that µ̂(0, 0) > µ̂(1, 0), i.e. a selfish action
is more likely to come from a rule-following type if the state is low. As πh > πl
it follows that (a) Ehµ̂(0) < Elµ̂(0) and subsequently (b)
c−πh
1−Ehµ̂(0)
< c−πl1−Elµ̂(0) .
Therefore, in the PBE it is necessary and sufficient that γI ≤ c−πl1−Elµ̂(0) . Lastly,
note that 1 − Ehµ̂(0) = 1 − (πh · µ(1−σh)1−µσh + (1 − πh) ·
µ(1−σl)
1−µσl
) and re-formulation
gives 1 − Ehµ̂(0) = g(µ). That yields the necessary and sufficient condition for the
unique PBE described in Lemma 2.3, i.e. γI ≤ c−πhg(µ) .
The main intuition behind Lemma 2.3 is straightforward. If image con-
cerns are sufficiently weak, the selfish type acts selfishly under the Conditional
Rule. If image concerns were sufficiently strong, the selfish type would have
an incentive to act prosocially, deviate and mimic the rule-following type.
Moreover the equilibrium in which the selfish type acts fully selfish is unique.
In any equilibrium in which the selfish type would act prosocially (or attach
a positive probability to such action), the ambiguity that arises with the
Conditional Rule creates an incentive to deviate and act selfishly.6
2.2.3 A Wiggle Room Equilibrium
As the behavior described in Lemmas 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 is consistent with the
wiggle room equilibrium in Definition 2.1, Proposition 2.1 follows naturally.
6Note that the analysis has only considered the selfish type’s behavior conditional on
γF ≥ c − πl. Clearly, the other two cases, i.e. when the rule-following type does not
perfectly follow both rules, are inconsistent with a wiggle room equilibrium. Yet for
completeness, I state the equilibria for these cases here. If γF < c − πh, there is a
unique equilibrium in which no type follows any rule and both types act selfishly. For the
intermediate case, γF ∈ [c − πh, c − πl), there is a unique equilibrium in which the selfish
type acts selfishly if and only if γI is sufficiently small. If not, there exists no equilibrium,
neither in pure nor in mixed strategies. The proof is similar to the proof of selfish behavior
under the Conditional Rule for Lemma 2.3 and is thus omitted.
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Proposition 2.1.
Suppose γF ≥ c − πl and c−πhg(µ) ≥ γI ≥
c−πl
µ
. The wiggle room equilibrium
exists and is unique.
Proof. The conditions follow from Lemmas 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. It is left to prove that
there exist µ such that c−πh
g(µ) >
c−πl
µ
, i.e. g(µ) < µ and thus c−πh
g(µ) ≥ γI ≥
c−πl
µ
is
possible. That proof is relegated to the proof of Condition 4 of Corollary 2.1.
Proposition 2.1 summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a wiggle room equilibrium. It reflects that, within the wiggle
room equilibrium, no type can have an incentive to deviate. As stated in
Lemma 2.1, the rule-following type adheres to both rules if and only if his
intrinsic motivation for rule-following is sufficiently high. Lemmas 2.2 and
2.3 show that the selfish type follows the Unconditional Rule if his image
concerns are sufficiently strong, but acts selfishly under the Conditional Rule
if his image concerns are sufficiently weak. Therefore image concerns must be
intermediate. Furthermore, from Proposition 2.1 follow further restrictions
on the signal structure and type composition. Corollary 2.1 summarizes four
necessary conditions for the wiggle room equilibrium to exist.
Corollary 2.1.
A wiggle room equilibrium exists only if
1. γF ≥ c − πl: rule-following concerns are sufficiently pronounced, and
2. γI ∈ [ c−πlµ ,
c−πh
g(µ)
]: image concerns are intermediate, and
3. σh < 1 ∨ σl > 0: signals are noisy, and
4. µ > µ: the fraction of rule-following agents is sufficiently large.
and µ = max
{
c−πl
γI
, µ1
}
and µ1 is implicitly given by g(µ1)
!
= µ1.
Proof. Conditions 1 and 2 are stated in Proposition 2.1 already. For Condition 3,
note that the wiggle room equilibrium cannot exist if g(µ) = 1 as in that case c−πl
µ
>
c−πh
g(µ) , a violation of Condition 2. Recall that g(µ) =
(1−µ)[1−µ(σlπh+(1−πh)σh)]
(1−µσh)(1−µσl)
.
Suppose σh = 1 and σl = 0. Then g(µ) = 1 − (1 − πh)µ. However, σl = 0
also implies that πh = 1 and thus g(µ) = 1. Therefore, if σh = 1 and σl = 0,
the wiggle room equilibrium does not exist. However, if σh = 1 and σl > 0,
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πh < 1 and g(µ) =
1−µ−µπ(1−σl)
(1−µσl)
∈ (0, 1). If σh < 1 and σl = 0, πh = 1 and
g(µ) = (1−µ)[1−µ(1−πh)σh]1−µσh ∈ (0, 1).
The first part of Condition 4, µ ≥ c−πl
γI
emerges from γI ≥ c−πlµ . For the second
part of Condition 4, i.e. µ ≥ µ1, note that c−πlµ ≤ γI ≤
c−πh
g(µ) implies that it must
hold that g(µ) < µ as πh > πl. Now note that if Condition 3 holds, g(µ) ∈ (0, 1)
and it is continuous in µ. Secondly, also µ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, Brouwer’s fixed
theorem states that µ1 exists with g(µ1)
!
= µ1. Lastly, to show that µ1 is a lower
bound to µ, note that g(µ) is decreasing in µ, with g(0) = 1. Hence, for µ > g(µ),
it must hold that µ > µ1.
The first two conditions of Corollary 2.1 have been discussed already.
The third condition describes that a wiggle room equilibrium, quite natu-
rally, builds on signals’ noisiness. Formally, the wiggle room equilibrium
requires that g(µ) < 1, which implies that the expected posterior beliefs in
equilibrium, Ehµ̂(0), are positive. Intuitively, signals must be noisy so that
the selfish type can maintain a positive image to some degree. That nosiness
is captured by g(µ) < 1. However, if both signals are precise it holds that
g(µ) = 1, and actions perfectly reveal the agent’s type; hence there is no pos-
sibility for a positive image if acting selfishly. That gives an incentive for the
selfish type to deviate and act prosocial to fully recover his image. Therefore,
with precise signals a wiggle room equilibrium cannot exist.
However, it is not required that both signals are noisy. If σh < 1 and
σl = 0 the agent may receive a low signal even though the state is high. In
this case, despite a high state and a selfish action, the agent can have still
followed the rule as he may have received the misleading, low signal. Thus,
the selfish type can use this possibility to act selfishly under the Conditional
Rule. If σh = 1 and σl > 0 the agent may receive a high signal even though
the state is low. Here, the selfish type “gambles” and hopes that the signal
is actually misleading. If the state is low despite a high signal, his selfish
action would not be socially punished (as the rule-follower also plays a = 0
when the signal and state are low). Therefore, the existence of some noise
is necessary for the emergence of a moral wiggle room. However, the selfish
type’s decision to use it and act selfishly depends on the relative size of his
image concerns.
The fourth condition of Corollary 2.1 describes that there must be suffi-
ciently many rule-followers. Otherwise, any posterior belief that the agent is
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a rule-following type is too low and the selfish type has no incentive to act
prosocially.
Hence, the existence of a wiggle room equilibrium is quite sensible to exact
parameter constellations.7 This is one of the major complications for the
experimental setup, described in Section 2.3. I conclude the theory section
by examining the welfare implications under both rules in a wiggle room
equilibrium.
Welfare
To analyze welfare consequences, denote W U as the expected welfare under
the Unconditional Rule RU and W C the expected welfare under the Condi-
tional Rule RC . In the wiggle room equilibrium they are given by
W U =ρ · (1 + e) − c (2.11)
W C =µ · [ρσh · (1 + e − c) − (1 − ρ)σlc]. (2.12)
Under the Unconditional Rule, any agent plays a = 1 at costs c. Only if
ω = 1, i.e. with a probability of ρ, that action translates into welfare benefits
of (1 + e).
Under the Conditional Rule the selfish type always takes the selfish action,
inducing a welfare of zero. The agent is a rule-following type with probability
µ. In that case, he plays a = 1 at costs c if and only if the signal is high. If
the state turns out to be high as well (with probability ρσh), there is a welfare
gain of (1 + e) and costs of c. If the state is low despite a high signal (with
probability (1 − ρ)σl), the prosocial action does not pay off. Comparing both
welfares under the two rules gives Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.2.
In the wiggle room equilibrium, the Unconditional Rule induces a higher wel-
fare only if
1 + e
c
− 1 > 1 − ρ
ρ
1 − µσl
1 − µσh
. (2.13)
7Interestingly, in any other existing equilibrium there is even less rule-following under the
Unconditional Rule, see Footnote 6 and the proof for Lemma 2.2.
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Proof. The proof involves only some mathematical reformulation of W U > W C
and is thus omitted.
First, it is apparent that the Unconditional Rule becomes more likely if
the prosocial action’s externality increase and costs decrease. In that case,
the welfare benefits from the prosocial action in a high stage increase; thus
the relative inefficiency of the Unconditional Rule (i.e. that it prescribes the
inefficient action for s = l) decreases.
Secondly, to analyze the effect of the wiggle room on the relative welfare
benefits of the Unconditional Rule, I focus on the comparative statics of µ
on W U − W C under these two conditions. Suppose (a) the conditions in
Proposition 2.1 hold, i.e. a wiggle room equilibrium exists, and (b) that if all
agents followed the rule the Conditional Rule would induce higher welfare,
i.e. 1+e
c
−1 < 1−ρ
ρ
1−σl
1−σh
. This is the case if (1−σl) and σh are sufficiently high,
i.e. the signals’ noisiness is sufficiently low.
Proposition 2.2 implies an upper bound µ on the share of rule-following
individuals for the Unconditional Rule to be superior. For the intuition,
suppose there are only rule-following individuals, i.e. µ = 1. In that case,
the Conditional Rule is superior as it prescribes the efficient action for each
signal. However, in the wiggle room equilibrium selfish types do not follow the
Conditional Rule. That relative disadvantage increases when µ decreases; less
rule-following types implies more selfish behavior only under the Conditional
Rule. Because both types follow the Unconditional Rule, it becomes superior
if the Conditional Rule cannot induce sufficiently many individuals to act
prosocially, i.e. if µ < µ. This finding is stated in Corollary 2.2.8
Corollary 2.2.
Suppose c − πl ≤ γF , c−πlµ ≤ γI ≤
c−πh
g(µ)
and 1+e
c
− 1 < 1−ρ
ρ
1−σl
1−σh
. The Uncon-
ditional Rule induces higher welfare if and only if µ ∈ [µ, µ).
Proof. The proof involves only to solve Equation (2.13) for µ and noting that
Corollary 2.1 states a lower bound on µ and is thus omitted.
8Here, µ is defined by Corollary 2.1 and µ = ρ(1+e)−c
ρσh(1+e)−(ρσh+(1−ρ)σl)c
.
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2.3 Experiment
An experiment was conducted to test two main questions. First, do individ-
uals follow rules in an uncertain environment? The theory clarifies that this
is a necessary condition for the existence of a wiggle room equilibrium. The
second question builds on that condition. Does a wiggle room equilibrium
emerge in the experiment, i.e. do individuals act more selfishly under the
Conditional Rule?
2.3.1 Design
The experiment uses a variant of a three-person public goods game (PGG). It
consists of four parts. In Part I, subjects play the PGG three times for differ-
ent multiplication factors. In the main part of the experiment, uncertainty as
well as rules and (self-)image concerns are introduced to the PGG. It consists
of a one-shot (Part II) and repeated version (Part III) of the PGG. In Part
IV, a post-experimental survey is conducted. Details about the survey as well
as a summary of the experimental structure (Figure 2.3) are to be found at
the end of this section.
Part I
In Part I, subjects are randomly matched into groups of three. In a group,
each subject receives an endowment of 20 points and decides over a contribu-
tion x ∈ {0, 10, 20} to the group account. Every point that is not contributed
to the group account is allocated to a private account. A subject earns one
point for each point allocated to his/her private account. A contribution to
the group account of x points translates into an earning of y points for each of
the three subjects in the group. The exact amount y depends on the level of
contribution and the state of the world ω that applies to one group. There are
three potential states, called State 1, State 2 and State 3.9 The relationship
between contribution x and earnings y for each state can be found in Table
2.1. For example, for one contribution of x = 20 points, each subject in the
group receives y = 12 (9, 5) points if the state is ω = State 1 (2, 3). Given a
9In the experiment, states were called “situations”. All instructions as well as exemplary
screenshots can be found in Appendix B.2.
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ω State 1 State 2 State 3
x = 0 y = 0 y = 0 y = 0
x = 10 y = 5 y = 8 y = 2
x = 20 y = 12 y = 9 y = 5
Table 2.1: Earnings Scheme for the Group Account
state ω, full earnings for individual i are given by
πi = 20 − xi +
3∑
j=1
yj(xj, ω). (2.14)
For all states, the payoff-maximizing contribution is xS = 0. But states differ
in their efficient, welfare-maximizing contribution x∗. The respective efficient
contributions are underlined in Table 2.1. In State 1, the efficient contribution
is x∗ = 20 points, in State 2 it is x∗ = 10 points and in State 3, x∗ = 0.
In Part I of the experiment, subjects play the PGG for each state sep-
arately. After explaining the general public goods game, the relationship
between a contribution and the subjects’ earnings for State 1 is introduced
first. Control questions follow. Then, subjects simultaneously make their
contribution decision for State 1. Thereafter, beliefs about the other group
members’ contributions are elicited. That procedure is repeated for State 2
and State 3.10 There is no feedback on others’ contributions within or after
Part I. Only at the end of the experiment, one of the three states is randomly
drawn by the computer and earnings are distributed according to subjects’
contributions and the drawn state.
In Part I, subjects are therefore introduced to the general trade-off of a
PGG in an incentivized manner. Due to the complex environment in the
main part of the experiment, it is important that subjects understand the
PGG and its implications in each state.
Main Part - Parts II and III
The main part of the experiment introduces uncertainty as well as rules. It
consists of a one-shot (Part II) and repeated (Part III) version of the following
three-person PGG; I explain the one-shot version first.
10In half of the sessions, the order of states is reversed.
Chapter 2. Optimal Rule Design and an Emerging Moral Wiggle Room 64
After Part I, subjects are randomly re-matched into groups of three and
randomly assigned one of two roles. There is one group that consists of
“rulers” who, in Part II, choose non-binding rules for other groups. The
remaining groups consist of “contributors”.
Contributors play a PGG similar to Part I. Endowments, states and the
earnings scheme from Table 2.1 remain the same. The overall structure of the
one-shot PGG in Part II is described in Figure 2.2. At t = 1, the computer
privately draws a state that determines the relationship between contributions
and earnings for each group. Based on that draw, the computer further draws
private independent signals for each subject of a group. At t = 2, rulers choose
a rule for each group. At t = 3, contributors are informed about the rule in
their group. Thereafter, contributions are elicited via the strategy method,
i.e. for each signal, at t = 4. This part’s payoffs and contribution are revealed
to the subjects only at the end of the experiment.
Uncertainty and Signals. At t = 1, the computer privately draws one
of the three states with equal probability. Subjects do not learn the relevant
state until the end of the experiment. But they do receive a noisy, private
signal about the computer draw. There are three potential signals, Signal I,
Signal II and Signal III. After the state is drawn, the computer draws a signal
for each subject in a group independently. The signal matches the state with
probability 5/6.11 Each of the other two, “misleading” signals is drawn with
a probability of 1/12. Subjects are instructed about the signal structure as
well as the resulting posteriors. The posteriors are depicted using a pie chart
to ease understanding. Subjects further learn that signals are private and no
other subject can observe other subjects’ signals.
To compare behavior under an Unconditional Rule and a Conditional
Rule, all three subjects within a group receive the same non-binding rule that
guides behavior. The rule is given to the subjects before their contribution
decision. The experiment’s treatment variation is therefore on the group level
and consists of the two different rules.
11That is, Signal I is the matching signal for State 1 etc. The conditional probabilities
are chosen such that the efficient contribution remains the same for each state and the
according signal.
Chapter 2. Optimal Rule Design and an Emerging Moral Wiggle Room 65
t = 1
Computer
privately draws
a state & signals
t = 2
Rulers
choose
a rule
t = 3
Contributors
observe
the rule
t = 4
Contributors
make a contribution
for each signal
t
Figure 2.2: Timeline in Part II, the One-Shot PGG.
Rule Choice and Treatment Variation. Before the subjects’ contribu-
tion decisions, all subjects in a group receive a “group rule”. The group rule
is chosen by one of the rulers who do not play the PGG, neither in Part II
nor Part III. The contributors are instructed that the ruler “has an incentive
to choose a group rule that induces a group payoff that is as high as possible.”
This is “because his own earnings from this part of the experiment depend
inter alia on this group payoff.” That procedure is ought to make the Uncon-
ditional Rule “plausible” and induce sufficient rule-following behavior, even
when it prescribes inefficient behavior.
Each ruler is matched with two groups and chooses one group rule for
each group. There are three rules, displayed in Table 2.2. Rule A is the
Unconditional Rule. It prescribes a contribution of 10 points regardless of the
signal. This is the ex-ante efficient contribution. Rule C is the Conditional
Rule. It dictates the efficient contribution for each signal. Rule B is, in
expected terms, inferior to both rules. It dictates the selfish contribution
of zero points for all signals. For the first group the ruler is matched with,
he chooses between the Unconditional Rule A and Rule B. For the second
group, he chooses between the Conditional Rule C and Rule B. In additional
instructions, only available to the rulers, it is explicitly stated that Rule A
and Rule C are superior to Rule B as they generate higher expected group
if subjects follow the rule. As rulers receive the average payoff of one of the
groups randomly, they are incentivized to choose the Unconditional Rule and
the Conditional Rule. All subjects were informed that rules are non-binding,
i.e. there exist no formal sanctions for non-compliance.
After rulers have chosen a rule for each group, the chosen group rule is
depicted to each subject in a group on the computer screen. Subjects know
only about the chosen rule; they are informed neither about the existence of
other rules nor about the procedure of the ruler’s decision.
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When receiving ..., Unconditional
Rule B
Conditional
contribute: Rule A Rule C
Signal I 10 points 0 points 20 points
Signal II 10 points 0 points 10 points
Signal III 10 points 0 points 0 points
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Choice for Group 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Choice for Group 2
Table 2.2: Rules in the Experiment
In conclusion, that setup allows for a treatment variation on the group
level. Groups receiving Rule A are in the “Unconditional” treatment (UN-
COND). Groups receiving Rule C are in the “Conditional” treatment (COND).
Throughout the whole experiment, the only difference between the two treat-
ments is the group rule.
One-shot PGG (Part II). After the general instructions for Part II
are read aloud, subjects answer unincentivized control questions. They are
assigned to their respective roles as contributors and rulers. After the com-
puter has privately drawn states for the contributor groups and signal for their
members, the ruler chooses a group rule (without knowing the draws). The
selected group rule is then displayed to all subjects in a group. Thereafter, the
subjects’ contributions are elicited via the strategy method: subjects make
a contribution decision for each signal without knowing the signal that was
drawn, first for Signal I, then II and III. Moreover, beliefs about other group
members’ contributions are elicited after the respective contribution decision.
If beliefs are correct, subjects receive additional 5 points. At the end of Part
II, subjects are informed about which signal was drawn to determine their
contribution. Only at the end of the experiment, subjects learn the state in
Part II and the contributions of the other group members (but not the others’
private signals).
Moreover, rulers state beliefs about the expected groups’ average pay-
offs. Thereby I measure whether rulers anticipate rule-based changes in the
group payoffs and thus welfare differences between the rules. Rulers receive
additional 5 points if their belief is correct within a 1-point-range.
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Repeated PGG (Part III). The repeated version of the PGG consists
of ten rounds. Groups are stable between Part II and III as well as across
rounds in Part III. Also the group rule remains the same. At the beginning
of each round, subjects receive feedback: the states as well the other group
members’ contributions in all previous rounds are displayed. Furthermore,
each subject (privately) observes his/her signals, contributions and payoffs
in all previous rounds. In a current round, the computer first draws a state
for the group for that round and then draws independent signals for each
subject. Then, subjects decide over their contributions to the group account.
The group rule as well as the feedback and the current signal are depicted on
the decision screen.
Groups and subjects are matched across treatments (i.e. group rules) on
the sequence of states, and the sequence of signals respectively. This allows
for a clean comparison of rule effects in the repeated PGG game. For each
group, one of the ten rounds was randomly chosen to determine subjects’
earnings in Part III.
Rulers’ task in Part III. While contributors play the repeated version
of the PGG, rulers face a different task. They undertake a belief elicitation
task to elicit prevalent social norms induced by the different rules. Thereby,
I use simple coordination games based on Krupka and Weber (2013): rulers
state their beliefs over another ruler’s response on the social appropriateness
of contributions. They do so for each of the three different states under both
the Unconditional Rule and and the Conditional Rule. This gives six belief
measures (3 states x 2 rules). Thereby, they rate hypothetical contributions
on a scale of “Socially very inappropriate, Socially inappropriate, Socially
appropriate, Socially very appropriate”. Rulers are incentivized to match
the answer of a randomly chosen other ruler in their group. One of the six
answers is randomly chosen for the payoff. If the answer is equal to the
matched ruler’s answer, the ruler receives 20 points. As described by Krupka
and Weber (2013) this method allows to identify prevalent social norms in
the situation at hand.
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Figure 2.3: Overall Structure of the Experiment
Part IV
At the end of the experiment, all participants complete an (unincentivized)
survey containing socio-demographic questions as well as questions on trust,
risk, negative reciprocity, altruism and math skills from the Global Prefer-
ence Survey (Falk et al. 2018). The complete structure of the experiment is
presented in Figure 2.3.
2.3.2 Hypotheses
The first hypothesis regards the rulers’ rule choice. Treatment variation only
works if rulers choose the Unconditional Rule and the Conditional Rule, re-
spectively, over the inferior Rule B.
Hypothesis 2.1.
Rulers prefer the Unconditional Rule and the Conditional Rule over Rule B.
The second hypothesis investigates subjects’ rule-following behavior. The
summary in Table 2.3 highlights that the Unconditional Rule and the Condi-
tional Rule differ in the prescribed contributions for Signal I and Signal III.
Thus, if subjects tend to follow rules contributions in COND will be higher
when the signal is Signal I and lower when the signal is Signal III.
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Signal I Signal II Signal III
Selfish contribution xS 0 points 0 points 0 points
Efficient contribution x∗ 20 points 10 points 0 points
UNCOND: Unconditional Rule 10 points 10 points 10 points
COND: Conditional Rule 20 points 10 points 0 points
Table 2.3: Contributions and Rules
Hypothesis 2.2.
Subjects tend to follow the rules, i.e. contributions are higher (lower) under
the Conditional Rule for Signal I (Signal III).
Given that a substantial fraction of subjects follows the rules, the pos-
sibility for a wiggle room exists. In Part III, the social appropriateness of
contributions under each rule is elicited from rulers. In terms of the model,
social appropriateness is an approximation for social image. The more socially
appropriate a contribution is, the higher the contributor’s social image should
be. In that sense, rulers in Part III take the role of a neutral observer. If they
update consistently, rulers should infer that a contribution of zero points is
socially less inappropriate under the Conditional Rule. This is because under
the Unconditional Rule, a contribution of zero points is unambiguously rule-
breaking. Under the Conditional Rule, a contribution of zero points can still
be rule-following (if the subject has received a misleading Signal III). I focus
on the social appropriateness of actions for State 2. In terms of the model,
State 2 and Signal II correspond to ω = 1 and s = h as both rules prescribe
the same prosocial action in that case. Under the Unconditional Rule, the
model predicts µ̂(ω = 1, a = 0) = 0. Under the Conditional Rule, the model
predicts µ̂(ω = 1, a = 0) > 0. Hypothesis 2.3 applies that intuition to the
current experiment.
Hypothesis 2.3.
For State 2, a contribution of zero points is socially less inappropriate under
the Conditional Rule.
Given that all three previous hypotheses hold, there is room for wiggle
room behavior. If the wiggle room equilibrium exists, subjects will contribute
less under the Conditional Rule. As Table 2.3 shows, both rules dictate the
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same contribution of 10 points when receiving Signal II. Therefore, Signal II
allows for a clean comparison of the rules. There, the only difference between
the two rules lies in the potential to “wiggle” under the Conditional Rule.
Hypothesis 2.4 states that contributions are lower under the Conditional Rule
when subjects receive Signal II.
Hypothesis 2.4.
Subjects use the possibility to act selfishly under the Conditional Rule, i.e.
contributions are lower under the Conditional Rule for Signal II.
2.3.3 Procedures
The experiment took place at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Eco-
nomic and Social Sciences (MELESSA), with a total of 10 sessions and 207
participants. A pilot session was conducted to test the subjects’ understand-
ing of the experiment.12 In the experiment, there were 21 participants per
session, except for one session with 18 participants. Participants were re-
cruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and the experiment was conducted via
oTree (Chen et al. 2016). One point was converted into 0.125 EUR at the
end of the experiment. The subjects’ earnings from each of the three ex-
perimental parts were summed up to determine their total earnings. These
ranged between 11 and 21.50 EUR (12.86 and 25.14 US-$), with an average
of 15.71 EUR (18.37 US-$). On average, a session lasted around 61 minutes.
The experiment was pre-registered.13
2.3.4 Main Results
Rule Choice
In the experiment, 30 rulers made 59 rule choices.14 In 57 of them, the
Unconditional or Conditional Rule was chosen, i.e. a percentage of 96.6%.
12Due to administrative problems, one additional session had to be aborted after Part I.
The data from that session was not used for any analysis.
13http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=uh7pu3
14In one session, there were only 18 participants. Therefore, one ruler had only one matched
contributor group and made only one rule choice. It was randomly determined whether
the Unconditional Rule or Conditional Rule was the alternative to Rule B.
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Result 2.1.
Rulers choose the superior rule.
I exclude all groups that play under Rule B from the analysis. In total
28 groups (84 subjects) act under the Unconditional Rule and 29 groups (87
subjects) under the Conditional Rule.
Rule-Following Behavior
Hypothesis 2.2 states that the Conditional Rule induces higher contributions
for Signal I and lower contributions for Signal III. Figure 2.4 shows the mean
contributions in Part II and III for each signal under the different rules.
When the Conditional Rule dictates a higher contribution for Signal I, sub-
jects contribute significantly more (Part II: p=0.0015. Part III: p=0.0000).15
Similarly, for Signal III when the Conditional Rule dictates a lower contribu-
tion, subjects contribute significantly less (p=0.0000 in both parts). However,
subjects follow the rules imperfectly and tend to behave more selfishly than
the rule prescribes. Contributions are lower than the rule dictates in all but
one case.16 Moreover, under the Unconditional Rule more subjects follow the
rule for Signal I than for Signal III as in the former case rule-following is more
in line with selfish behavior for Signal I than for Signal III.17 In conclusion,
Hypothesis 2.2 is confirmed.
Result 2.2.
Contributors tend to follow the rules.
Before examining subjects’ wiggle room behavior, I first investigate the
existence of a potential wiggle room, based on the social appropriateness
of contributions. Figure 2.5 displays the means of the social appropriateness
measures elicited from rulers in Part III. Following Krupka and Weber (2013),
15Unless noted otherwise, a two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is used to test for
significance. For the analysis in Part III, I further exclude two additional groups that
were matched with the two groups under Rule B.
16Differences to the rules’ prescribed contributions are highly significant at the 1%-level
for each signal and in both parts (using a two-sided Student’s t-test). Contributions are
slightly higher than zero for Signal III under the Conditional Rule.
17The proportions are: 45 out of 84 subjects contribute 10 points for Signal I and 32
subjects for Signal III (p=0.0000, Fisher’s exact test).
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Figure 2.4: Mean Contributions for Each Signal in Part II and Part III
the Likert scale was transformed into values of (−1, −1
3
, 1
3
, 1). Thus a higher
mean is associated with a higher perceived social appropriateness.
First, social appropriateness of a contribution increases when the contri-
bution is prescribed by the rule, mostly at the 10% significance level. In State
1, 10 points are socially more appropriate under the Unconditional Rule (0.49
vs. 0.29, p=0.0598) while 20 points are socially more appropriate under the
Conditional Rule (0.76 vs. 0.89, p=0.0556). In State 2, both rules dictate
a contribution of 10 points. The social appropriateness of 10 points is the
same for both rules (0.67 vs. 0.64, p=0.6447). In State 3, 10 points again
are socially more appropriate under the Unconditional Rule (0.56 vs 0.33,
p=0.0837) while zero points are socially more appropriate under the Condi-
tional Rule (-0.09 vs 0.40, p= 0.0006). While negative deviations from the
rule are always socially inappropriate, the evidence of positive deviations is
mixed.18
The findings for State 2 confirm Hypothesis 2.3. Both rules dictate a
contribution of 10 points for the most probable Signal II. However, a selfish
deviation from the rule to a contribution of zero points is considered signif-
icantly less socially inappropriate under the Conditional Rule among rulers
(-0.60 vs. -0.36, p=0.0333).
Result 2.3.
A selfish, rule-breaking contribution is socially less inappropriate under the
Conditional Rule.
18One potential explanation is that social appropriateness includes other dimension of
social behavior than rule-following, for example efficiency and social concerns.
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Figure 2.5: Mean Measures of Social Appropriateness of Contributions
Note: The scale ranges from -1 (“socially very inappropriate”) to 1 (“socially very
appropriate”). The means are dependent on the state and the group rule.
Therefore, a neutral observer (here the rulers) takes into account that
the contributor may have received a misleading signal. In this case a selfish
contribution is rule-breaking only under the Unconditional Rule; hence a
wiggle room emerges. Selfish subjects can use a lack of punishment (in terms
of social disapproval) under the Conditional Rule to act more selfishly.
However, Figure 2.4 already reveals that subjects do not contribute less
under the Conditional Rule for Signal II. The mean contributions for Signal
II are not significantly different, neither in Part II (8.10 points under the Un-
conditional Rule and 8.05 under the Conditional Rule, p=0.9722) nor in Part
III (7.97 points under the Unconditional Rule and 7.71 under the Conditional
Rule, p=0.4679). Therefore, Hypothesis 2.4 has to be rejected.
Result 2.4.
Subjects do not use the wiggle room that the Conditional Rule offers them.
For Part III, additional regression analyses displayed in Table 2.4 give
further insights.19 First, in line with previous findings on repeated public
goods games (Chaudhuri 2011), contributions decline over time.20 Secondly,
individuals react to the information provided by signals and adapt their con-
tribution behavior. Signal I and Signal II increase expected earnings from a
19Other estimation models such as a Pooled OLS model and a Fixed Effects GLS model
yield similar results and are displayed in Appendix B.1.
20For an illustration, see Figure B.3 in Appendix B.1.
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Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Indv. Contribution
Round -0.35∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.770) (0.067) (0.067)
Conditional Rule 0.94 0.74
(0.745) (0.777)
Signal I 8.70∗∗∗ 8.84∗∗∗ 6.08∗∗∗ 6.13∗∗∗
(0.772) (0.782) (0.808) (0.813)
Signal II 6.56∗∗∗ 6.74∗∗∗ 6.16∗∗∗ 6.21∗∗∗
(0.358) (0.354) (0.468) (0.463)
Signal I * Cond. Rule 3.98∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗
(1.423) (1.311)
Signal II * Cond. Rule -0.48 -0.57
(0.654) (0.745)
Signal III * Cond. Rule -1.23∗∗∗ -1.58∗∗
(0.457) (0.734)
Avr. Contr. Part I 0.37∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059)
Constant 2.71∗∗∗ -2.38 3.83∗∗∗ -1.02
(0.646) (1.541) (0.450) (1.519)
Controls Yes Yes
Number of obs. 1,620 1,590 1,620 1,590
Number of indv. 162 159 162 159
Number of group clusters 54 54 54 54
Table 2.4: GLS Random Effects Model on Contributions in Part III
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the group level. ∗: p < 0.1, ∗∗:
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗: p < 0.001. Three groups were dropped because of a Rule B-group match or
because of no match in the session with 18 subjects. Controls in Models 2 & 4 include age,
gender, previous participations in experiments, self-reported math skills and measures for
altruism, negative reciprocity, risk and trust. The question on gender was not answered
by three participants, they were dropped in Models 2 & 4.
contribution compared to Signal III and consistently increase contributions
as well.
In Models 1 & 2 the Conditional Rule dummy indicates no general effect
of rules on contribution behavior. However the Conditional Rule has signal-
specific effects as it induces higher (lower) contributions for Signal I (Signal
III) as shown in Models 3 & 4. Yet, as already stated in Result 2.4, there is no
difference in contributions across rules when the signal is Signal II. Generally,
this finding raises additional questions. In the experiment, subjects follow
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rules and, according to the social appropriateness measure, there is room to
act more selfishly under the Conditional Rule. However, the moral wiggle
room has no effect on overall contribution behavior.
2.3.5 Additional Results
Contribution Behavior in Part I and Types. In Part I, subjects
contribute to the group account for each state separately. This gives data on
the subjects’ behavior in “regular” public goods games. I can use these data
(a) to classify subjects and examine whether rules have different impact for
different subjects and (b) as an additional control for subjects’ understanding
of the experiment.21 Due to the complex design, it is important to verify that
subjects behave consistently across experimental parts.
First, we can establish that subjects (1) have understood the PGG’s in-
centive structure and (2) behave consistently across parts. Subjects follow the
incentives to cooperate in each state of Part I as mean contributions decline
with the state.22 Subjects also behave consistently as a subject’s contribu-
tions in Part I has a significant effect on his/her contributions in Part III (see
Table 2.4).23
Secondly, I classify subjects into “selfish subjects”, “perfect contributors”
and “imperfect contributors” according to their Part I behavior.24 There are
26 selfish subjects (12.6%), 86 imperfect contributors (41.5%) and 62 perfect
contributors (30.0%) who account for 84% of all subjects. As a next step,
I examine whether the Unconditional Rule and the Conditional Rule have
different effects on the three types’ behavior in Part III. The type-specific
mean contributions are displayed in Figure 2.6 for each signal. Contributions
21Further, 14 control questions were asked to examine subjects’ understanding of the PGG
and the uncertainty and group rule in Part II. Over 90% of all participants answered all
questions correctly after two attempts at most.
22Mean contributions are 10.14 points in State 1, 8.02 points in State 2 and 1.64 points in
State 3. All means differ significantly at the 1%-level, using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
23As a summary statistics for Part I, a subject’s average contribution across all states was
used in the regression analysis. In Table 2.4, the variable is called “Avr. Contr. Part I”.
24Because of a lack of data on conditional contributions, I use a different classification
than the standard approach by Fischbacher et al. (2001). Instead the subjects’ condi-
tional contributions, I use their contributions across states. A subject is “selfish” if he
contributes zero points in all three states. A subject is a “perfect contributor” if he
contributes the efficient amount in each state. A subject is an “imperfect contributor” if
he contributes the efficient amount in State 1 or State 2, but less otherwise.
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Figure 2.6: Type-Specific Mean Contributions in Part III
differ by type as expected. Perfect contributors contribute more than other
types and follow both rules the most. Imperfect contributors also follow
both rules, but to a lesser extent. Selfish subjects contribute less than other
types. Most interestingly however, they do display wiggle room behavior; they
contribute less under the Conditional Rule. However, the differences are only
significant for Signal I (p=0.0060), but not for Signal II (p=0.2712).25 This
may be due to stronger incentives to act selfishly, given that the Conditional
Rule prescribes a contribution of 20 points for Signal I but of 10 points for
Signal II.
Result 2.5.
Selfish subjects use a moral wiggle room under the Conditional Rule if incen-
tives to act selfishly are sufficiently strong.
Beliefs. Subjects believe that the other group members follow the rule.
Whenever a rule prescribes higher contributions, subjects’ beliefs follow.26
Together with the results on social appropriateness, this is suggestive evidence
for an “expressive function” of rules (as in Sunstein 1996). Here rules have no
direct power as there are no formal sanctions on non-compliance. However
they alter beliefs and social norms and thus change behavior.
25The difference for Signal III is also significant (p=0.0318), but not indicative of wiggle
room behavior.
26See Figure B.1 in Appendix B.1. In both parts, mean belief differences are significant at
the 1%-level for Signal I and Signal III but are insignificant for Signal II.
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Payoffs. The experimental parameters were ex-ante constructed such that,
if all subjects followed rules, i.e. without a wiggle room equilibrium, there
were no payoff differences between the two rules. Result 2.4 shows no evi-
dence of wiggle room behavior in the experiment. Consequently, there are no
significant payoff differences between the two rules. In Part II, the average
payoff is 26.45 (27.30) points under the Unconditional (Conditional) Rule.27
In Part III, average payoffs are 25.34 points and 25.65 points respectively.
Order Effects. In half of the session, the order in which states were
presented to the subjects was reversed. Interestingly, strong order effects arise
as contributions are significantly higher for the first state that is introduced.
Secondly, the rules have different effects, dependent on the order. Again,
subjects seem to follow rules more strongly in their first contribution. These
effects were unanticipated, but could be explained by experimenter demand
effects and anchoring.28
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter is concerned with wiggle room behavior under different rules.
More specifically, I compare prosocial behavior and welfare effects under an
Unconditional Rule and a Conditional Rule, both theoretically and in a lab-
oratory experiment. The theory highlights a potential downside of the Con-
ditional Rule, the emergence of a wiggle room. In that case, the Conditional
Rule fails to induce selfish agents to follow the rule. Indeed, the model shows
that when the share of selfish, image concerned individuals as well as their
image concerns are sufficiently high, the Conditional Rule results in lower
welfare than the Unconditional Rule.
In a laboratory experiment, I test for the effects of the two rules on con-
tributions and resulting welfare in a public goods game. First, I find that
subjects tend to follow both rules and that selfish contributions are consid-
ered less inappropriate under the Conditional Rule. Therefore, there is scope
27When stating their beliefs about average payoffs, rulers systematically underestimated
average payoffs for both rules (22.30 points for the Unconditional Rule and 23.48 points
for the Conditional Rule) but also expected no differences in payoffs (p=0.5149).
28A more thorough analysis as well as a discussion are relegated to Appendix B.1.
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for wiggle room behavior; nonetheless I do not find generally lower contri-
butions under the Conditional Rule. However, consistent with wiggle room
behavior, selfish subjects do contribute less under the Conditional Rule if
incentives to act selfishly are sufficiently strong.
Therefore, the evidence on wiggle room behavior and subsequent implica-
tions on the optimality of rules remains inconclusive. Consistent with findings
by van der Weele et al. (2014), I do not find general evidence of wiggle room
behavior. One potential reason is that “reciprocity trumps wiggling”. Both
experiments include subjects’ cooperation (trust and moonlighting games in
van der Weele et al. (2014), a public good game here). If reciprocity concerns
are sufficiently strong they may outweigh the incentives to act selfishly, even in
wiggle room situations. Consequently the Conditional Rule may be superior
in similar settings. On the other hand, selfish subjects seem to behave more
selfishly under the Conditional Rule when incentives are sufficiently strong,
in line with wiggle room behavior found in Dana et al. (2007), Andreoni and
Bernheim (2009), and Grossman (2014).
Generally, the lack of overall effects of wiggle room behavior may thus
be attributed to reciprocal preferences that make the use of wiggle rooms
unattractive, or inadequate incentives to act selfishly or to a surprisingly
low fraction of selfish subjects. In the current experiment, only 13% of the
subjects were categorized as selfish, compared to, e.g., 30% in Fischbacher
et al. (2001). In conclusion, more research is needed to fully understand the
drivers of wiggle room behavior in different settings.
Individuals easily find excuses in manifold situations to explain their self-
ish behavior (e.g. Exley 2015); the intransparency in moral wiggle rooms
is only one of them. To disregard rules, more excuses come to mind. For
example, Unconditional Rules may be seen as implausible or inefficient and
therefore never come into effect. Conditional Rules especially lack simplicity;
here individuals may use complexity as an excuse for non-compliance. Future
research should further investigate what excuses are induced by different rules
and how they affect the rules’ effectiveness.
Chapter 3
Promotion, Delegation and
Selection
3.1 Introduction
Internal promotions are widely used to fill job vacancies.1 They are ought to
achieve two objectives at once, namely to create incentives for employees and
to select the best managers (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). It is not obvious,
however, that the two objectives are always in line. To motivate employees,
promotions must be based on current employee performance. To select the
best managers, they must be based on expected manager performance. If the
two measures are negatively correlated, a conflict of objectives arises.
There is ample evidence that promotions are mostly based on past and
current employee performance (Frederiksen et al. 2017); and the Peter princi-
ple states that this approach leads to worse management selection, in line with
a conflict of objectives (Peter and Hull 1969). That claim, a trade-off between
motivation and selection, is substantiated in Benson et al. (2018). They pro-
vide evidence that firms rather promote the best performing employees than
the expectedly best managers. Indeed, firms could improve managerial per-
formance by 30% if promotion decisions were based on other measures than
employee performance.
1For example, DeVaro et al. (2019) find that around 60% of new jobs are filled via internal
promotions. Baker et al. (1988, p.600) state that “promotions are used as the primary
incentive device in most organizations”. For a broader overview on empirical studies, see
Gibbons and Roberts (2012).
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This chapter examines an arising trade-off between the two objectives of
performance-based promotions, motivation and selection. Most importantly,
it first illustrates that such trade-off emerges from misaligned incentives be-
tween managers and the firm and the delegation of decision rights. That
approach differs from previous “skill-based” models such as Fairburn and
Malcomson (2001), Lazear (2004), and Schöttner and Thiele (2010) and from
the original intuition behind the Peter principle (Peter and Hull 1969). These
models blame skill differences between employee and manager tasks for bad
manager selection of performance-based promotions. In contrast, my the-
ory offers another explanation, namely the exploitation of decision rights by
promoted managers.
I show that employees who generate lower profits as managers are in-
centivized more strongly by the prospect of becoming manager; consequently
they are also more likely to get promoted. The intuition stems from the
fact that a management position, i.e. the promotion prize, entails more re-
sponsibility and more decision rights. Yet managerial decision-making is not
contractible. Hence a manager can exploit decision rights at his own inter-
est; only the preference alignment between manager and principal determines
how private benefits and profits are influenced by the manager’s decisions.
Consequently, lower preference alignment leads to higher private benefits for
the manager and lower profits for the firm.
It follows that those employees who gain more from a promotion because
of higher private benefits generate lower profits. If promotions are based on
employee performance, a trade-off between motivation and selection arises.
First, employees work hard to get promoted as they are incentivized by future
private benefits as managers. Furthermore, employees with lower preference
alignment receive higher private benefits when promoted and thus they will
work even harder than their competitors. Such behavior leads to a higher
promotion probability and a negative selection effect arises: employees who
generate lower profits as managers are more likely to get promoted.
The model further investigates the trade-off between motivation and selec-
tion from different angles. First it examines how a principal should optimally
delegate decision rights when promotions are based on employee performance.
Since managers receive private benefits from decision-making, the principal
could limit their decision rights, and thus private benefits, by delegating fewer
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decisions. As a result, bad selection of managers is reduced at the expense of
employee motivation. Consequently the optimal level of delegation balances
both effects. One of the main findings shows that partial delegation can be
optimal under performance-based promotions: the principal delegates only
a limited number of decisions to the manager as too much delegation would
attract unprofitable managers too strongly.
Moreover, I analyze the optimality of performance-based promotions in
light of the manager’s decision rights. If a management position is equipped
with many decision rights, the selection effect will be particularly pronounced.
In this case the principal will not use performance-based promotions to select
managers, to prevent those with worse preference misalignment from rising
to the top. I further consider the optimal design of the organization, i.e. the
joint choice of delegation and promotion. I show that (a) delegation and the
simultaneous use of performance-based promotions lead to higher motivation
of employees and (b) their joint use increases if preferences are sufficiently
aligned and the selection effect is sufficiently low.
The model also offers a new perspective to why we observe promotions at
all when the Peter principle applies. Fairburn and Malcomson (2001, p.45)
ask: “Why not (..) use promotions to assign employees to jobs and monetary
bonuses to provide incentives?” I investigate this question in two extensions.
I first analyze how worker wages and delegation interact. Workers are moti-
vated by both wages and expected private benefits from delegation, implying a
substitutability between the two incentive devices. Higher managerial discre-
tion then comes with lower subordinates’ wages. Overall, including monetary
incentives decreases the number of decisions delegated, but, in general, partial
delegation remains optimal. Secondly, I introduce further promotion-related
wage increases (Baker et al. 1994). I show that if such a wage increase is
optimal for the principal, the joint use of performance-based promotions and
delegation of decision rights is profitable as well.
Related Literature. This work combines two distinct strands of litera-
ture, namely that on the (negative) selection effects of promotions and the op-
timal delegation of decision rights. First, it offers a new explanation for why
performance-based promotion schemes induce inefficient selection of man-
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agers.2 While theories differ in explaining the benefits of performance-based
promotions3, they share the intuition behind its inefficiency: performance-
based promotions result in managers with an insufficient skills. Accordingly,
low manager performance arises because promoted workers lack the required
skills to be good managers (Peter and Hull 1969; Bernhardt 1995; Fairburn
and Malcomson 2001; Lazear 2004; Schöttner and Thiele 2010; Koch and
Nafziger 2012). The current approach is different as it is fully independent of
skill considerations. In my model, low manager performance arises because
promoted workers exploit managerial decision rights; and they vary in the
degree that they do so.
I also contribute to the literature on optimal delegation in which the prin-
cipal delegates decision rights to the manager to make him, e.g., acquire in-
formation (Aghion and Tirole 1997), communicate truthfully (Dessein 2002),
or exert effort (Bester and Krähmer 2008). In contrast to these papers, I am
concerned with the effects of delegation on the behavior of employees. My
model focuses on the link between managerial benefits and employees’ behav-
ior via performance-based promotions. It is silent about potential sources of
these benefits as well as the manager’s decision problem. Empirical evidence
regarding managerial private benefits can be, e.g., found in the literature on
managerial empire building (Jensen 1986; Hope and Thomas 2008), short-
termism (Bebchuk and Stole 1993; Edmans et al. 2017) and intrinsic valu-
ation of decision rights (Fehr et al. 2013; Bartling et al. 2014). In general,
managerial private benefits can arise from misaligned preferences as well as
ill-designed incentive schemes (see the discussion in Dessein 2002, p.815).
Furthermore, this chapter connects to work on complementarities in or-
ganizational design (see Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Roberts 2007). There
often exist interaction effects between different dimensions of organizational
design, for example between job design, monitoring and incentives (so called
2Empirical evidence for that claim can be found in Grabner and Moers (2013) and Benson
et al. (2018). They show promoting high-performing employees correlates negatively with
manager quality. More specifically, Benson et al. (2018) find that firms could increase
management performance by 30% if they based promotions on other measures than em-
ployee performance.
3For example, in Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) they prevent influence activities. In my
model, in Schöttner and Thiele (2010) and Koch and Nafziger (2012) and a large literature
on tournaments (Rosen 1986), performance-based promotions are used because they act
as an incentive device.
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“high performance work systems”, see Ichniowski and Shaw 2003), or between
the hierarchical structure of an organization and its use of promotions (Ke
et al. 2018). In the current model, complementarities between delegation and
the use of promotions arise because delegation increases private benefits of
managers and thus the prize for winning a promotion.
Lastly, my work complements a literature in political economy on the del-
egation of authority and selection effects. Already Knight (1938) and Hayek
(1944) discussed the influence of institutions and political systems on the
selection of politicians. Besley (2005) points out that a political office’s “at-
tractiveness” to candidates crucially depends on the rents they can extract
while in office; these in turn depend on the office’s power. Such consideration
will affect who is running for office, “egoistic” or “public-spirited” politicians.4
Similarly, the current model shows that decision rights, the “attractiveness”
of a management position, attract employees who want to exploit those de-
cision rights. Therefore, rents to promotion and power must be limited to
mitigate potential selection effects. For political offices, this can be done,
e.g., by setting up institutions to align a politician’s private interests (Barro
1973), his accountability, for instance via re-elections (Maskin and Tirole
2004; Acemoglu et al. 2010), the implementation of “checks and balances”
(Persson et al. 1997), or power de-concentration (Grunewald et al. 2019). In
organizations, the principal can simply restrict a manager’s decision rights.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 I introduce the
model and then analyze optimal delegation and optimal promotion rules in
Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents two extensions of the model by introducing
monetary incentives for the workers, via bonus schemes and via promotion-
related wage increases. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
Overview
The firm consists of a principal (female) and two workers (male) who exert
effort and compete for a promotion to a management position. The principal
4This idea of political selection is prevalent even in science-fiction novels. To quote David
Brin, the author of the post-apocalyptic novel “The Postman” (1985, p. 267): “It is said
that power corrupts, but actually it’s more true that power attracts the corruptible.”
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receives profits from both hierarchy levels, i.e. the workers’ work effort and
from the decisions made by the manager who is a promoted worker. In order
to maximize profits, the principal ex-ante chooses an organizational design
that has two dimensions. Thereby he chooses a promotion rule and the degree
of delegation of decision rights to the management position.
The model is introduced step-by-step. First I present the workers’ effort
choice and how it is shaped by promotion prospects. Then I continue by
introducing the management stage and the delegation decision. The model
setup is concluded by bringing both parts together. The incorporation of
wage payments, to the manager or to the employees, is relegated to the model
extensions in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
Promotions and Workers’ Effort
In the firm there are two workers competing for a promotion to a management
position. A worker i exerts unobservable effort ei ∈ [0, 1] on a project at
convex effort costs c(ei) =
c
2
e2i . Each worker’s project can either be a success
or a failure. In case of success, the principal receives S > 0, otherwise 0. A
worker i’s project success probability, given by pr(success) = ei, increases
linearly in his effort and is independent from the other worker’s effort.
Workers are incentivized purely by promotion prospects and do not receive
any wage payments.5 The principal P (she) ex-ante commits to a promotion
rule. The promotion rule is fully captured by a promotion probability pi(ei, ej)
for a worker i, given i’s and his coworker j’s effort levels ei and ej.
If worker i gets promoted he receives private benefits as a manager. These
are denoted by umi and will depend on the delegation decision as introduced
later. In general the risk-neutral worker i’s utility function is given by
ui(ei) = pi(ei, ej) · umi −
c
2
e2i . (3.1)
Promotion Rules
The principal can decide between two promotion rules prom ∈ {P, R}. The
“performance-based promotion” P is based on the workers’ project outcomes.
5In Section 3.4.1, workers receive additional performance-based wage payments. The main
results remain unchanged.
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When only one project is successful the principal promotes the successful
worker. Otherwise, he randomizes between the workers.6 In contrast, the
“random promotion” R is fully independent of the workers’ work. In that
case, the principal randomizes between the workers and chooses each of them
with probability pR = 0.5.7
Delegation
In the firm, a finite divisible number of similar decisions, normalized to 1,
need to be made. The principal P can delegate k ∈ [0, 1] of these decisions to
a manager M (he) who can then implement his favored choice. The payoffs
for each decision depend on the decision-maker:
1. If P makes a decision, total surplus from this decision is π > 0. The
manager cannot extract any private benefits and thus his payoff is uM =
0. The principal receives the full surplus, thus her profits are Π = π.
2. If M makes a decision, total surplus from this decision is πD > π. But
the manager extracts a share α ∈ [0, 1] of the surplus, and his payoff is
uM = απ
D. The principal receives the remaining share, Π = (1− α)πD.
The principal delegates decision rights over a fraction of k decisions to the
manager, and keeps decision rights over a fraction of (1 − k) decisions to
herself. Thus overall payoffs from managerial decision-making are given by
Π(k) = k · (1 − α)πD + (1 − k) · π = π + k · (δ − α)πD (3.2)
uM(k) = k · απD. (3.3)
Here, δ = π
D−π
πD
∈ (0, 1) displays the relative surplus increase due to bet-
ter managerial decision-making. The setup resembles the main trade-off of
a standard delegation problem in a stylized way.8 A manager makes overall
6In Appendix C.1, I show that these two promotion rules are superior to any convex
combination of the two. Therefore, if it is optimal not to randomize fully between the
workers, it is optimal not to randomize at all.
7One famous example for purely random promotions in a slightly different setting is that
of ancient Athens. There, political offices were filled via lots to ensure “pure” democracy
(see Headlam 1891). I thank Mike Powell for bringing up this example.
8For example, it arises from Aghion and Tirole (1997) with the following parameter values:
αAT = (1 − α) πD
π
, βAT = 0, bAT = πD, BAT = π, effort levels of eAT = EAT = 1 and
normalized costs of gATP (1) = g
AT
A (1) = 0.
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better decisions than the principal, captured by πD > π.9 However, delega-
tion also comes with a loss of control which stems from the decisions’ non-
contractibility and a preference misalignment between manager and principal.
The degree of preference misalignment is measured by α. Increasing α implies
a stronger preference misalignment. Profits fall and private benefits rise.
Unknown Managerial Types
There are two different types of managers that have distinct degrees of pref-
erence misalignment. Manager types are private information. Each worker i
is one of the two manager types, denoted by mi ∈ {A, B}, with prob(mi =
B) = µ ∈ (0, 1). Both types are equally skilled and generate the same total
surplus when making a decision, given by πD. However, the types’ preference
alignment differs. A-type managers’ preferences are well aligned, B-type man-
agers’ are not. I assume that αB > δ > αA. Thus the principal would delegate
all decisions to an A-type, but none to a B-type manager if she knew the type.
From a worker’s perspective, a promotion hence yields private benefits
of umi(k) that depend on his private type mi as well as the management
position’s amount of decision rights k. Therefore, worker i’s private benefits
from a promotion are given by umi = kαmiπ
D. I can re-write worker i’s utility
function as10
ui(ei) = pi · k · αmiπD
︸ ︷︷ ︸
umi
− c
2
e2i . (3.4)
Timeline
To conclude the model setup, the time structure is as follows.
1. The principal chooses the degree of delegation k and the promotion rule
prom.
2. Workers are independently drawn from the population with respect to
their managerial type.
9Reasons for the superiority of managers’ decision-making include local information that
are available only to the manager (Hayek 1945) or that delegation increases the manager’s
initiative (Aghion and Tirole 1997).
10In the following, whenever possible, I drop the subscript i for notational ease.
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3. Workers simultaneously exert unobservable effort, and each worker’s
project outcome is realized and observed.
4. The principal promotes one of the workers according to the promotion
rule chosen in t = 1. The other worker leaves the firm and receives an
outside utility of 0.
5. Decision rights are delegated to the newly promoted manager, according
to the choice in t = 1. Payoffs from decision-making are realized and
the game ends.
3.3 Analysis
In this section I analyze the model presented above. First I examine the op-
timal choice of delegation for each promotion rule. Then I derive the optimal
promotion rule, having fixed the degree of delegation. At the end of this
section I analyze the optimal joint decision of delegation and promotion rule.
All proofs can be found in Appendix C.2.
3.3.1 The Effects of Promotion Rules on Delegation
Random Promotion
Random promotion implies a fixed promotion probability of pR = 0.5 for
each worker that is independent of effort. A worker cannot influence the
probability of promotion and thus has no incentives to work. It follows that
eR = 0 for both workers. Then the principal faces a B-type manager with
probability µ, as if there was a random draw from the population. This is
because workers are drawn independently from the population and are also
promoted randomly. Let α = (1−µ)αA +µαB denote the expected preference
misalignment. As eR = 0, projects are unsuccessful with certainty and the
principal’s profits only consist of the payoff from decision-making:
EΠR = µΠB + (1 − µ)ΠA = π + k(δ − α)πD (3.5)
where Πm = π +(δ −αm)πD are decision-making profits when facing manager
type m ∈ {A, B}.
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Consequently, optimal delegation under random promotion depends on
the relative benefits from managerial decision-making and losses from expected
preference misalignment. Note that the principal’s profits are linear in k.
Therefore, if and only if the benefits from managerial decision-making, given
by δ, outweigh the expected loss of control due to preference misalignment, α,
the principal delegates all decision rights to the manager, and none otherwise.
This is summarized in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1.
Under random promotion, the principal either delegates all decisions, or none:
kR =



1 if δ ≥ α
0 if δ < α.
(3.6)
Performance-Based Promotion
Under performance-based promotions each worker’s promotion probability
depends on the respective project success. It follows that workers face a
strategic game in which their expected utility and thus their optimal strategy
depend both on their own and their co-worker’s exerted effort. However,
workers observe neither their co-worker’s managerial type nor their effort
level. This game is simplified by its binary structure. A worker i’s expected
promotion probability is given by
pi =µ [ei(1 − eBj )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i is successful
+ 0.5eieBj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
both successful
+ 0.5(1 − ei)(1 − eBj )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
both unsuccessful
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The other worker is a B-type
+ (1 − µ) [ei(1 − eAj )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i is successful
+ 0.5eieAj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
both successful
+ 0.5(1 − ei)(1 − eAj )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
both unsuccessful
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The other worker is a A-type
(3.7)
which can be simplified to
pi = 0.5 + 0.5(ei − ej). (3.8)
Here, ej = (1 − µ)eAj + µeBj denotes the ex-ante expected effort level of a
worker with emj defining the effort level of worker j with managerial type m.
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The resulting functional form of pi is a Difference Contest Success Function
with unknown contenders (Hirshleifer 1989). It follows that the marginal
effect of i’s effort on his promotion probability is independent of his expected
co-worker’s effort. Therefore, each worker has unique dominant strategy that
is derived by standard utility maximization. Lemma 3.1 states optimal effort
provision in the resulting Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1.
A worker’s optimal equilibrium effort under performance-based promotions
increases in the degree of delegation and is higher for B-type workers and is
given by
ePm = k ·
αmπ
D
2c
. (3.9)
Workers exert effort, i.e. ePm > 0, only if there is a positive amount of
delegation, i.e. k > 0. Moreover, because private benefits of a manager are
increasing in both the degree of delegation and the preference misalignment,
so are expected utility and effort provision. This is the incentive effect of
performance-based promotions. Moreover, since the preference misalignment
of a B-type manager is larger, i.e. αB > αA, B-type workers exert higher
effort than A-types. This translates into a higher probability of promotion
for the B-type. A selection effect arises, stated in Lemma 3.2a. Note that the
selection effect only arises with a heterogeneous workforce, i.e. if there are one
A-type as well as one B-type worker among the workers. In a homogeneous
workforce, both workers are of the same type, exert the same effort and are
promoted with the same probability, as described by Lemma 3.2b.
Lemma 3.2.
Under performance-based promotion,
(a) with a heterogeneous workforce with one A-type and one B-type worker,
the following statements hold if and only if there is delegation (k > 0):
– B-type workers are promoted with a higher probability than A-types:
phB − phA = k ·
(αB − αA)πD
2c
> 0 (3.10)
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where phm denotes the probability of success for type m in a hetero-
geneous workforce.
– The types’ difference in their probability of promotion is increasing
in the degree of delegation:
∂(ph
B
−ph
A
)
∂k
> 0.
(b) with a homogeneous workforce, workers exert identical, but type-dependent
effort and thus have the same probability of promotion of phomm = 0.5.
Lemma 3.2a says that workers who make less profitable decisions are pro-
moted with a higher probability. This is a mildly revised, more general version
of the Peter principle as it implies that, in expectations, profits are reduced
by promoting the worse manager. The mechanism in Lemma 3.2 also implies
that a negative selection effect persists even when the principal bases the
promotion decision on other measures than current performance, provided
that workers still can influence their promotion probability, for instance by
shifting effort towards the new promotion measure or by gaming.
Taking optimal worker behavior from Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 as given, the
principal maximizes his own expected profits EΠP over the degree of delega-
tion k. Since managerial types are private, expected profits are given by
EΠP =
only A-type workers
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1 − µ)2[ΠA + 2ePAS] +
heterogenous workforce
︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ(1 − µ)[phAΠA + phBΠB + 2ePS] +
only B-type workers
︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ2[ΠB + 2e
P
BS]
(3.11)
with eP = (1 − µ)ePA + µePB and optimal effort levels given by Lemma 3.1.
Expected profits can be displayed by considering each potential workforce
composition. For each of these, profits depend on the (expected) payoff from
managerial decision-making and workers’ project success. Moreover, Equa-
tion (3.11) can be decomposed into three parts:
EΠP = (1 − µ)ΠA + µΠB
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ 2 · ePS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ 2µ(1 − µ)(p
h
B − phA)(ΠB − ΠA)
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
Random Promotion
︷ ︸︸ ︷
π + k(δ − α)πD+
Incentive Effect
︷ ︸︸ ︷
kαπD
c
S −
Selection Effect
︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ(1 − µ)(k(αB − αA)π
D)2
2c
.
(3.12)
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Compared to random promotions, a performance-based promotion induces
two further effects on expected profits. It increases worker incentives and
thus expected gains from successful projects (the incentive effect). On the
other hand, it worsens management selection and lowers expected profits
from managerial decision-making by promoting the “wrong kind of manager”
with a higher probability (the selection effect). Profit maximization leads to
the optimal degree of delegation, given in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2.
Under performance-based promotion, optimal delegation is given by
kP =



1 if δ ≥ α2
k̃ if δ ∈ [α1, α2)
0 if δ < α1
(3.13)
with k̃ = c(δ−α)+αS
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)2πD
, α1 = (1− Sc )·α and α2 = (1− Sc )·α+
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)
2πD
c
.
Figure 3.1 gives a graphical illustration of that result. One can explain
optimal delegation by focusing on the three effects of delegation on expected
profits, as displayed in Equation (3.12). First, optimal delegation for ran-
dom promotion is given by Proposition 3.1. If δ ≥ α, there is full delega-
tion, and none otherwise. This is depicted in Figure 3.1 as the dotted line.
Under performance-based promotions, two additional effects come into play.
The incentive effect on worker behavior increases profits as more delegation
makes both workers work harder and thus increases the probability of project
success, as is shown in Lemma 3.1. Generally the incentive to delegate in-
creases if the expected loss from preference misalignment is sufficiently low,
i.e. α1 < δ. The selection effect only arises in a heterogeneous workforce
which occurs with probability 2µ(1 − µ), see Lemma 3.2. It is a combination
of two distinct effects as delegation affects both workers’ and the manager’s
behavior. Since delegation affects workers’ effort differently, it increases the
probability that a B-type worker gets promoted,
∂(ph
B
−ph
A
)
∂k
> 0. It also in-
creases the relative loss in profits when a B-type manager takes decisions
instead ot an A-type manager, ∂(ΠB−ΠA)
∂k
< 0. Additionally, there exists an
interaction between the two effects. The severity of an increase in B-type’s
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Figure 3.1: Optimal Delegation under Random and Performance-Based
Promotions
probability of getting promoted depends on the loss that is related to B-type
managers, and vice versa.
To gain more intuition, suppose k = 0. Then, the relative loss and the
difference in promotion probabilities are zero as well. Increase k marginally.
The effect of a marginal increase on profits is given by the marginal increase in
B-type promotion probability, holding fixed the relative loss, and the marginal
increases in the relative loss, holding fixed promotion probabilities. A marginal
increase in B-type promotion probability does not affect profits as the relative
loss at k = 0 is still zero, and vice versa. Therefore, at k = 0, a marginal
increase in delegation does not affect profits via the selection effect. On
the other hand, suppose k is close to 1. Then, a marginal increase in k is
severe as (a) the marginal effect on promotion probabilities is large because
relative loss is high already and (b) the marginal effect on the relative loss
matters because the difference in promotion probabilities is also high. Thus,
even though profits from decision-making and optimal effort level are linearly
increasing in k, expected profits are quadratic in k, due to the selection effect.
This intuition is summarized in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3.
The selection effect of delegation under performance-based promotion is an
increasing, quadratic function of k, being zero at k = 0. It decreases expected
profits for any k > 0.
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There are two implications of Lemma 3.3. First, because the selection
effect does not exist at k = 0, the threshold α1 is unaffected by selection
concerns. Secondly, under a performance-based promotion the optimal degree
of delegation is continuous for intermediate δ, as shown in Proposition 3.2.
While the incentive effect makes delegation profitable for δ ∈ (α, α), the
convexity of the selection effect makes full delegation too costly if δ ∈ [α, α2).
Comparative Statics. If the manager’s relative advantage in decision-
making is small (low δ) or the expected loss of control is large (high α), it is not
worthwhile for the principal to delegate because profits from delegation will
be low. The same applies if gains from worker incentivization are sufficiently
small because of a low value of successful projects (low S) or very high effort
costs (high c).
On the other hand, delegation is always positive if projects are sufficiently
profitable, i.e. if S > c. In this case, the incentive effect is positive and
outweighs potential losses due to worse decision-making.11 Furthermore, for
sufficiently high profits from managerial decision-making, the principal dele-
gates all decisions if the project implications from bad selection are sufficiently
harmless, for instance because a heterogeneous workforce is unlikely (µ close
to 0 or 1). Selection is also a minor concern if the heterogeneity among
managers is low (low αB − αA).
Partial delegation arises whenever gains from worker incentives are suffi-
ciently high (δ > α1) but the selection effect is sufficiently strong (δ < α2).
Does performance-based promotion always lead to higher delegation com-
pared to random promotion? The answer again depends on the relative
strength of the selection effect. It determines the size of α2, the “full dele-
gation” threshold under performance-based promotion. If the selection effect
is sufficiently strong, then α2 > α and the principal uses partial delegation
under performance-based promotion and full delegation under random pro-
motion for δ ∈ [α, α2]. However, if the selection effect is relatively weak
compared to the incentive effect then optimal delegation is always higher un-
der performance-based promotion. This finding is summarized in Corollary
3.1 and depicted in Figure 3.2.
11One can see that as, at k = 0, the marginal effect of increasing k on expected profits is
given by (δ − α + αS
c
)πD which is positive for S > c.
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Figure 3.2: Higher Delegation under Performance-Based Promotions
Note: This is an illustration of Corollary 3.1. If α2 < α, delegation is always weakly
higher under performance-based promotion, as displayed by the gray area.
Corollary 3.1.
Performance-based promotions induce higher delegation than random promo-
tion if µ(1 − µ)(αB − αA)2πD < αS, i.e. if the selection effect is sufficiently
weak.
Corollary 3.1 shows a positive correlation between the use of performance-
based promotions and the degree of delegation for a sufficiently minor selec-
tion effect. This is consistent with empirical evidence provided by Alfaro et
al. (2016). They find a positive correlation between a plant’s incentive prac-
tices, such as performance-based promotions, and the degree of delegation
from headquarters to that plant.12
3.3.2 The Effects of Delegation on Promotion Rules
Following Corollary 1, I further analyze the optimal choice of promotion rule
holding fixed the degree of delegation. That mimics manifold situations in
which the principal is bound to a positive degree of delegation, at least in
the short term. Reasons include information overload, time constraints and
hierarchical structures within the firm. In the model, I fix k at k > 0. The
12Thereby, they use data on management policies from the World Management Survey.
Its index on incentive practices includes two measures on the use of performance-based
promotions, bonuses and talent management.
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principal can only decide on the promotion rule. Comparing the expected
profits under the two promotions practices, gives by Equations (3.5) and
(3.12), implies that the optimal promotion practice ultimately depends on
the incentive and the selection effect:
EΠP − EΠR = 2 · ePS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incentive Effect
+ 2µ(1 − µ)(p
h
B − phA)(ΠB − ΠA)
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection Effect
. (3.14)
Thus, performance-based promotions are optimal if and only if the selection
effect is sufficiently small. This in turn depends on the degree of delega-
tion. The selection effect leads to a disproportionate reduction in profits with
increasing delegation. Therefore performance-based promotions outperform
random promotions for sufficiently low levels of k, as stated in Corollary 3.2.
Corollary 3.2.
For a fixed degree of delegation k, performance-based promotions outperform
random promotions if and only if k < k
P
= 2αS
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)2πD
, i.e. if the degree
of delegation is sufficiently low .
Note that k
P
is decreasing in the size of the selection effect, µ(1−µ)(αB −
αA)
2πD, and increasing in the expected profits from motivating workers, 2αS.
Furthermore, performance-based promotion is optimal for any degree of del-
egation if the selection effect is sufficiently weak because in that case k
P ≥ 1.
If the selection effect is strong, and the degree of delegation is sufficiently high
(k > k
P
), the principal may refrain from performance-based promotion. This
is related to a finding by Benson et al. (2018). They show that the use of
performance-based promotion is decreasing in the manager’s team size. Un-
der the assumption of a positive correlation between team size and the team
manager’s decision rights, Corollary 3.2 provides an explanation. The nega-
tive selection effect of performance-based promotions outweighs the expected
benefits from worker motivation.
3.3.3 Optimal Organizational Design
When designing an organization, the principal must jointly consider all di-
mensions of organizational design. Only then she accounts for potential com-
plementarities between different dimensions of organizational design as argued
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by Roberts (2007). Otherwise, the implementation of a certain policy on one
dimension can well be ineffective, or even harmful, without complementary
changes in another.13 In the current model the principal jointly decides over
the optimal degree of delegation and the promotion rule, i.e. she chooses
(k∗, prom∗) ∈ {(kP , P); (kR, R)} with
(k∗, prom∗) arg max {EΠP(kP) ; EΠR(kR)}. (3.15)
Indeed, the optimal organizational design as described in Proposition 3.3 does
make use of complementarities between delegation and promotion rules. Prof-
itability of delegation is higher under performance-based promotion practices
unless the selection effect is too strong, and vice versa.
Proposition 3.3.
The optimal organizational design is as follows.
• If δ ≤ α1, there is no delegation and the promotion rules are equivalent:
(k∗, prom∗) = (0, P) = (0, R). (3.16)
• If δ ∈ (α1, α], performance-based promotion with delegation is optimal:
(k∗, prom∗) = (kP , P). (3.17)
• If δ > α, performance-based promotion with delegation is optimal if and
only if the negative selection effect is sufficiently small:
(k∗, prom∗) =



(kP , P) iff µ(1 − µ)(αB − αA)2πD ≤ [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
c(δ−α)
(1, R) iff µ(1 − µ)(αB − αA)2πD > [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
c(δ−α)
.
(3.18)
The intuition is as follows. If benefits from managerial decision-making
are sufficiently low, i.e. δ ≤ α1 < α, the principal refrains from delegat-
13One example for a failure of organizational design due to missing complementarities
are GM’s investments in automation and flexibility in its production processes in the
1980s. As GM did not make complementary changes in other dimensions of internal
organization, the investment eventually led to large losses (Roberts 2007, p.40).
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ing any decision rights. Yet if there is no delegation the private benefits
of a manager are zero and both promotion rules become equivalent. Thus,
the principal is indifferent between the two. If δ ∈ (α1, α], the principal
optimally chooses either partial or full delegation (kP = {k̃, 1} > 0) un-
der a performance-based promotion and no delegation under a random pro-
motion. But because kP = {k̃, 1} > 0, zero delegation is dominated un-
der performance-based promotion and so is zero delegation under random
promotion, i.e. EΠP(k̃P) > EΠP(kP = 0) = EΠR(kR = 0. If δ > α,
the principal fully delegates under a random promotion. Thus, if she also
fully delegates under a performance-based promotion (i.e. when δ > α2) the
trade-off between motivation and selection determines the optimal promotion
rule. A performance-based promotion is optimal if the selection effect is suf-
ficiently weak. For partial delegation under a performance-based promotion
(i.e. when α ≤ δ < α2), a random promotion gives higher payoffs from man-
agerial decision-making, but lacks incentives and selection. Consequently, a
sufficiently low selection effect implies that the gains from increasing worker
incentives may outweigh lower managerial profits due to lower delegation.
3.4 Extensions
This section discusses the effects of monetary incentives for workers and man-
agers on optimal delegation under performance-based promotions.14
3.4.1 Worker Wages
Additionally to their promotion prospects, workers receive wage payments de-
pendent on the project outcome, namely wS in case of success and wF in case
of failure. Workers remain risk-neutral. Furthermore, wages are constrained
to be non-negative (e.g. because of workers’ limited liability). Worker i’s
utility is then given by ui = pi · umi + ei · wS + (1 − ei) · wF − c2e2i ≥ 0, and
14One may also wonder about a fully-integrated model with worker wages, manager wages
and delegation. Yet Proposition 3.5 shows that manager wages are independent of dele-
gation and consequently also of worker wages. Thus, results for a fully integrated model
would not differ from the results presented in this section.
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consequently optimal effort provision is given by ewi =
2(wS−wF )+umi
2c
. The
principal chooses jointly chooses {k, wF , wS} to maximize expected profits of
EΠw = π + k(δ − α)πD + 2ew(S − wS) + 2µ(1 − µ)
(pwB − pwA)(ΠB − ΠA)
2
− wF .
(3.19)
Introducing the bonus scheme has two effects. First, it motivates workers
by giving additional incentives. But it also decreases potential profits from a
worker’s project success as the principal has to pay wS to the worker in case
of success. Both effects influence optimal delegation that is determined by
Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.4.
The optimal organizational design with delegation and bonus pay, defined by
{kw, w∗F , w∗S}, is given by
(w∗F , w
∗
S) = (0,
2S − kw · απD
4
) and kw =



1 if δ ≥ αw2
k̃w if δ ∈ [αw1 , αw2 )
0 if δ < αw1
(3.20)
with k̃w =
c(δ−α)+ αS
2
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)2πD+
α2πD
4
, αw1 = (1 − S2c)α, and αw2 = (1 − S2c)α +
(µ(1 − µ)(αB − αA)2πD + α
2πD
4
)/c.
There is a two-fold interaction between wages and delegation that is sum-
marized by Corollaries 3.3 and 3.4 below. First, wages decrease profits in
case of success which in turn lowers the optimal use of delegation. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 3.3. Optimal delegation with additional wages (displayed
by the dashed line) is weakly lower than optimal delegation without (straight
line).
Corollary 3.3.
Introducing a bonus scheme lowers the use of delegation if δ ∈ (α1, αw2 ).
Secondly, due to their joint use as worker incentive bonuses and delegation
are substitutes as described by Corollary 3.4. For the intuition suppose there
is a mean-preserving spread in the workforce heterogeneity, i.e. αB − αA
Chapter 3. Promotion, Delegation and Selection 99
α1 αw1 α α2 α
w
2
0
1
δ
kP , kR
Performance-Based Promotion with Additional Wages
Figure 3.3: Optimal Delegation with and without Worker Wages
Note: This is an illustration of Proposition 3.4. For any given preference misalignment
δ, optimal delegation under performance-based promotion with additional wage payments
to the workers is weakly lower than without.
increases while α remains constant. Then, the selection effect worsens and
delegation becomes more costly. Consequently, the principal lowers delegation
but increases bonuses to provide sufficient incentives to the workers.
Corollary 3.4.
Higher managerial discretion implies lower wages for subordinates, and vice
versa.
3.4.2 Manager Wages
There is strong empirical evidence that “promotions are associated with large
wage increases” (Waldman 2012, p.523). In contrast to private benefits from
decision-making, the value of money is homogeneous for all workers. Thus,
it prevents a negative selection effect. If that is the case, why not incentivize
workers with wage increases instead of private benefits from decision-making?
The answer is given below. Similar to a wage increase, delegation in this
model is essentially a linear transfer of utility from principal to manager.
The effects of both incentive devices are mainly similar. But delegation ad-
ditionally comes with better decision-making by managers, thus increasing
total surplus from management. Because costs from delegation, given by the
Chapter 3. Promotion, Delegation and Selection 100
selection effect, are negligible for low values of k, delegation becomes more
profitable than similar increases in the manager’s wage.
The principal offers an additional monetary prize of ŵ ∈ [0, ŵmax] to the
promoted worker. A worker i’s utility function is given by ûi = pi(ei, ej) ·(ŵ+
umi) − c2 êi
2. Note that the wage increase and private benefits become perfect
substitutes in the worker’s utility function. Given the resulting optimal effort
level of êi =
w+umi
2c
, the principal maximizes his expected profits of
EΠ̂ = π + k(δ − α)πD + (sŵ + kαπ
D)S
c
+ 2µ(1 − µ)(pB − pA)(ΠB − ΠA)
2
− ŵ.
(3.21)
Profit maximization over ŵ and k gives the optimal organizational design
with management wages. It is stated in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5.
The optimal organizational design with delegation and manager wages under
performance-based promotions, defined by {ŵ∗, k̂∗}, is given by
{ŵ∗, k̂∗} =



{0, 0} if S < c · (1 − δ
α
)
{0, kP} if c · (1 − δ
α
) < S < c
{ŵmax, kP} if S > c
(3.22)
where kP is given in Proposition 3.2.
There are three insights from Proposition 3.5. First, expected profits are
linear in ŵ and thus there exists a corner solution. Moreover there is no
interdependence between manager wages and delegation. Thus, the optimal
amount of delegation is the same as without manager wages and equivalent
to optimal delegation in Proposition 3.2.
Furthermore, there exist an interesting relationship between manager wages
and delegation on the extensive margin. If wages increase when switching
from a working position to management (i.e. when S > c), the principal
will also delegate. For the intuition, consider the marginal effects of wage in-
creases and delegation on profits at zero. Remember from Section 3.3.1 that
the selection effect is zero at k = 0. Thus, the marginal effect of delegation at
zero is given by higher incentives and better managerial decision-making at
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the costs of loss of control: απ
D·S
c
+δπD −απD = απD(S
c
−1)+δπD. Compare
this to the marginal effects from a wage increase on profits that stems from
higher incentives and wage costs, i.e. S
c
− 1.
Note the similarities between the two marginal effects. Delegation is essen-
tially a utility transfer from principal to manager. By delegating a decision the
principal gives, in expectation, απD to the manager and thereby incentivizes
workers. This translates into higher probabilities of success and the princi-
pal’s expected profits are increased by απ
D·S
c
. This multiplier is equivalent for
wage increases. Wages induce a marginal transfer of 1 from the principal to
the worker, to receive higher expected profits of S
c
. After accounting for the
different “dimensions of utility” (monetary payment vs. private benefits from
decision-making) the marginal effects are essentially the same. However dele-
gation additionally increases total surplus as managers make better decisions,
captured by δπD = πD − π. When delegating the principal keeps some share
of that surplus increase. This gives additional incentives to delegate. Conse-
quently, even when wage increases are not profitable, i.e. S
c
< 1, delegation
may still be. Proposition 3.5 therefore relies on the efficiency of delegation
in this model. In contrast, if delegation decreases total surplus (πD < π)
the principal only delegates if gains from worker incentives are sufficiently
large. Hence, the relationship between wage increases and delegation on the
extensive margin would be reversed.
3.5 Conclusion
Many organizations rely on internal promotions to fill management positions,
often based on employees’ performance. Yet this wide-spread business prac-
tice can lead to suboptimal promotion decisions (Benson et al. 2018). Tradi-
tionally such findings were explained via differences in skill sets - employees
who are good in worker tasks may not have the proper skills for management
tasks. Here I pursue a different approach, showing that suboptimal promo-
tions can optimally arise even without considering skill effects. This is due to
the non-contractibility of management decision. It gives rise to managerial
benefits that in turn affects workers behavior differently under performance-
based promotions. Consequently, workers who make less profitable decisions
as managers are promoted more likely.
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I show that such interaction between managerial decision rights and worker
behavior has various implications for organizational design. It affects how
many decision rights should be delegated to a management position (Propo-
sition 3.2), how promotions should be designed optimally (Corollary 3.2) and
the joint decision of the two (Proposition 3.3). Moreover, optimal incentive
schemes for both managers and workers can be linked to delegation, promo-
tion and management selection (Propositions 3.4 and 3.5).
In the current model, workers want to become managers due to a non-
contractibility of decision-making and subsequent private benefits. A recent
literature has emphasized another reason for why individuals value decision
rights. Fehr et al. (2013) and Bartling et al. (2014) find an intrinsic moti-
vation for decision-making. In their experiments, individuals forgo money to
make decisions themselves, without any instrumental or informational advan-
tage. In an organizational context, these “power-hungry” individuals will in-
fluence for instance the optimal hierarchy of firms (Dessein and Holden 2019).
Such preferences for power can also be put into the present context. Workers
with higher intrinsic valuation of decision-rights have an higher incentive to
work hard and thus will have a higher probability of getting promoted. Fur-
thermore, as managers such individuals may try to hoard even more decision
rights, for example by acquiring inefficiently many firms and becoming an
empire-builder (Jensen 1986). In this case a trade-off between selection and
incentives arises, similar to the current model. It will be interesting to further
examine how the intrinsic valuation of decision rights interacts with different
choices of organizational design.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
Lemma 1.1
Lemma 1.1 follows from the maximization of the expected utilities at t = 1, see Equations
(1.3) and (1.4). First, I derive the optimal effort levels given by Equation (1.5). The
comparative statics stated in Lemma 1.1 are then straightforward. From maxe EuAt1 =
(
1 − (1 − α)πλ2
)
ev − ce2 e2 − πλαcA, it follows that
∂EuA
t1
∂e
= (1 − (1 − α)πλ2)v − cee and
the second derivative is negative. Therefore, eA = (1−(1−α)πλ
2)v
ce
. From maxe EuNt1 =
(
1 − πλ2
)
ev − ce2 e2, it follows that
∂EuN
t1
∂e
= (1 − πλ2)v − cee and the second derivative is
negative. Therefore, eN = (1−πλ
2)v
ce
.
The first statement of Lemma 1.1 follows from eA > eN ∀α > 0. The second statement
follows from ∂e
A
∂α
= πλ
2v
ce
> 0.
Lemma 1.2
Recall f(λ) :=
(
(2 − (2 − α)πλ2)λv2
)
− 2cecA with λ ∈ [0, 1]. First, I establish that f is
concave in its domain λ ∈ [0, 1]. The derivatives of f(λ) with respect to λ are given by
∂f(λ)
∂λ
= (2 − 3(2 − α)πλ2)v2 and ∂
2f(λ)
∂λ2
= −6(2 − α)πλ)v2 (A.1)
As ∂
2f(λ)
∂λ2
< 0 ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], it follows that f(λ) is concave in λ with a unique global maximum
at λ =
√
2
3(2−α)π . Therefore, f(λ) is increasing for λ < λ and decreasing for λ > λ.
Lemma 1.3
First note that if f(λ) < 0 no agent seeks advice. Lemma 1.2 states that λ =
√
2
3(2−α)π
and recall f(λ) =
(
(2 − (2 − α)πλ2)λv2
)
− 2cecA. Therefore, f(λ) is given by
f(λ) =
(
2 − (2 − α)π · 2
3(2 − α)π
)
· λv2 − 2cecA =
4
3
λv2 − 2cecA (A.2)
which is increasing in λ. Therefore, if f(λ = 1) < 0 it is also negative for all λ < 1 and
thus for all λ ≤ 1. It follows that f(λ) < 0 if it holds that 43 λv2 − 2cecA < 0 with λ = 1,
i.e. if cA >
2v2
3ce
.
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Lemma 1.4
Lemma 1.4 follows from comparing the optimal effort levels in Equation (1.17). I derive
those by utility maximization. Expected utilities at t = 1 are denoted by
EũAt1 =(1 − πλ)(e(v + RN,S) + (1 − x)RN,F ) + πλ
(
e(v + RA,S) + (1 − x)RA,F − cA
)
− ce
2
e2
(A.3)
EũNt1 =(1 − πλ)(e(v + RN,S) + (1 − x)RN,F ) + πλ((1 − λ)e(v + RN,S) + λRN,F ) −
ce
2
e2.
(A.4)
Simple re-formulation leads to the following, well-defined maximization problems:
max
e
EũAt1 =e · (v + dN ) + πλ · x
(
(dA − dN ) + RA,F − RN,F
)
− πλcA −
ce
2
e2 (A.5)
max
e
EũNt1 =
(
1 − πλ2
)
· e · (v + dN ) − ce
2
e2. (A.6)
The first order derivatives are given by ∂Eũ
A
t1
∂e
= (v + dN ) + πλ(dA − dN ) − cee
and ∂Eũ
N
t1
∂e
=
(
1 − πλ2
)
− cee; the second order derivatives are negative.
Thus ẽA = v+d
N +πλ(dA−dN )
ce
and ẽN = (1−πλ
2)(v+dN )
ce
.
The first statement of Lemma 1.4 follows from both effort levels increasing in dA and dN
if dA, dN > 0. The second statement follows from eA − eN = πλ
ce
(dA − v − (1 − λ)dN ).
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A.2 Equilibrium Analysis of Advice-Seeking
with Reputation Concerns
There are four potential pure-strategy equilibria in the case of two types λl and λh. There
are two pooling equilibria in which both type seek advice or do not seek advice. Also,
there are two separating equilibrium in which only the high (low) type seeks advice and
the low (high) type does not. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE). The D1 criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987) is applied as an equilibrium refinement to
determine off-equilibrium beliefs.
Pooling on Advice-Seeking
In this equilibrium, both types seek advice. Therefore, type i exerts effort of
eAi =
v + dN + πλi(dA − dN )
ce
. (A.7)
There are three possibilities regarding the ex-post reputation utility.1
1. Suppose dA = dN . In this case, both agents exert the same effort. Therefore, success
or failure is no signal, and µ̂a,S = µ̂a,F ∀a and thus dA = dN = 0. As both agents
would seek advice if possible and low types have a higher probability to need advice,
this implies that µ̂A,y < µ̂N,y ∀y. Then, there are three possibilities:
• µ > µ̂A,y: R = 0.
• µ ∈ [µ̂A,y, µ̂N,y]: RN = r.
• µ < µ̂A,y: RN = RA = r
Two conditions then imply the pooling on advice-seeking equilibrium:
(a) If µ ∈ [µ̂A,y, µ̂N,y]: (2 − πλ2)λ · v2 ≥ 2ce(cA + r) ∀λ ⇔ f(λ) ≥ 2cer ∀λ.
(b) If otherwise: (2 − πλ2)λ · v2 ≥ 2cecA ∀λ ⇔ f(λ) ≥ 0 ∀λ.
Therefore, condition for the equilibrium is:
(2 − πλ2)λ · v2 ≥ 2ce(cA + r) if µ > µ̂A,y =
πλh
πλh + (1 − π)λl
(A.8)
(2 − πλ2)λ · v2 ≥ 2cecA if otherwise. (A.9)
2. Suppose dA > dN . Then, the low type exerts higher effort (because he is more likely
to receive advice and thus motivated more strongly to work hard) and success is a
signal for being a low type. Therefore, µ̂(a, S) < µ̂(a, F ). As the low type is also
more likely to need advice, it holds that µ̂N,F is the higher posterior belief and µ̂A,S
is the lowest posterior belief. Therefore, the possibility in line with dA > dN is that
dA = 0 and dN = −r and µ ∈ (max
{
µ̂N,S , µ̂A,F
}
, µ̂N,F ]. In this case, the only
conditions satisfying the pooling on advice-seeking equilibrium
(a) µ ∈ (max
{
µ̂N,S , µ̂A,F
}
, µ̂N,F ]
1The posterior beliefs in equilibrium are given by
µ̂A,S = µλhe
A
h
µλhe
A
h
+(1−µ)λleAl
, µ̂A,F = µλh(1−e
A
h
)
µλh(1−eAh )+(1−µ)λl(1−e
A
l
)
,
µ̂N,S = µ(1−πλh)e
A
h
µ(1−πλh)eAh +(1−µ)(1−πλl)e
A
l
, and µ̂N,F = µ(1−πλh)(1−e
A
h
)
µ(1−πλh)(1−eAh )+(1−µ)(1−πλl)(1−e
A
l
)
.
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(b) [(2 − πλ2)(v − r) + πλ · r][λv + (1 − λ)r] + 2cer ≥ 2cecA
⇔ f(λ) + r(zr − wv) + 2cer ≥ 0
where w = 2((2 − πλ2)λ − 1) and z = (1 − λ)(2 − πλ − πλ2).
3. Suppose dA < dN . Then, the low type exerts higher effort and success is a signal
for being a high type. Therefore, µ̂(a, S) > µ̂(a, F ). Together, this implies that
dA = 0, dN = r and µ̂N,S must be the highest posterior belief and µ̂A,F must be the
lowest posterior belief. In this case, the only conditions satisfying the pooling on
advice-seeking equilibrium
(a) µ ∈ (max
{
µ̂A,S , µ̂N,F
}
, µ̂N,S ]
(b) [(2 − πλ2)(v + r) − πλ · r][λv − (1 − λ)r] ≥ 2cecA ⇔ f(λ) − r(zr − wv) ≥ 0
where w = 2((2 − πλ2)λ − 1) and z = (1 − λ)(2 − πλ − πλ2).
Pooling on no Advice-Seeking
In this PBE, both types do not seek advice. Note that advice-seeking is off equilibrium
path. The D1 criterion implies that dA = 0 (no updating on the off equilibrium path).
The effort choice of type i are then given by
eNi
(1 − πλ2i )(v + dN )
ce
. (A.10)
Note that as λh < λl, it follows that eNh > e
N
l and thus success is an indicator for the high
type: µ̂N,S > µ̂N,F .2 Therefore, there are two possibilities regarding ex-post reputation
benefits.
• Suppose µ < µ̂N,F and thus dN = 0.
– Suppose the high type has a higher incentive to deviate. Then, RA,F = r and
the equilibrium condition is given by
(2 − πλ2l )λlv < (2 − πλ2h)λhv ≤ 2cecA ⇔ f(λl) ≤ f(λh) ≤ 0. (A.11)
– Suppose the low type has a higher incentive to deviate. Then, RA,F = 0 and
the equilibrium condition is given by
(2 − πλ2h)λhv − 2cer < (2 − πλ2l )λlv − 2cer ≤ 2cecA
⇔ f(λl) ≤ f(λh) ≤ 2cer. (A.12)
• Suppose dN > 0 and µ ∈ (µ̂N,F , µ̂N,S ]. Then, RN,S = r and RN,F = 0.
– Suppose the high type has a higher incentive to deviate. Then, RA,F = r and
the equilibrium condition is given by
[(2 − πλ2l )(v + r) − πλlr][λlv − (1 − λl)r] <
< [(2 − πλ2h)(v + r) − πλhr][λhv − (1 − λh)r] ≤ 2cecA − 2cer
⇔ f(λl) − r(zr + wv) ≤ f(λh) − r(zr + wv) ≤ −2cr. (A.13)
2The posterior beliefs in equilibrium given by
µ̂A,S = µλhe
A
h
µλhe
A
h
+(1−µ)λlelA
, µ̂A,F = µλh(1−e
A
h
)
µλh(1−eAh )+(1−µ)λl(1−e
l
A
)
, µ̂N,S = µe
A
h
µeA
h
+(1−µ)el
A
=
µ(1−πλ2
h
)
1−π[(1−µ)λ2
l
+µλ2
h
]
, and µ̂N,F = µ(1−e
A
h
)
µ(1−eA
h
)+(1−µ)(1−el
A
)
= µ(1−e
A
h
)
(1−el
A
)+µ(eA
l
−eA
h
)
.
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– Suppose the low type has a higher incentive to deviate. Then, RA,F = 0 and
the equilibrium condition is given by
[(2 − πλ2h)(v + r) − πλhr][λhv − (1 − λh)r] <
< [(2 − πλ2l )(v + r) − πλlr][λlv − (1 − λl)r] ≤ 2cecA
⇔ f(λl) − r(zr + wv) ≤ f(λh) − r(zr + wv) ≤ 0. (A.14)
and again, w = 2((2 − πλ2)λ − 1) and z = (1 − λ)(2 − πλ − πλ2).
Separation and the High Type Asks for Advice
Note in this PBE advice-seeking is fully informative: µ̂A = 1. However, no advice-seeking
is not (with probability 1 − πλh the high type does not need advice). This implies that
dA = 0 and RA,S = RA,F = r. In this case, effort levels are given by
eAh =
v + (1 − πλh)dN
ce
and eNl =
(1 − πλ2l )(v + dN )
ce
. (A.15)
Therefore, eAh > e
N
l and success is a indicator for high ability. This implies µ̂
N,S > µ̂N,F
and dN ≥ 0.3
• Suppose µ̂ ∈ (µ̂N,S , 1] and dN = 0. In this case, the condition for the high type
separation equilibrium is
(2 − πλ2h)λhv2 ≥ 2ce(cA − r) > (2 − πλ2l )λlv2
⇔ f(λh) ≥ −2cer > f(λl) (A.16)
• Suppose µ̂ ∈ (µ̂N,F , µ̂N,S ] and dN = r. In this case, the condition for the high type
separation equilibrium is
[(2 − πλ2h)(v + r) − πλhr][λhv − (1 − λh)r] ≥ 2ce(cA − r)
and 2ce(cA − r) > [(2 − πλ2l )(v + r) − πλlr][λlv − (1 − λl)r]
⇔ f(λh) − r(zr + wv) ≥ −2cer > f(λl) − r(zr + wv) (A.17)
and again, w = 2((2 − πλ2)λ − 1) and z = (1 − λ)(2 − πλ − πλ2).
Separation and the Low Type Asks for Advice
In this PBE, advice-seeking is fully informative for being a low type. Therefore, µ̂A = 0,
dA = 0 and RA,S = RA,F = 0. It follows the types provide following effort:
eAl =
v + (1 − πλl)dN
ce
and eNh =
(1 − πλ2h)(v + dN )
ce
. (A.18)
This implies that the low type’s effort level is higher if and only if dN < λ
2
h
λl−λ2h
v. In this
case, µ̂N,F > µ̂N,S .4
3The posterior beliefs in equilibrium are given by
µ̂A,S = µ̂A,F = 1, µ̂N,S = µ(1−πλh)e
A
h
µ(1−πλh)eAh +(1−µ)e
l
A
, and µ̂N,F = µ(1−πλh)(1−e
A
h
)
µ(1−πλh)(1−eAh )+(1−µ)(1−e
l
A
)
.
4The posterior beliefs in equilibrium are given by
µ̂A,S = µ̂A,F = 0, µ̂N,S = µe
A
h
µeA
h
+(1−µ)(1−πλl)elA
, and µ̂N,F = µ(1−e
A
h
)
µ(1−eA
h
)+(1−µ)(1−πλl)(1−elA)
.
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• Suppose µ ∈ (µ̂N,S , µ̂N,F ] which implies dN < 0. In this case, RN,S = 0 and
RN,F = r and the conditions for the low type separation equilibrium are
[(2 − πλ2l )(v − r) + πλlr][λlv + (1 − λl)r] − 2cer ≥ 2cecA
and 2cecA > [(2 − πλ2h)(v − r) + πλhr][λhv + (1 − λh)r] − 2cr
⇔ f(λl) + r(zr + wv) ≥ 2cecA > f(λh) + r(zr + wv) (A.19)
• Suppose µ < µ̂N,S which implies dN = 0 but RN,S = RN,F = r. There, and the
condition for the low type separation equilibrium is
(2 − πλ2l )λlv2 − 2cer ≥ 2cecA > (2 − πλ2h)λhv2 − 2cer
⇔ f(λl) ≥ 2cr > f(λh) (A.20)
• Suppose µ ∈ (µ̂N,F , µ̂N,S ] which implies dN > 0. This only holds if µ̂N,F < µ̂N,S
and thus dN = r > λ
2
h
λl−λ2h
v. In this case, RN,S = r and RN,F = 0 and the conditions
for the low type separation equilibrium are
[(2 − πλ2l )(v + r) − πλlr][λlv − (1 − λl)r] ≥ 2cecA
and 2cecA > [(2 − πλ2h)(v + r) − πλhr][λhv − (1 − λh)r]
⇔ f(λl) − r(zr + wv) ≥ 2cr > f(λh) − r(zr + wv) (A.21)
and again, w = 2((2 − πλ2)λ − 1) and z = (1 − λ)(2 − πλ − πλ2).
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B.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Beliefs
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Figure B.1: Mean Beliefs for Each Signal in Part II and Part III
Order Effects
Figure B.2a depicts mean contributions in Part I, for each state conditional on the order.
Standard denotes an order of “State 1, State 2, State 3”. Reverse is “State 3, State 2,
State 1”. There is a positive effect of a state being introduced first. Contributions for
State 3 are higher in Reverse than in Standard (p=0.0003). This could be because it
may seem implausible to the subjects to play a public goods game without contributing.
Consequently, they choose a nonzero contribution at the beginning. Contributions for State
1 are not significantly higher in Standard than Reverse (p=0.1927). Interestingly, the order
effect is even more pronounced in Part II. Figure B.2b displays the mean contributions for
each signal, conditional on the rule and the order. Rule have different effects, dependent
on the order. More specifically, subjects seem to follow rules more strongly in their first
contribution. If State 1 is presented first, contributions under the Conditional Rule for
Signal I nearly double (p=0.0000). If it is presented last however, the Conditional Rule
does not significantly change behavior (p=0.6645). Therefore, the order has a significant
effect on Signal I contributions under the Conditional Rule (p=0.0175). Similar results
holds for the Unconditional Rule and Signal III and could be explained by anchoring
effects. Subjects are anchored by State 3 that it is inefficient to contribute and continue
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(a) Mean Contributions for Each State in Part I, Conditional on Order
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(b) Mean Contributions for Each Signal in Part II, Conditional on Order and Rule
Figure B.2: Mean Contributions, Conditional on the Order.
to do so throughout the experiment. Therefore, any rule has less effect on the subjects’
contribution behavior.
Part III - Time Trend of Contributions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Round
Mean Contribution
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Figure B.3: Mean Contributions in Each Round in Part III
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Part III - Additional Regression Analyses
Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Indv. Contribution
Round -0.35∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗
(0.670) (0.076) (0.077) (0.067) (0.068)
Conditional Rule 0.94 0.74
(0.744) (0.774)
Signal I 6.06∗∗∗ 8.70∗∗∗ 8.88∗∗∗ 6.14∗∗∗ 6.24∗∗∗
(0.803) (0.812) (0.791) (0.836) (0.820)
Signal II 6.14∗∗∗ 6.74∗∗∗ 6.95∗∗∗ 6.21∗∗∗ 6.33∗∗∗
(0.490) (0.351) (0.338) (0.454) (0.431)
Signal I * Cond. Rule 5.26∗∗∗ 3.81 ∗∗ 3.67∗∗∗
(1.332) (1.490) (1.333)
Signal II * Cond. Rule 0.68 -0.26 -0.39
(0.733) (0.649) (0.776)
Signal III * Cond. Rule -1.26∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗
(0.411) (0.698)
Avr. Contr. Part I 0.37∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.589)
Constant 3.22∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ -2.45 3.80∗∗∗ -1.09
(0.526) (0.655) (1.520) (0.453) (1.498)
Controls Yes Yes
Number of obs. 1,620 1,620 1,590 1,620 1,590
Number of indv. 162 162 156 162 156
Number of group clusters 54 54 54 54 54
Table B.1: Further Estimation Models on Contributions in Part III
Note: Model 1: Fixed Effects GLS Model, Models 2-5: Pooled OLS Model. Robust
standard errors in brackets, clustered at the group level. ∗: p < 0.1, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗∗∗:
p < 0.001. Three groups were dropped because of a Rule B-group match or because of
no match in the session with 18 subjects. Controls in Models 3 & 5 include age, gender,
previous participations in experiments, self-reported math skills and measures for altruism,
negative reciprocity, risk and trust. The question on gender was not answered by three
participants, they were dropped in Models 3 & 5.
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B.2 Instructions
In the following, I provide the original instructions as well as important exemplary computer
screenshots for the experiment that was conducted in German. There were three printouts
for the General Instructions, Part I and Part II. All other instructions were displayed on
the computer screens. For exposition, screenshots are changed in size and format.
General Instructions (printed)
Instruktionen
Herzlichen Willkommen zu diesem Experiment und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme. Bitte
lesen Sie die folgenden Instruktionen sorgfältig durch.
Von nun an und für die gesamte Dauer des Experiments ist es Ihnen und allen anderen
Teilnehmern untersagt, mit anderen Teilnehmern1 zu kommunizieren, Ihr Mobiltelefon
zu benutzen, oder andere Programme auf dem Computer zu starten. Falls Sie eine dieser
Regeln brechen, müssen wir Sie leider vom Experiment und den Auszahlungen ausschließen.
Falls während des Experiments Fragen aufkommen, drücken Sie bitte den roten Knopf auf
der Tastatur vor Ihnen. Einer der Experimentalleiter wird zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre
Fragen privat beantworten.
Generelle Instruktionen und Bezahlung
Dieses Experiment befasst sich mit ökonomischem Entscheidungsverhalten. Es wird am
Computer durchgeführt.
Das Experiment dauert ca. 75 Minuten. Es besteht aus drei Teilen. In jedem dieser Teile
können Sie mit Ihren Entscheidungen Geld verdienen. Ihr Verdienst im Experiment kann
sowohl von Ihren Entscheidungen als auch den Entscheidungen der anderen Experiment-
teilnehmer abhängen. Wie genau Ihr Verdienst von diesen Entscheidungen abhängt, wird
Ihnen jeweils in den einzelnen Teilen erläutert.
Ihnen wird Ihr genauer Verdienst am Ende des Experiments mitgeteilt. Dazu werden
Ihre einzelnen Verdienste aus jedem Teil des Experiments zusammengerechnet. Zusätzlich
erhalten Sie 6 Euro für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment. Ihr Gesamtverdienst wird Ihnen
am Ende des Experiments privat und in bar ausgezahlt.
Während des Experiments werden wir Ihren Verdienst nicht in Euro bezeichnen, sondern
in „Punkten“. Am Ende des Experiments wird Ihr Verdienst aus dem Experiment wieder
in Euro umgerechnet. Dazu wird Ihr Gesamtverdienst durch 8 geteilt.
Die Umrechnungsrate beträgt also:
1 Punkt = 1/8 Euro
Ihr Gesamtverdienst in diesem Experiment in Euro lautet daher:
6 Euro + (Punkte aus dem Experiment / 8) Euro
Ihr Gesamtverdienst im Experiment wird bei der Auszahlung auf 50cent – Beträge aufgerun-
det.
Anonymität
1Zur besseren Verständlichkeit verwenden wir in den Instruktionen nur männliche Beze-
ichnungen. Diese sind geschlechtsneutral zu verstehen.
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Alle Ihre Entscheidungen und Antworten bleiben anonym. Die anderen Teilnehmer er-
fahren nicht, welche Entscheidungen Sie getroffen haben und welcher Teilnehmer wie viel
verdient hat.
Fragen
Wenn Sie gerade Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand. Haben Sie Fragen während des
Experiments, können Sie die rote Taste auf der Tastatur vor Ihnen drücken. Einer der
Experimentalleiter wird zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Fragen privat beantworten.
Teil 1 – Instruktionen
Wir werden nun die Instruktionen für den ersten Teil des Experiments gemeinsam durchge-
hen.
Instructions for Part I (printed)
Teil 1 - Instruktionen
Zunächst werden Sie mit der grundlegenden Entscheidung vertraut gemacht, die Sie im
Experiment treffen müssen. Bitte lesen Sie sich die Instruktionen gut durch.
Während des gesamten ersten Teils des Experiments sind Sie Teil einer Gruppe mit zwei
weiteren Teilnehmern. Insgesamt besteht eine Gruppe also aus drei Mitgliedern. Alle
Mitglieder und ihre Entscheidungen sind anonym.
Ihr Verdienst in Teil 1 des Experiments
In Teil 1 werden Sie und die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder Entscheidungen in drei
verschiedenen Situationen treffen. Am Ende des Experiments wird eine der drei Situa-
tionen vom Computer zufällig (mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit) ausgewählt. Ihr Verdienst
in Teil 1 des Experiments hängt von Ihrer Entscheidung und den Entscheidungen der an-
deren beiden Gruppenmitglieder in dieser Situation ab. Wir erläutern nun zunächst die
generelle Entscheidung in jeder Situation, bevor wir auf die einzelnen Situationen eingehen.
Ihre Einzahlungsentscheidung
Sie haben 20 Punkte zur Verfügung. Sie entscheiden darüber, wie viele dieser Punkte Sie
in ein Gruppenkonto, und wie viele Punkte Sie in ein Privatkonto einzahlen. Jeder Punkt,
den Sie nicht in das Gruppenkonto einzahlen, geht automatisch in das Privatkonto. Sie
können in 10er Schritten einzahlen, also entweder 0 Punkte, 10 Punkte oder 20 Punkte.
Das Gruppenkonto
Sie können Punkte in das Gruppenkonto einzahlen. Daraufhin erhalten Sie eine Auszahlung
aus dem Gruppenkonto. Wie hoch diese Auszahlung ist, hängt von der jeweiligen Situation
ab und wird Ihnen später für jede Situation separat erläutert. Auch die anderen Gruppen-
mitglieder profitieren von Ihrer Einzahlung in das Gruppenkonto: sie erhalten eine ebenso
hohe Auszahlung wie Sie. Genauso erhalten Sie eine Auszahlung für jede Einzahlung eines
anderen Gruppenmitglieds.
Ihr Verdienst entsteht aus den Auszahlungen aus dem Gruppenkonto, die wiederum aus
Ihrer Einzahlung und den Einzahlungen der anderen Gruppenmitglieder resultieren. Daher
gilt:
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Ihr Verdienst aus dem Gruppenkonto = Auszahlungen aus dem
Gruppenkonto
Das Privatkonto Jeder Punkt, den Sie nicht in das Gruppenkonto einzahlen, wird in ein
Privatkonto eingezahlt. Für jeden Punkt in Ihrem Privatkonto verdienen Sie einen Punkt.
Wenn Sie beispielsweise 10 Punkte in das Privatkonto einzahlen, ist Ihr Verdienst aus
dem Privatkonto 10 Punkte. Niemand außer Ihnen profitiert von einer Einzahlung in das
Privatkonto. Daher gilt:
Ihr Verdienst aus dem Privatkonto = 20 Punkte - Ihre Einzahlung in das
Gruppenkonto
Ihr Gesamtverdienst in einer Situation
Ihr Verdienst in einer Situation ist die Summe der Verdienste aus Gruppenkonto und
Privatkonto:
Ihr Verdienst = 20 Punkte - Ihre Einzahlung in das Gruppenkonto +
Auszahlungen aus dem Gruppenkonto
Fragen
Wenn Sie Fragen haben, können Sie nun die Hand heben. Haben Sie Fragen während des
Experiments, drücken Sie bitte die rote Taste auf der Tastatur vor Ihnen. Ein Experimen-
talleiter wird zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage privat beantworten.
Situation 1
Wir beginnen nun mit Situation 1 und Ihrer Einzahlungsentscheidung für diese Situation.
Alle weiteren Instruktionen zu Teil 1 finden Sie auf dem Computerbildschirm.
Bitte geben Sie nun Ihr „Teilnehmerlabel“ auf dem Computerbildschirm ein.
Ihr Teilnehmerlabel ist gleich der Computer-Nummer, die groß an der Seiten-
wand an Ihrem Platz hängt.
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Exemplary Screenshots for Part I
Description of State 1
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Decision Screen - Contribution
Decision Screen - Beliefs
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Instructions for Part II (printed)
Teil 2 – Instruktionen
Allgemeine Entscheidungssituation
In diesem Teil des Experiments befinden Sie sich in einer ähnlichen Entscheidungssitua-
tion wie in Teil 1: Während des gesamten zweiten Teils sind Sie Teil einer Gruppe mit
zwei weiteren Teilnehmern. Wie im vorherigen Teil können Sie und die anderen beiden
Gruppenmitglieder bis zu 20 Punkte in ein Gruppenkonto einzahlen.
Die jeweiligen Einzahlungen resultieren in Auszahlungen für jedes Gruppenmitglied. Auch
Ihr Verdienst wird weiterhin bestimmt durch:
Ihr Verdienst = 20 Punkte - Ihre Einzahlung in das Gruppenkonto +
Auszahlungen aus dem Gruppenkonto
Einmalige Einzahlung
Im Unterschied zu Teil 1 wird von jedem Gruppenmitglied nur einmalig in das Grup-
penkonto eingezahlt. Eine Einzahlung resultiert dabei wieder in einer Auszahlung für
jedes Gruppenmitglied. Die Höhe der Auszahlung hängt von der Situation ab, in der sich
Ihre Gruppe befindet.
Es gibt drei mögliche Situationen. Das sind dieselben, die Sie in Teil 1 kennengelernt
haben. Eine Übersicht über die drei Situationen finden Sie nochmals aufgelistet im Beiblatt
zu diesen Instruktionen. Der Computer zieht zufällig (mit gleichen Wahrscheinlichkeiten)
und geheim, welche der drei Situationen in Ihrer Gruppe relevant für die Auszahlungen
aus dem Gruppenkonto sein wird.
Wenn Sie und Ihre Gruppenmitglieder ihre jeweiligen Einzahlungsentscheidungen treffen,
wissen also weder Sie noch die anderen Gruppenmitglieder, welche Situation der Computer
für Ihre Gruppe gezogen hat. Sie wissen demnach nicht mit Sicherheit, welche Auszahlung
aus einer Einzahlung in das Gruppenkonto entsteht.
Am Ende des Experiments erfahren Sie sowohl welche Situation in diesem Teil in Ihrer
Gruppe galt als auch wie viele Punkte die anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder in das Grup-
penkonto eingezahlt haben.
Signale
Auch wenn kein Gruppenmitglied weiß, in welcher Situation sich Ihre Gruppe befindet, er-
halten sowohl Sie als auch die anderen Gruppenmitglieder jeweils vom Computer “private”
Informationen über die vorherrschende Situation. Die Informationen sind privat, weil
kein anderes Gruppenmitglied beobachten kann, welche Information Sie erhalten haben.
Umgekehrt können auch Sie keine Informationen der anderen Gruppenmitglieder beobachten.
Es gibt drei verschiedene Informationen. Wir nennen eine Information „Signal“. Es gibt
Signal I, Signal II und Signal III.
Begriffsklärung
Das „korrekte Signal“ ist immer das Signal, das mit der Situation übereinstimmt. Anson-
sten ist es ein „falsches Signal“.
In Situation 1 ist Signal I das korrekte Signal, Signal II und III sind falsche Signale. In
Situation 2 ist Signal II das korrekte Signal, Signal I und III sind falsche Signale. In Situ-
ation 3 ist Signal III das korrekte Signal, Signal I und II sind falsche Signale.
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Wir werden zunächst erst erklären, wie der Computer Signale generiert. Danach wird
Ihnen erläutert, welche Rückschlüsse Sie aus einem Signal ziehen können.
Für jedes Gruppenmitglied simuliert der Computer geheim, einzeln und unabhängig
voneinander den Wurf eines Würfels mit sechs Seiten. Der Computer wirft den Würfel
also dreimal, einmal für jedes Gruppenmitglied. Bei jedem Wurf / Gruppenmitglied gilt:
• Zeigt der Würfel die Zahl 1 an, erhält das Gruppenmitglied ein falsches Signal.
Welches der beiden falschen Signale dies ist, wird vom Computer zufällig bestimmt.
• Zeigt der Würfel eine der Zahlen 2, 3, 4, 5 oder 6 an, erhält das Gruppenmitglied
das korrekte Signal.
Beispiele
1. Zuerst zieht der Computer Situation 2.
Danach würfelt er nacheinander dreimal. Die folgenden Würfelzahlen entstehen:
• Eine 1 für Gruppenmitglied A
• Eine 5 für Gruppenmitglied B
• Eine 3 für Gruppenmitglied C
Das bedeutet: Gruppenmitglieder B und C erhalten das korrekte Signal II. Gruppen-
mitglied A erhält ein falsches Signal (I oder III). Der Computer bestimmt zufällig,
dass A das Signal I erhält.
2. Zuerst zieht der Computer Situation 1.
Danach würfelt er nacheinander dreimal. Die folgenden Würfelzahlen entstehen:
• Eine 4 für Gruppenmitglied A
• Eine 4 für Gruppenmitglied B
• Eine 2 für Gruppenmitglied C
Das bedeutet: Alle Gruppenmitglieder erhalten das korrekte Signal I.
3. Zuerst zieht der Computer Situation 3.
Danach würfelt er nacheinander dreimal. Die folgenden Würfelzahlen entstehen:
• Eine 1 für Gruppenmitglied A
• Eine 6 für Gruppenmitglied B
• Eine 1 für Gruppenmitglied C
Das bedeutet: Gruppenmitglieder A & C erhalten ein falsches Signal. Der Computer
bestimmt zufällig und unabhängig für die beiden Gruppenmitglieder, dass A Signal
I erhält und C Signal II erhält. Gruppenmitglied B erhält das korrekte Signal III.
Interpretation der Signale
Vor Ihrer Einzahlungsentscheidung erhalten Sie ein Signal. Da Sie weder die Situation oder
die Würfelzahl des Computers beobachten können, wissen Sie nicht, ob dieses Signal das
korrekte Signal oder ein falsches Signal ist. Mit den obigen Informationen kann man aber
die folgenden Rückschlüsse ziehen:
1. Es ist am wahrscheinlichsten, dass das Signal korrekt ist. Dann wird auch die
tatsächlich vorherrschende Situation in Ihrer Gruppe widergespiegelt.
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2. Es ist am wahrscheinlichsten, dass Ihre Gruppenmitglieder dasselbe Signal wie Sie
erhalten. Es ist jedoch auch möglich, dass die anderen Gruppenmitglieder andere
Signale erhalten als Sie.
3. Außerdem kann man je nach Signal ausrechnen, mit welcher Wahrscheinlichkeit sich
die Gruppe in einer Situation befindet. Wir haben dies graphisch für Sie aufbere-
itet. Die Kreisdiagramme zeigen dabei die Wahrscheinlichkeiten der verschiedenen
Situationen an, wenn Sie ein Signal erhalten.
Zusammenfassung
• Der Computer zieht geheim eine Situation, die in Ihrer Gruppe für alle Grup-
penmitglieder gilt. Daher ist der Zusammenhang zwischen Einzahlung und Auszahlung
aus dem Gruppenkonto für alle Gruppenmitglieder derselbe.
• Dann erhalten die Gruppenmitglieder jeweils ein Signal. Dieses Signal kann korrekt
oder falsch sein. Gruppenmitglieder können unterschiedliche Signale erhalten.
• Wenn Sie ein Signal erhalten, können Sie Rückschlüsse auf die in Ihrer Gruppe
vorherrschende Situation ziehen. Dazu können Sie die Kreisdiagramme benutzen.
• Die Signale sind “privat”: Kein Gruppenmitglied kann die Signale der anderen Grup-
penmitglieder beobachten.
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• Das bedeutet, Sie können nur begrenzt Rückschlüsse über das Verhalten der Grup-
penmitglieder ziehen, wenn Sie am Ende des Experiments die Situation und die Ein-
zahlungen der anderen beiden Gruppenmitglieder beobachtet haben. Denn Sie wis-
sen nicht, welches Signal die anderen Gruppenmitglieder jeweils tatsächlich erhalten
haben. Genauso können die anderen Gruppenmitglieder nur begrenzt Rückschlüsse
über Ihr Verhalten ziehen.
Eine Gruppen-Regel für Ihre Gruppe
In Ihrer Gruppe gibt es außerdem eine Gruppen-Regel. Die Gruppen-Regel wird von
einem anderen Teilnehmer im Experiment, „Teilnehmer R“, ausgewählt. Teilnehmer R ist
in keiner Gruppe und trifft keine Einzahlungsentscheidung.
Teilnehmer R hat den Anreiz, eine Regel auszuwählen, die einen möglichst
großen Gesamtverdienst in Ihrer Gruppe generiert. Der Gesamtverdienst bezeich-
net die Summe der Verdienste aller Mitglieder einer Gruppe. Dies tut er, weil sein eigener
Verdienst aus diesem Teil des Experiments unter anderem von diesem Gesamtverdienst
abhängt. Es liegt in seinem Eigeninteresse, eine Regel auszuwählen, sodass der Gesamtver-
dienst so groß wie möglich ist. Teilnehmer R erhält außerdem weitere Informationen, die
es ihm ermöglichen, eine gute Entscheidung zu treffen. Jedoch kennt auch Teilnehmer R
die Situation in Ihrer Gruppe nicht.
Die Regel wird allen Gruppenmitgliedern eine Einzahlungsentscheidung für jedes Signal
vorschreiben. Die Regel ist jedoch nicht verpflichtend. Das heißt, es gibt keine di-
rekten negativen Konsequenzen für ein Gruppenmitglied, wenn sich dieses Gruppenmitglied
nicht an die Regel hält.
Die nächsten Schritte und Ihr Verdienst in diesem Teil des Experiments
Zuerst wird Ihre Gruppen-Regel von einem Teilnehmer R ausgewählt und allen Mitgliedern
in Ihrer Gruppe angezeigt.
Sie treffen eine Einzahlungsentscheidung für jedes der drei möglichen Signale. Jedoch wird
nur eine dieser Entscheidungen tatsächlich ausgeführt:
Nachdem Sie die drei Einzahlungsentscheidungen getroffen haben, bestimmt der Computer
die Situation, die in Ihrer Gruppe vorherrscht, und welches Signal jedes Gruppenmitglied
erhält. Nur die Einzahlungsentscheidung für das tatsächlich erhaltene Signal wird ausge-
führt.
Am Ende des Experiments erfahren Sie die Einzahlungen der anderen Gruppenmitglieder,
welche Situation in Ihrer Gruppe gilt und Ihren resultierenden Verdienst in diesem Teil des
Experiments. Dementsprechend erfahren auch die anderen Gruppenmitglieder die Höhe
Ihrer Einzahlung.
Bitte warten Sie auf die Instruktionen des Experimentleiters, um fortzufahren. Sie werden
dann zunächst Verständnisfragen beantworten.
Wenn Sie Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte jetzt Ihre Hand.
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Exemplary Screenshots for Part II - Rulers
Rulers’ Additional Instructions
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Rulers’ Rule Choice for Group 1
Elicitation of Rulers’ Beliefs over Group Payoffs
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Screenshots for Part II - Contributors
Display of Group Rule
Decision Screen - Contribution in Part II
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Decision Screen - Beliefs in Part II
Screenshots for Part III - Rulers
Part III Instructions for Rulers (a)
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Part III Instructions for Rulers (b) - it also includes a screenshot of the actual decision
screen.
Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter 2 128
Screenshots for Part III - Contributors
Part III Instructions for Contributors (a)
Part III Instructions for Contributors (b)
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Decision Screen - Contribution in Part III
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Instructions for Part IV
In Part IV, the following unincentivized survey questions (mostly building on Falk et al.
(2018)) were asked on the computer screen.
1. Wie sehr sind Sie bereit oder nicht bereit, Risiken einzugehen? Bitte verwenden
Sie die folgende Skala von 0 bis 10. Hier bedeutet 0, dass Sie ’überhaupt nicht
bereit sind, Risiken einzugehen’. 10 bedeutet, dass Sie ’sehr bereit sind, Risiken
einzugehen’. Sie können auch jede Zahl zwischen 0 und 10 verwenden, um anzugeben,
wo sie sich auf der Skala sehen, in dem Sie (die Zahlen) 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
oder 10 verwenden. [0-10]
2. Stellen Sie sich die folgende Situation vor: Heute haben Sie unerwartet 1000 Euro
erhalten. Wie viel von dem Geld würden Sie einem guten Zweck spenden? [0-1000]
3. Wir fragen Sie nun nach Ihrer Bereitschaft sich in einer bestimmten Art zu verhalten.
Bitte verwenden Sie wieder eine Skala von 0 bis 10. 0 bedeutet ’überhaupt nicht
bereit, dies zu tun’ und 10 ’sehr bereit, dies zu tun.’ Sie können auch jede Zahl
zwischen 0 und 10 verwenden, um anzugeben, wo sie sich auf der Skala sehen, in
dem Sie (die Zahlen) 0, 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, oder 10 verwenden.
• Wie sehr wären Sie bereit, jemanden zu bestrafen, der Sie unfair behandelt,
selbst wenn dies für Sie negative Konsequenzen haben würde? [0-10]
• Wie sehr wären Sie bereit, jemanden zu bestrafen, der andere unfair behandelt,
selbst wenn dies für Sie Kosten verursachen würde? [0-10]
• Wie sehr wären Sie bereit, für einen guten Zweck zu geben, ohne etwas als
Gegenleistung zu erwarten? [0-10]
4. Wie gut beschreibt jede der nachfolgenden Aussagen Sie als Person? Bitte verwenden
Sie die Skala von 0 bis 10. 0 bedeutet ’beschreibt mich überhaupt nicht’ und 10
’beschreibt mich perfekt’. Sie können auch jede Zahl zwischen 0 und 10 verwenden,
um anzugeben, wo sie sich auf der Skala sehen, in dem Sie (die Zahlen) 0, 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, oder 10 verwenden.
• Wenn ich sehr ungerecht behandelt werde, räche ich mich bei der ersten Gele-
genheit, selbst wenn Kosten entstehen, um das zu tun. [0-10]
• Ich vermute, dass Leute nur die besten Absichten haben. [0-10]
• Ich bin gut in Mathematik. [0-10]
5. Bitte geben Sie zuletzt noch folgende Informationen an.
• An wie vielen Experimenten haben Sie bereits im MELESSA teilgenommen?
• Bitte geben Sie Ihr Alter an. [0-99]
• Bitte geben Sie Ihr Geschlecht an. [Männlich, Weiblich, Diverse, Keine Angabe]
• Bitte wählen Sie Ihren höchsten Bildungsabschluss aus. [Hauptschulabschluss,
Realschulabschluss, Abitur, B.Sc. / B.A., M.Sc. / M.A. / Diplom, Promotion,
Anderes / Keine Angabe]
• Falls Sie studieren, bitte geben Sie Ihr Studienfach an.
Preferences elicited by 1-4 were transformed into measured for risk, altruism, negative
reciprocity and trust according to the procedure by Falk et al. (2018).
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C.1 Optimal Promotion Tournaments
This appendix shortly discusses promotion rules that are a convex combination of random
and performance-based promotions. For example, a firm could probabilistically switch its
promotions practices between promoting the most successful worker or promoting based
on other, performance-independent measures such as tenure.
For simplicity, fix k. Suppose the principal additionally chooses a probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] that
determines the likelihood of a successful worker’s promotion when his co-worker’s project
was a failure. ρ = 1 is equivalent to a (fully) performance-based promotion rule, ρ = 0.5 to
random promotion. This gives a general promotion probability of pni = 0.5+(ρ−0.5)(ei−ej)
for worker i, resulting in optimal effort provision of eni =
(ρ−0.5)umi
c
. Note that for any
ρ ≤ 0.5, eni = 0. Then, the principal’s maximization problem is given by
max
ρ
EΠn =µΠB + (1 − µ)ΠA + 2en(ρ) · S + 2µ(1 − µ)
(pnB(ρ) − pnA(ρ))(ΠB − ΠA)
2
.
(C.1)
Note that the effect of ρ only comes via workers’ behavior. ρ increases average effort
provision, but also increases the spread in promotion probabilities. However, due to the
linearity of effort in ρ and the linearity of promotion probability in effort expected profits are
linear in ρ. Thus, a “binary’ solution arises. The principal either uses random promotion
or performance-based promotion. A convex combination between the two is never optimal,
stated in Proposition C.1. For the proof, see Appendix C.2.
Proposition C.1.
Either a random or a performance-based promotion is optimal, i.e. ρn = {0.5, 1}.
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C.2 Proofs
Proposition 3.1
Note that expected profits (Equation (3.5)) are linear in k. They are increasing if δ > α,
constant if δ = α and decreasing if δ < α. Proposition 3.1 follows immediately.
Lemma 3.1
First note that expected utility is concave in ei, and thus there is a unique maximum. The
first order condition is given by 0.5 ·umi −cei
!
= 0. Solving for the optimal effort level gives
ePi =
umi
2c = k ·
αmi π
D
2c .
Lemma 3.2
Under a heterogeneous workforce, as phi = 0.5 + 0.5(ei − ej), see Equation (3.8), we get
phB − phA = 0.5(ePB − ePA) − 0.5(ePA − ePB) = ePB − ePA =
umB − umA
2c
= k
(αB − αA)πD
2c
.
(C.2)
Under a homogeneous workforce, j = i, and thus phomi = p
hom
j = 0.5.
Proposition 3.2
First, I show the simplification of the profit function to Equation (3.12), before maximizing
Equation (3.12) over k.
EΠ = (1 − µ)2 (ΠA + 2eAS) + 2µ(1 − µ)
(
phAΠA + p
h
BΠB + 2eS
)
+ µ2 (ΠB + 2eBS)
=ΠA ·
(
(1 − µ)2 + 2µ(1 − µ)phA
)
+ ΠB ·
(
µ2 + 2µ(1 − µ)phB
)
+ 2S ·
(
(1 − µ)2 eA + 2µ(1 − µ)e + µ2eB
)
=ΠA · (1 − µ) + 2µ(1 − µ)
(eA − eB)
2
ΠA + ΠB · µ + 2µ(1 − µ)
(eB − eA)
2
ΠB
+ 2S ·
(
(1 − µ)2 eA + 2µ(1 − µ)(µeA + (1 − µ)eB) + µ2eB
)
=(1 − µ)ΠA + µΠB + 2S · (µeA + (1 − µ)eB) + 2µ(1 − µ)
(eB − eA)
2
(ΠB − ΠA)
=(1 − µ)ΠA + µΠB + 2eS + 2µ(1 − µ)
(phB − phA)(ΠB − ΠA)
2
. (C.3)
Plugging in (pB − pA)(ΠB − ΠA) = (
kαπD)2
2c and e =
kαπD
2c gives Equation (3.12).
The maximization problem is then
max
k
EΠP = π + k(δ − α)πD + kαπ
D
c
S − µ(1 − µ)
(
k(αB − αA)πD
)2
2c
. (C.4)
The first- and second-order derivatives are given by
FDk = (δ − α)πD +
απD
c
S − kµ(1 − µ)
(
(αB − αA)πD
)2
/c (C.5)
SDk = −µ(1 − µ)
(
(αB − αA)πD
)2
/c < 0. (C.6)
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Thus, the profit function is concave in k. Note that due to the concavity of EΠP , if
FDk is negative at zero, k = 0 is optimal. Moreover, if FDk is positive at 1, k = 1 is
optimal. Furthermore, any k̃ ∈ [0, 1] with FDk(k̃) != 0 is the unique interior solution to
the maximization problem above.
1. FDk is negative at zero if (δ − α)πD + απ
D
c
S < 0, or δ < α − S
c
α. Thus, kP = 0 if
δ < α1 = (1 − Sc )α.
2. FDk is non-negative at 1 if (δ − α)πD + απ
D
c
S − µ(1 − µ) ((αB−αA)π
D)2
c
≥ 0, or
δ ≥ (1 − S
c
)α + µ(1 − µ) (αB−αA)
2πD
c
= α2. Thus, kP = 1 if δ ≥ α2.
3. In any other case, we have an interior solution, implicitly given by FDk(k̃)
!
= 0
which gives k̃ = c(δ−α)+αS
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)
2πD
.
Lemma 3.3
The selection effect is given by −2µ(1 − µ) (k(αB−αA)π
D)2
4c . First note that it is zero at
k = 0 and negative for k > 0. Taking the first-order derivative w.r.t k gives −µ(1 − µ)k ·
((αB−αA)πD)2
c
which is negative for k > 0 and zero for k = 0.
Corollary 3.1
Suppose α2 ≤ α. Then, for any α > δ ≥ α2, kP = 1 > 0 = kR. This implies
kP = kR if δ ≤ α1
kP > kR if δ ∈ (α1, α2)
kP > kR if δ ∈ [α2, α)
kP = kR if δ ≥ α.
α2 ≤ α holds if µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD ≤ αS < S.
Corollary 3.2
The difference in expected profits, given by Equation (3.14), is
EΠP − EΠR =2eS + 2µ(1 − µ)(phB − phA)(ΠB − ΠA)
=
kαπDS
c
− µ(1 − µ)
(
k(αB − αA)πD
)2
2c
=
kπD
2c
· (2αS − µ(1 − µ)k (αB − αA)2 πD), (C.7)
which is positive whenever k < k
P
= 2αS
µ(1−µ)(αB−αA)
2πD
.
Proposition 3.3
The proof for Proposition 3.3 is completed in several steps. Generally, we need to compare
optimal expected profits under performance-based promotion against optimal expected
profits under random promotion. As in both cases, the optimal degree of delegation is
piecewise, we continue case by case. First note that α1 < min{α, α2}.
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1. Suppose δ ≤ α1 < min{α, α2}.
Then, kP = kR = 0 and thus EΠP = EΠR = π.
2. Suppose α1 ≤ δ < min{α, α2}.
Then, kP = k̃ and kR = 0 and thus the difference in expected payoffs is given by
EΠP(k̃) − EΠR(0) = k̃ · (δ − α)πD + k̃ · απ
D
c
S − µ(1 − µ)
(
k̃(αB − αA)πD
)2
2c
= k̃πD
[
δ − (1 − S
c
)α − µ(1 − µ)k̃ (αB − αA)
2
πD
2
]
= k̃πD
[
δ − (1 − S
c
)α − µ(1 − µ) c(δ − α) + αS
µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD
(αB − αA)2 πD
2
]
= k̃πD
[
δ − (1 − S
c
)α − δ − (1 −
S
c
)α
2
]
= k̃πD
[
δ − (1 − S
c
)α
2
]
=
k̃πD
2
[δ − α1] > 0 (C.8)
3. Suppose α2 < α and α2 ≤ δ < α.
Then, kP = 1 and kR = 0 and thus the difference in expected payoffs is given by
EΠP(1) − EΠR(0) = (δ − α)πD + απ
D
c
S − µ(1 − µ)
(
αB − αA)πD
)2
2c
= πD ·
[
δ −
(
α(1 − S
c
) + µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)
2
πD
2c
)]
= πD · [δ − α2] > 0. (C.9)
4. Suppose α2 > α and α < δ < α2.
Then, kP = k̃ and kR = 1 and thus
EΠP(k̃) − EΠR(1) = (δ − α)πD(k̃ − 1) + k̃ απ
D
c
S − µ(1 − µ)
(
k̃(αB − αA)πD
)2
2c
=
πD
c
·
[
c(δ − α) + αS
2
· k̃ − (δ − α)c
]
=
πD
c
·
[
c(δ − α) + αS
2
· c(δ − α) + αS
µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD
− (δ − α)c
]
, (C.10)
which is non-negative if and only if µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD ≤ [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
2c(δ−α) . Note
that for α2 > α, it must hold that µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD > αS, but the two
conditions are consistent.
5. δ ≥ max{α, α2}.
Then, kP = kR = 1 and thus
EΠP(1) − EΠR(1) = απ
D
c
S − µ(1 − µ)
(
αB − αA)πD
)2
2c
, (C.11)
which is non-negative if and only if µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD ≤ 2αS.
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The first three cases can be summarized as:
If δ ≤ α1 : (k∗, prom∗) = (0, P) = (0, R), (C.12)
If δ ∈ (α1, α] : (k∗, prom∗) = (kP , P). (C.13)
First note that αS < 2αS < [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
2c(δ−α) . Also for the two cases it holds that δ > α.
Further they can be summarized as follows.
1. µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD < αS < 2αS: α2 < α < δ and (k∗, prom∗) = (1, P).
2. αS ≤ µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD ≤ 2αS: α2 ≥ α and (k∗, prom∗) = (1, P).
3. 2αS < µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD < [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
2c(δ−α) :
α2 ≥ α and (k∗, prom∗) = (k̃1, P) where k̃1 = 1 if δ ≥ α2 and k̃ otherwise.
4. µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD > [c(δ−α)+αS]
2
2c(δ−α) : α2 ≥ α and (k∗, prom∗) = (1, R).
Proposition 3.3 is then a re-formulation of the above stated.
Proposition 3.4
The profit maximization problem is given by
max
{k,ws,wF }
EΠw = π + k(δ − α)πD + 2ew(S − wS) + µ(1 − µ)(pwB − pwA)(ΠB − ΠA) − wF ,
(C.14)
which can be re-written (analogously as in Proposition 3.2) as
max
{k,ws,wF }
EΠw =π + k(δ − α)πD + 2(wS − wF ) + kαπ
D
c
(S − wS)
− µ(1 − µ) (k
(
αB − αA)πD
)2
2c
− wF . (C.15)
Due to the workers’ limited liability, wF = 0 is optimal. Then, first- and second-order
derivatives are then given by
FDk = (δ − α)πD +
απD
c
(S − wS) − µ(1 − µ)k
(
(αB − αA)πD
)2
c
(C.16)
FDwS =
(
2(S − wS) − 2wS + kαπD
)
c
(C.17)
SDk = −µ(1 − µ)
(
(αB − αA)πD
)2
c
< 0 (C.18)
SDwS = −2 < 0. (C.19)
First, wS =
2S−kαπD
4 is optimal, independent of k due to the independent concavity of
profits in both parameters. Using this, we get
FDk = (δ − α)πD +
απD
c
(S − 2S − kαπ
D
4
) − µ(1 − µ)k
(
(αB − αA)πD
)2
c
= δ − α(1 − S
2c
) − k
(
α2πD
4c
+ µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)
2
πD
c
)
(C.20)
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To find the optimal k I proceed as in the proof for Proposition 3.2, but the full procedure
is omitted. Proposition 3.4 follows.
Corollary 3.3
We need to show that, on the extensive margin, the degree of delegation is lower with bonus
schemes, thus for k = 0, we have that αw1 > α1 and for k = 1, we have that αw2 > α2.
On the intensive margin, we need to show that k̃ > k̃w.
1. αw1 > α1 holds as α − αS2cx > α − αSc .
2. αw2 > α2 holds as αw2 = α2 +
αS
2c +
(απD)2
4c .
3. k̃ > k̃w holds as
k̃ =
c(δ − α) + αS
µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD
>
(c(δ − α) + αS2 )
µ(1 − µ) (αB − αA)2 πD + α
2πD
4
= k̃w, (C.21)
as the RHS’s numerator is smaller and denominator is larger.
Corollary 3.4
This follows directly from Proposition 3.4 as ∂w
S
∂kw
= − απD4 for δ ∈ [αw1 , αw2 ) (and otherwise
kw is constant).
Proposition 3.5
The first-order conditions with respect to ŵ and k are given by
∂ÊΠ
∂ŵ
=
S
c
− 1 != 0 (C.22)
∂ÊΠ
∂k
= (δ − α)πD + απ
D
c
S − kµ(1 − µ)
(
(αB − αA)πD
)2
c
!
= 0 (C.23)
First note that the FOCs are independent. Secondly, FOCk̂ is the same as in Proposition
3.2 and the optimal amount of delegation is given by kP . Thirdly, to analyze when a
positive amount of ŵ or k̂ is optimal, look at the behavior at ŵ = 0, and k = 0.
∂EΠ̂
∂w
|ŵ=0 =
S
c
− 1 (C.24)
∂EΠ̂
∂k
|k=0 = δπD + απD · (
S
c
− 1). (C.25)
Thus, ∂ÊΠ
∂ŵ
|ŵ=0> 0 if and only if S > c which in turn implies that ∂ÊΠ
∂k̂
|k=0> 0. Also,
∂ÊΠ
∂k̂
|k=0> 0 if and only if S > c(1 − δα ). Taken together, the three cases stated in
Proposition 3.5 arise.
Proposition C.1
First note en(ρ) = (ρ−0.5)kαπ
D
2c and p
n
B(ρ) − pnA(ρ) =
(ρ−0.5)k(αB−αA)π
D
2c . Then the first-
order derivative of expected profits is ∂EΠ
n
∂ρ
= kαπ
DS
c
− µ(1 − µ) (k(αB−αA)π
D)2
2c , which is
independent of ρ. Thus a binary solution is optimal. Since ρ < 12 would imply e < 0 we can
restrict the possible set of solutions to ρn ∈ {12 ; 1}. Thus either random or performance-
based promotions optimally emerge.
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